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Executive Summary
There is a growing bipartisan consensus that flaws in America’s death-penalty system have reached
crisis proportions. Many fear that capital trials put people on death row who don’t belong there. Others say
capital appeals take too long. This report—the first statistical study ever undertaken of modern American
capital appeals (4,578 of them in state capital cases between 1973 and 1995)—suggests that both claims are
correct. 
Capital sentences do spend a long time under judicial review. As this study documents, however,
judicial review takes so long precisely because American capital sentences are so  persistently and
systematically fraught with error that seriously undermines their reliability.
Our 23 years worth of results reveal a death penalty system collapsing under the weight of its own
mistakes. They reveal a system in which lives and public order are at stake, yet for decades has made more
mistakes than we would tolerate in far less important activities. They reveal a system that is wasteful and
broken and needs to be addressed.
Our central findings are as follows: 
! Nationally, during the 23-year study period, the overall rate of prejudicial error in the American
capital punishment system was 68%. In other words, courts found serious, reversible error
in nearly 7 of every 10 of the thousands of capital sentences that were fully reviewed during
the period.
! Capital trials produce so many mistakes  that it takes three judicial inspections to catch them
—leaving grave doubt whether we do catch them all. After state courts threw out 47% of death
sentences due to serious flaws, a later federal review found “serious error”—error undermining the
reliability of the outcome—in 40% of the remaining sentences.
! Because state courts come first and see all the cases, they do most the work of correcting erroneous
ii
death sentences. Of the 2,370 death sentences thrown out due to serious error, 90%  were
overturned by state judges—many of whom were the very judges who imposed the death sentence
in the first place; nearly all of whom were directly beholden to the electorate; and none of whom,
consequently, were disposed to overturn death sentences except for very good reason. This does not
mean that federal review is unnecessary. Precisely  because of the huge amounts of serious capital
error that state appellate judges are called upon to catch, it is not surprising that a substantial
number of the capital judgments they let through to the federal stage are still seriously
flawed.
! To lead to reversal, error must be serious, indeed. The most common errors—prompting a majority
of reversals at the state post-conviction stage—are (1) egregiously incompetent defense
lawyers who didn’t even look for—and demonstrably missed—important evidence that the
defendant was innocent or did not deserve to die; and (2) police or prosecutors who did
discover that kind of evidence but suppressed it, again keeping it from the jury. [Hundreds
of examples of these and other serious errors are collected in Appendix C and D to this Report.]
! High error rates put many individuals at risk of wrongful execution: 82% of the people whose capital
judgments were overturned by state post-conviction courts due to serious error were found to
deserve a sentence less than death when the errors were cured on retrial; 7% were found to be
innocent of the capital crime.
! High error rates persist over time. More than 50% of all cases reviewed were found seriously
flawed in 20 of the 23 study years, including 17 of the last 19. In half the years, including the most
recent one , the error rate was over 60% .
! High error rates exist across the country. Over 90% of American death-sentencing states have
iii
overall error rates of 52% or higher.  85% have error rates of  60% or higher. Three-fifths
have error rates of 70% or higher.
! Illinois (whose governor recently declared a moratorium on executions after a spate of death-row
exonerations) does not produce atypically faulty death sentences. The overall rate of serious error
found in Illinois capital sentences (66%) is very close to—and slightly lower than—the
national average (68%).
! Catching so much error takes time—a national average of 9 years from death sentence to the last
inspection and execution. By the end of the study period, that average had risen to 10.6 years. In
most cases, death row inmates wait for years for the lengthy review procedures needed to
uncover all this error. Then, their death sentences are reversed. 
! This much error, and the time needed to cure it, impose terrible costs on taxpayers, victims’
families, the judicial system, and the wrongly condemned. And it renders unattainable the
finality, retribution and deterrence that are the reasons usually given for having a death
penalty.
Erroneously trying capital defendants the first time around, operating the multi-tiered inspection
process needed to catch the mistakes, warehousing thousands under costly death row conditions in the
meantime, and having to try two out of three cases again is irrational.
This report describes the extent of the problem. A subsequent report will examine its causes and their
implications for resolving the death penalty crisis.
iv
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I. Introduction
A new debate over the death penalty is raging in the United States.1 Until now, the focus of that
debate has been the fairness of particular capital convictions and sentences. This Report addresses a
different and broader question: the reliability—indeed, the bare rationality—of the death penalty
system as a whole. It asks whether the mistakes and miscarriages of justice known to have been made
in individual capital cases2 are isolated, or common? The answer provided by our study of 5,760 capital
sentences and 4,578 appeals is that serious  error—error substantially undermining the reliability of capital
verdicts— has reached epidemic proportions  throughout our death penalty system. More than two out
of every three capital judgments reviewed by the courts during the 23-year study period were
found to be seriously flawed.
Americans seem to be of two minds about the death penalty.3 In the last several years, executions
have risen steeply, reaching a 50-year high.4 Two-thirds of the public support the penalty.5 
Two-thirds support, however, represents a steady decline from the four-fifths of the population
that supported the penalty only six years ago, leaving support for capital punishment at a 20-year low.6
When life without parole is proposed as an alternative, support for the penalty drops even more—often
below a majority.7 Grants of executive clemency reached a 20-year high in 1999.8 
In 1999 and 2000, Governors, attorneys general and legislators in Alabama, Arizona, Florida, and
Tennessee have fought high-profile campaigns to speed up and increase the number of executions.9 
In the same period, however:
! The Republican Governor of Illinois, with support from a majority of the electorate, declared a
2
moratorium on executions in the state.10
! The Nebraska Legislature did the same. Although the governor vetoed the legislation, the
Legislature appropriated money for a comprehensive study of the even-handedness of the state’s
exercise of capital punishment.11 Similar studies have since been ordered by the Chief Justice, task
forces of both houses of the state legislature and the Governor of Illinois,12 and also the Governors
of Indiana and Maryland and the Attorney General of the United States.13
! Serious campaigns to abolish the death penalty are under way in New Hampshire16 and (with the
support of the Governor and a popular former Republican Senator) in Oregon.17
! The Florida Supreme Court and Mississippi Legislature have recently acted to improve the quality
of counsel in capital cases,18 and bills aiming to do the same and to improve capital prisoners’
access to DNA evidence have been introduced in both houses of the United States Congress, with
bipartisan sponsorship.19
! Observers in the Wall Street Journal, New York Times Magazine, and Salon and on ABC This
Week see “a tectonic shift in the politics of the death penalty .”20 In April 2000 alone, George Will21
and Rev. Pat Robertson—both strong death penalty supporters—expressed doubts about the
manner in which government officials carry out the penalty in the United States, and Robertson
advocated a moratorium on Meet the Press.22
Fueling these competing initiatives are two beliefs about the death penalty. One is that death
sentences move too slowly from imposition to execution, undermining deterrence and retribution, subjecting
our criminal laws and courts to ridicule, and increasing the agony of victims.23 The other is that death
sentences are fraught with error, causing justice too often to miscarry, and subjecting innocent and other
undeserving defendants—mainly, the poor and racial minorities— to execution.24
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Some observers attribute these seemingly conflicting events and opinions to “America’s
schizophrenia—we believe in the death penalty, but shrink from it as applied.”25 These views may not
conflict, however, and Americans who hold both may not be irrational. It may be that capital sentences
spend too much time under review and that they are fraught with disturbing amounts of error. Indeed, it
may be that capital sentences spend so much time under and awaiting judicial review precisely
because they are so persistently and systematically fraught with alarming amounts of error. That
is the conclusion to which we are led by a study of all 4,578 capital sentences that were finally reviewed
by state direct appeal courts, 248 state post-conviction reversals of capital judgments, and all 599 capital
sentences that were finally reviewed by federal habeas corpus courts between 1973 and 1995.26  
II. Summary of Central Findings
In Furman v. Georgia27 in 1972, the Supreme Court reversed all existing capital statutes and
death sentences. The modern death-sentencing era began the next year with the implementation of new
capital statutes designed to satisfy Furman.  Unfortunately, no central repository of detailed information
on post-Furman death sentences exists.28 In order to collect that information, we undertook a painstaking
search, beginning in 1991 and accelerating in 1995, of all published state and federal judicial opinions in
the U.S. conducting direct and habeas review of state capital judgments, and many of the available
opinions conducting state post-conviction review of those judgments. We then (1) checked and catalogued
all the cases the opinions revealed, and (2) collected hundreds of items of information about each case from
the published decisions and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund’s quarterly death row census, and (3)
tabulated the results.29 
Nine years in the making, our central findings thus far are these:
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! Between 1973 and 1995, approximately 5,760 death sentences were imposed in the U.S.30 Only
313 (5.4%; one in 19) of those resulted in an execution during the period.31
! Of the 5,760 death sentences imposed in the study period, 4,578 (79%) were finally reviewed on
“direct appeal” by a state high court.32 Of those, 1,885 (41%; over two out of five) were thrown
out because of “serious error,” i.e., error that the reviewing court concludes has seriously
undermined the reliability of the outcome or otherwise “harmed” the defendant.33
! Nearly all of the remaining death sentences were then inspected by state post-conviction courts.34
Our data reveal that state post-conviction review is an important source of review in states such
as Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, and Tennessee.35 In
Maryland, at least 52% of capital judgments reviewed on state post-conviction during the study
period were overturned due to serious error; the same was true of at least 25% of the capital
judgments that were similarly reviewed in Indiana, and at least  20% of those reviewed in
Mississippi.36
! Of the death sentences that survived state direct and post-conviction review, 599 were finally
reviewed in a first habeas corpus petition during the 23-year study period.37 Of those 599, 237
(40%; two out of five) were overturned due to serious error.38
! The “overall success rate” of capital judgments undergoing judicial inspection, and its converse,
the “overall error-rate,” are crucial factors in assessing the effectiveness of the capital punishment
system. The “overall success rate” is the proportion of capital judgments that underwent, and
passed, the three-stage judicial inspection process during the study period.  The “overall error
rate” is the reverse: the proportion of fully reviewed capital judgments that were overturned at one
of the three stages due to serious error.39 Nationally, over the entire 1973-1995 period, the
5
overall error-rate in our capital punishment system was 68%.40 
! “Serious error” is error that substantially undermines the reliability of the guilt finding or
death sentence imposed at trial.41 Each instance of that error warrants public concern. The
most common errors  are (1) egregiously incompetent defense lawyering (accounting for
37% of the state post-conviction reversals), and (2) prosecutorial suppression of evidence that
the defendant is innocent or does not deserve the death penalty (accounting for another
16%—19%, when all forms of law enforcement misconduct are considered).42 As is true of other
violations, these two count as “serious” and warrant reversal only when there is a reasonable
probability that, but for the responsible actor’s miscues, the outcome of the trial would have
been different.43
! The seriousness of these errors is also revealed by what happens on retrial, when the errors are
cured. In our state post-conviction study, an astonishing 82% (247 out of 301) of the capital
judgments that were reversed were replaced on retrial with a sentence less than death, or
no sentence at all.44 In the latter regard, 7% (22/301) of the reversals for serious  error
resulted in a determination on retrial that the defendant was not guilty of the capital
offense.45
! The result of very high rates of serious , reversible error among capital convictions and
sentences, and very low rates of capital reconviction and resentencing, is the severe
attrition of capital judgments. As is illustrated by the flow chart below:
1. For every 100 death sentences imposed and reviewed during the study period, 41 were
turned back at the state direct appeal phase because of serious error. Of the 59 that got
through that phase to the second, state post-conviction stage, at least46 10%—meaning
6
6 more of the original 100—were turned back due to serious flaws. And, of the 53 that
got through that stage to the third, federal habeas checkpoint, 40%—an additional 21
of the original 100—were turned back because of serious error. All told, at least 68 of
the original 100 were thrown out because of serious flaws , compared to only 32 (or
less) that were found to have passed muster—after an average of 9-10 years  had passed.
2. And among the individuals whose death sentences were overturned for serious error, 82%
(56 in our example) were found on retrial not to have deserved the death penalty, including
7% (5) who were found innocent of the offense.
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! High error rates pervade American capital-sentencing jurisdictions, and are geographically
dispersed. Among the 26 death-sentencing jurisdictions with at least one case reviewed in both the
state and federal courts and as to which information about all three judicial inspection stages is
available:
1. 24 (92%) have overall error rates of 52% or higher; 
2.  22 (85%) have overall errors rates of 60% or higher;
3. 15 (61%) have overall error rates of 70% or higher.
4. Among other states, Maryland, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Indiana, Oklahoma,
Wyoming, Montana, Arizona, and California have overall error rates of 75% or higher.47
! It sometimes is suggested that Illinois, whose governor declared a moratorium on executions in
January 2000 because of a spate of death row exonerations there,48 generates “uniquely” flawed
death sentences.49 Our data dispute this suggestion: The overall rate of serious  error found to
infect Illinois capital sentences (66%) actually is slightly lower than the nationwide
average (68%).50
! High error rates have persisted for decades. A majority of all cases reviewed in 20 of the 23
study years—including in 17 of the last 19 years—were found seriously flawed. In half of the
years studied, the error rate was over 60%. Although error rates detected on state direct appeal
and federal habeas corpus dropped some in the early 1990s, they went back up in 199551. The
amount of error detected on state post-conviction has apparently risen throughout the 1990s.52
! The 68% rate of capital error found by the three stage inspection process is much higher than
the error rate of less than 15% found by those same three inspections in noncapital criminal
cases.53
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! Appointed federal judges are sometimes thought to be more likely to overturn capital sentences
than state judges, who almost always are elected in capital-sentencing states.54 In fact, state judges
are the first and most important line of defense against erroneous death sentences. They found
serious error in and reversed 90% (2,133 of the 2,370) capital sentences that were overturned
during the study period.55
! Under current state and federal law, capital prisoners have a legal right to one round of direct
appellate, state post-conviction and federal habeas corpus review.56 The high rates of error
found at each stage—including even at the last stage—and the persistence of high error
rates over time and across the nation, confirm the need for multiple judicial inspections .
Without compensating changes at the front-end of the process, the contrary policy of cutting back
on judicial inspection makes no more sense than responding to the insolvency of the Social Security
System by forbidding it to be audited.
! Finding all this error takes time. Calculating the amount of time using information in published
decisions is difficult. Only a small percentage of direct appeals decisions report the sentence date.
By the end of the habeas stage, however, a larger proportion of sentencing dates is reported in one
or another decision in the case. Accordingly, it is possible to get a good sense of timing for only the
599 cases that were finally reviewed on habeas corpus.  Among those cases:
1. It took an average of 7.6 years  after the defendant was sentenced to die to complete
federal habeas consideration in the 40% of habeas cases in which reversible error was
found.
2. In the cases in which no error was detected at the third inspection stage and an execution
occurred, the average time between sentence and execution was 9 years . Matters
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did not improve over time. In the last 7 study years  (1989-95), the average time
between sentence and execution rose to 10.6 years.57
! High rates of error, and the time consequently needed to filter out all that error, frustrate the goals
of the death penalty system. Figure 1 below compares the overall rate of error detected during the
state direct appeal, state post-conviction, and federal inspection process in the 28 states with at
least one capital case in which both inspections have been completed (the orange line), to the
percentage of death sentences imposed by each state that it has carried out by execution (the red
line).58 In general, where the rate of serious reversible error in a state’s capital judgments
reaches 55% or above (as is true for the vast majority of states), the state’s capital
punishment system is effectively stymied—with its proportion of death sentences carried
out falling below 7%.
*  Number of state post-conviction reversals in Delaware and Washington are unknown
Figure 1.  Overall Error Rate and 
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The recent rise in the number of executions59 is not inconsistent with these findings. Instead of
reflecting improvement in the quality of death sentences under review, the rising number of executions may
simply reflect how many more sentences have piled up for review. If the error-induced pile-up of cases
is the cause of rising executions, their rise provides no proof that a cure has been found for disturbingly high
error rates. To see why, consider a factory that produces 100 toasters, only 32 of which work. The
factory’s problem would not be solved if the next year it made 200 toasters (or added 100 new toasters
to 100 old ones previously backlogged at the inspection stage), thus doubling its output of working
products to 64. With, now, 136 duds to go with the 64 keepers, the increase in the latter would simply
mask the persistence of crushing error rates. 
The decisive question, therefore, is not the number of death sentences carried out each year, but
the proportion. And as Figure 2 below shows:60
! In contrast to the annual number of executions (the middle line in the chart), the proportion of
death row inmates executed each year (the bottom line) has remained remarkably
stable—and extremely low. Since post-Furman executions began in earnest in 1984, the nation
has executed an average of about 1.3% of its death row inmates each year; in no year has
it ever carried out more than 2.6 percent—or 1 in 39—of those on death row.61
! Figure 1 thus suggests that executions are increasing, not because of improvements in the
quality of capital judgments, but instead because so many more people have piled up on
death row that, even consistently tiny proportions of people being executed—because of
consistently prodigious error and reversal rates—are  prompting the number of executions
to rise.62 As in our factory example, rising output does not indicate better products, and instead
seems to mask the opposite.
Figure 2.  Persons on Death Row and 
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Figure 1, p. 11 above, illustrates another finding of interest that recurs throughout this Report: The
pattern of capital outcomes for the State of Virginia is highly anomalous, given the State’s high execution
rate (nearly double that of the next nearest state, and 5 times the national average) and its low
rate of capital reversals (nearly half that of the next nearest state, and less than one-fourth the
national average). The discrepancy between Virginia and other capital-sentencing states on this and other
measures63 presents an important question for further study: Are Virginia capital judgments in fact half as
prone to serious error as the next nearest state and 4 times better than the national average?64 Or, on the
other hand, are its courts more tolerant of serious error? We will address this issue below and in a
subsequent report.65 
III. Confirmation from a Parallel Study
Results from a parallel study by the U.S. Department of Justice suggest that our 32%, or one-in-
three, figure for valid death sentences actually overstates the chance of execution:
! Included in the Justice Department study is a report of the outcome as of the end of 1998 of the
263 death sentences imposed in 1989.66 A final disposition of only 103 of the 263 death sentences
had been reached nine years later.67 Of those 103, 78 (76%) had been overturned by a state or
federal court. Only 13 death sentences had been carried out.68 So, for every one  member of the
death row class of 1989 whose case was finally reviewed and who was executed as of 1998, six
members of the class had their cases overturned in the courts.
! Because of the intensive review needed to catch so much error, 160 (61%) of the 263 death
sentences imposed in 1989 were still under scrutiny nine years later.69  
! The approximately 3,600 people on death row today have been waiting an average of 7.4 years
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for a final declaration that their capital verdict is error-free—or, far more probably, that it has to
be scrapped because of serious error.70
! Of the approximately 6,700 people sentenced to die between 1973 and 1999, only 598—less
than one in eleven—were executed.71 About four times as many had their capital judgments
overturned or gained clemency.72 
IV. Implications of Central Findings
To help appreciate these findings, consider a scenario that might unfold immediately after any death
sentence is imposed in the U.S. Suppose the defendant, or a relative of the victim, asks a lawyer or the
judge, “What now?” 
Based on almost a quarter century of experience in thousands of cases in 28 death-sentencing
states in the U.S. between 1973 and 1995, a responsible answer would be: “The capital conviction or
sentence will probably be overturned due to serious error. It’ll take nine or ten years to find
out, given how many other capital cases being reviewed for likely error are lined up ahead of this
one. If the judgment is overturned, a lesser conviction or sentence will probably be imposed.”73 
As anyone hearing this answer would probably conclude as a matter of sheer common sense, all
this error, and all the time needed to expose it, are extremely burdensome and costly:
! Capital trials and sentences cost more than noncapital ones.74  Each time they have to be done
over—as happens 68% of the time—that difference grows exponentially. 
! The error-detection system all this capital error requires is itself a huge expense—apparently
millions of dollars per case.75
! Many of the resources currently consumed by the capital system are not helping the public, or
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victims,76 obtain the valid death sentences for egregious offenses that a majority support.  Given
that nearly 7 in 10 capital judgments have proven to be seriously flawed, and given that 4 out of
5 capital cases in which serious error is found turn out on retrial to be more appropriately handled
as non-capital cases (and in a sizeable number of instances, as non-murder or even non-criminal
cases),77 it is hard to escape the conclusion that large amounts of resources are being wasted on
cases that should never have been capital in the first place. 
! Public faith in the courts and the criminal justice system is another casualty of high capital error
rates.78 When most capital-sentencing jurisdictions carry out fewer than 6% of the death sentences
they impose,79 and when the nation as a whole never executes more than 2.6% of its death
population in a year,80 the retributive and deterrent credibility of  the death penalty is low.
! When condemned inmates turn out to be innocent81—an error that is different in its consequences,
but is not evidently different in its causes, from the other serious error discussed here82—there is
no accounting for the cost: to the wrongly convicted;83 to the family of the victim, whose search for
justice and closure has been in vain; to later victims whose lives are threatened—and even
taken—because the real killers remain at large;84 to the public’s confidence in law and legal
institutions; and to the wrongly executed, should justice  miscarry at trial, and should reviewing
judges, harried by the amount of error they are asked to catch, miss one.85
If what were at issue here was the fabrication of toasters  (to return to our prior example),
or the processing of social security claims, or the pre-takeoff inspection of commercial
aircraft—or the conduct of any other private- or public-sector activity—neither the consuming
and the taxpaying public, nor managers and investors, would for a moment tolerate the error-
rates and attendant costs that dozens of states and the nation as a whole have tolerated in their
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capital punishment system for decades. Any system with this much error and expense would be
halted immediately, examined, and either reformed or scrapped. 
The question this Report poses to taxpayers, public managers and policymakers, is
whether that same response is warranted here, when what is at issue is not the content and
quality of tomorrow’s breakfast, but whether society has a swift and sure response to murder, and
whether thousands of men and women condemned for that crime in fact deserve to die.
* * * * *
The remainder of this Report more fully describes our findings. Part V describes the review process
for capital sentences. Part VI describes our study methodology. Parts VII, VIII and IX more thoroughly
document and display our findings about the frequency with which reversible error is found in capital
judgments in the United States between 1973 and 1995, and the time taken to find those errors. Part VII
examines relevant factors at the national level. Part VIII does so using comparative analyses of the 28
capital-sentencing states in which at least one case had advanced through the entire post-sentence
inspection process. And Part IX does the same thing, comparing the 8 federal judicial circuits and
corresponding regions into which they are divided. After presenting a variety of information, Parts VII, VIII
and IX preliminarily address the potential causes of so much error in capital sentencing. Finally, Part X
briefly describes the more sophisticated analyses we will undertake in the next phase of our study (to be
published in the Fall) to set the stage for proposed reforms.
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V. The Capital Review Process
This phase of our study asks what state and federal courts discovered when they inspected capital
convictions and sentences imposed during the 23-year study period. In a later phase, we will consider some
candidate causes of the evidently irrational patterns of error that those courts have detected. In order to
frame these questions, we first describe the capital-inspection process whose results we are studying. 
A. First Inspection: State Direct Appeal
In Furman v. Georgia and later cases, the Supreme Court suggested that state high courts were
required to review all death sentences on direct review.86 As a consequence, the law of nearly all states
requires that capital judgments be automatically appealed.87 And as a matter of fact, virtually all capital
judgments are appealed.88 In all but two of our study states, that appeal ran directly from the trial court to
the highest court in the state with criminal jurisdiction, which is typically the state supreme court or, as in
Oklahoma and Texas, a “court of criminal appeals.”89 In Alabama and Ohio, there were two rounds of
appeals in the state direct review process—first to an intermediate court of criminal appeals, and then to
the state supreme court.90 Reversal of a capital conviction or sentence on direct appeal requires a showing
of “serious error” as defined earlier.91
In nearly all cases in which the direct appeal decision runs entirely against the defendant, he or she
seeks certiorari in the United States Supreme Court.92 Although in the vast majority of cases, the Supreme
Court denies review, it occasionally undertakes merits review and either affirms or reverses.93 Certiorari
proceedings are typically understood to be a part of the direct review, or pre-finality, stage of a criminal
case,94 and they are treated that way here. If the Supreme Court reversed a capital conviction or sentence
on direct review of the state high court’s decision, we counted that decision as a direct-appeal finding of
serious (indeed, in all such cases, federal constitutional95) error. 
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B. Second Inspection: State Post-Conviction
In order to seek federal habeas review of a constitutional claim, the prisoner must have exhausted
at least one full round of state judicial remedies for the claim.96 There are certain kinds of claims that cannot
easily be exhausted at trial and on direct appeal because the defendant cannot discover or adequately
litigate the facts or the legal principles supporting the claims at trial or on direct appeal.97 This sometimes
occurs (1) because a police officer, prosecutor or other state actor has suppressed the relevant facts (which
may itself have violated the Constitution, as when the suppressed facts show the defendant is innocent,98
or may keep the defendant from establishing the violation of some other principle, as when police
suppressed evidence that they coerced the defendant into confessing, or when the prosecutor hid his efforts
to keep African-Americans off of criminal juries99); (2) because the agent of the violation was the
defendant’s own trial or direct appeal attorney (as in the case of ineffective assistance of counsel), thus
preventing the defendant from recognizing or fairly litigating the claim;100 (3) because the evidence
establishing the claim was not reasonably available to the defense at the time of trial or appeal for some
other reason101 (as when counsel later discovers that the trial judge was corrupt102 or biased,103 that a juror
lied during the jury selection process,104 or that the bailiff secretly lobbied the jury to convict or
condemn105); or (4) because the legal rule establishing the claim did not exist at the time of trial or appeal
and the rule applies “retroactively” to the prisoner’s case.106 
Because the Supreme Court has suggested that states are constitutionally required to provide
adequate state post-conviction remedies for federal constitutional claims that cannot properly be pursued
at trial and on direct appeal,107 and because federal habeas law rewards states when they do provide such
remedies,108 all states now do so.109 State capital prisoners seeking to preserve their access to federal
habeas review accordingly are obliged to exhaust those remedies, and the professional obligation of capital
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attorneys to subject their clients’ convictions and sentences to searching scrutiny compels them to pursue
state post-conviction review in nearly all capital cases.110 
State post-conviction review takes a variety of forms under a variety of names (e.g., habeas
corpus, coram nobis, extraordinary motion for new trial, and state post-conviction procedures acts).
Traditionally, such proceedings have taken place after the completion of state direct appeal and have
entailed the filing of a petition for review with the judge who presided over the original trial, and the appeal
of any adverse rulings up to an intermediate state appellate court and then to the state high court.111 More
recently, an increasing number of states (1) have adopted “unitary appeal” procedures that require direct
appeal and state post-conviction proceedings to take place nearly simultaneously,112 and/or (2)  have
required prisoners to commence state post-conviction proceedings in a state intermediate or high court that
either can grant or deny state post-conviction relief once and for all, or can remand the case to a trial court
to take evidence. In most states, state post-conviction review is limited to claims that were not and could
not have been raised on direct appeal and that arise under state or federal constitutional law.113
Most capital prisoners also seek U.S. Supreme Court review on certiorari of adverse state post-
conviction proceedings, which the Supreme Court (very) occasionally grants.114 In the event that the Court
does so, and grants relief, our classification scheme counts that decision as part of the state post-conviction
inspection phase.115
C. Third Inspection: Federal Habeas Corpus
Because federal habeas corpus practice is controlled by federal statute,116 it is far more uniform
across states than are direct appeal and state post-conviction proceedings. Habeas proceedings begin with
the filing of a petition in a United States District Court in the state in which the defendant was convicted and
is incarcerated.117 If relief is denied, and if (but only if) the prisoner can show that his petition presents a
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substantial constitutional claim, he may appeal the denial to a federal circuit court,118 and if the district court
opinion is affirmed and a stay of execution is available, he may petition the Supreme Court for certiorari.119
Although habeas proceedings at the district court level are a matter of statutory right, stays of execution are
not, thus limiting capital habeas proceedings to cases in which the prisoner can secure a federal stay of
execution based on a substantial constitutional claim.120 Habeas relief is limited to a category of “serious
error” that is even narrower than the analogous of category of “serious” direct-appeal error.121
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VI. The Study
This study began in 1991 when the Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee asked the lead author
of this Report to calculate the frequency of relief in capital habeas corpus cases.122 Simply identifying the
relevant cases turned out to be a monumental task, because there is no single repository of capital habeas
corpus decisions either nationally or even (especially at the time) in most death-sentencing states, and key-
word searches of reported cases are substantially under-inclusive (because some decisions that are capital
are not identified as such) and over-inclusive (because many cases in which a death sentence was not
imposed either began as capital cases or refer to capital cases). Working with volunteer law student
assistants, therefore, the senior author undertook a painstaking search for capital habeas cases relying on
(1) the NAACP Legal Defense Fund’s (LDF’s) quarterly death row census,123 (2) computerized and book
research, and (3) a series of conversations with staff members of state death penalty resource centers and
other local death penalty lawyers who were familiar with some of the cases and death row inmates in their
states. 
In late 1995, the study was expanded from a simple count of cases and their outcomes to a search
for information that might help explain why relief is granted in so many capital habeas cases. In that year,
a team with social scientific expertise was assembled, and began collecting approximately 1300 items of
information about each case—relating to defendants, victims, offenses, evidence, lawyers, judges, timing,
claims, defenses, court procedures, and the like. We soon determined that the only reasonably accessible
source of this kind of information was published judicial decisions of federal habeas courts themselves and
of state courts when they denied relief at earlier inspection stages.124 
During 1996, 1997 and 1998, the senior authors developed, tested and revised a study instrument,
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developed and fine-tuned a set of research protocols, assembled and trained a series of law student
researchers to collect the information called for by the study information, periodically checked and
rechecked their completed forms, and in this way collected data on 599 initial federal habeas corpus cases
and 173 second or successive federal habeas corpus cases. The research protocol called for researchers
first to identify the “final federal habeas corpus decision” (the decision of the last and highest federal court
to finally resolve the merits of the habeas application), then to identify all other available state and federal
decisions addressing the same capital judgment (i.e., either the capital conviction, sentence or both), and
then to extract from each of those decisions a variety of information that was then coded onto the research
instrument. Beginning in 1997 and continuing through 1999, the information on the study instrument in each
case was entered into a data base and again checked and rechecked. 
We collected the results of all federal habeas corpus decisions that became “final” between January
1, 1973 and October 2, 1995.125 By “final,” we mean that (1) the highest federal court to which the case
has been timely brought either by the filing of a petition or an appeal has finally ruled on the validity of the
capital judgment (meaning both the conviction and death sentence), (2) the time for reconsideration or
rehearing by that court has passed, and (3) the time for U.S. Supreme Court review has passed without
that Court’s choosing to review the decision or, if it did choose to review it, with its own final merits
decision having been rendered. Here again, a finding of “serious error” is made only if the capital conviction,
the capital sentence, or both were overturned due to prejudicial, reversible error.126
Early on, it appeared that a major factor in determining outcomes in federal habeas cases was the
state that imposed the capital judgment under review. For example, although judges of the same (Eleventh)
federal circuit court reached nearly all of the final federal habeas decisions in cases from Florida, Alabama
and Georgia, their reversal rates in cases emanating from each of those three states were quite different
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(respectively, 37%, 45%, and 65%), suggesting that there was something about each particular state’s
death sentences that made them more or less error-prone.127 To study this possibility, we collected
information (in 1997 through 1999) about how states differ in regard to their demography, law, politics,
judicial organization and funding, death-sentencing history and the like. 
An early hypothesis in this regard was that the rate of error found by federal habeas proceedings
might be related to the rate of error found in state direct appeals—either because lax state inspections might
impose extra work on later federal ones (suggesting an inverse relationship between error rates found at
the two stages), or because excessive amounts of error might overwhelm judges at the first checkpoint,
permitting considerable remaining error to slip through and be caught (if at all) by judges at a later
checkpoint (suggesting a more direct relationship between error rates found at the two stages).128 To test
this hypothesis, we collected information about each state’s capital direct appeal outcomes—prompting
our second major study, covering the approximately 4,600 state direct appeal decisions during the 1973-
1995 study period. Working back and forth from the LDF death row census and computerized legal
research data bases, we compiled a list of all capital direct appeal decisions in the study period, then
collected a small set of information about each case from published opinions that our search identified. 
We collected the results of all direct appeal decisions that became “final” between January 1, 1973
and December 31, 1995. By “final,” we mean that (1) the highest state court with jurisdiction over the
appeal had finally ruled on the validity of the judgment (meaning both the conviction and death sentence),
(2) the time for reconsideration by that court had passed, and (3) the U.S. Supreme Court did not review
the decision or, if it did review it, had rendered a final merits decision by the end of 1995.129  A finding of
“serious error” was made if reversible error was found and the capital conviction, sentence or both were
overturned.130
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Substantially later in the process, we began collecting data on state post-conviction outcomes.
Those data are especially hard to find. Unlike state direct appeal decisions and appellate-level federal
habeas decisions, which almost always are published in capital cases, state post-conviction decisions often
are not published, even in capital cases. This is particularly so because state post-conviction review often
begins—and when it leads to reversal, ends—in trial courts that almost never publish their decisions.131 Nor
is there any central repository of information about when and where capital state post-conviction petitions
are pending, making it difficult to ascertain (1) the number of state post-conviction cases that actually were
decided at that stage during the study period (as opposed to the number that were available for resolution
at that stage, because they had “cleared” state direct appeal) and, thus, (2) the proportion of actually
decided cases in which “serious error” was found.
For these reasons, as is more fully described in the introduction to Appendix C, we limited our
collection of state post-conviction data to a list of known state post-conviction reversals of capital
judgments in the study states in which capital cases had progressed significantly beyond the direct appeal
stage by the end of 1995. This list, set out in full in Appendix C, enables us to derive an interesting, though
incomplete, picture of the rates of error detected by state post-conviction courts in reviewing death
sentences. To do so, we make three obviously inaccurate, but reliably conservative, assumptions: First
we assume that we have a complete list of capital state post-conviction reversals due to serious error that
occurred during the study period. In fact, our list is incomplete, although it probably contains most such
reversals. Second, we assume that every capital case that was available for state post-conviction review
because it had “cleared” direct appeal during the 1973-1995 study period was finally decided on state
post-conviction during that period. In fact, many of the “available” cases were not finally decided and were
still being litigated on state post-conviction as of the end of 1995.  Taken together, these two assumptions
27
lead to a third assumption —that every capital judgment that was available for state post-conviction review
and is not known to have been reversed due to serious error during the study period was affirmed.
Calculating error rates in this manner systematically underestimates those rates (and overstates success
rates) by (1) underestimating the numerator (the number of serious errors found, which we have
undercounted) and (2) overstating the denominator (the number of cases finally reviewed for serious
error, for which we have substituted the obviously larger number of cases available for review).132
Accordingly, our estimates of the rate of serious error found on state post-conviction review are
understated and conservative.
Analysis of the data collected in our habeas corpus and  direct appeal studies began in earnest in
mid-1999 and continues at this writing, along with analyses of our newer, state post-conviction data. This
Report presents the findings of our initial analyses. These focus on the basic operation and outcomes of the
post-trial system for reviewing capital judgments: How many and what proportion of death sentences were
reviewed at each of the three inspection stages during the study period—nationally, in each capital-
sentencing state, and in each federal judicial circuit and corresponding geographic region? How much error
was found, and by whom? How long did the process take? How do states compare in their sentencing and
execution rates and along other dimensions that might help explain differences in the frequency of capital-
sentencing error?
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VII. The National Capital Punishment Report Card 
In this Part, we present a “national composite capital-sentencing report card.” The report card
describes a variety of information, including the error rates found to characterize, and the time needed to
review, death sentences in capital states during the study period. This Part also explains the two-page
report card format that we use to report state, federal judicial circuit and regional as well as national data.
(In Part VIII below, we present state-by-state comparisons of the information on state report cards for the
28 death-sentencing states in which at least one final direct appeal and federal habeas decision occurred
during the 1993-1995 period.133 In Part IX below, we present similar comparisons of information on the
federal judicial circuit court/regional report cards.134)
The national capital-sentencing report card is set out below. It combines information about the rates
of error detected on direct appeal of capital judgments imposed in all 34 death-sentencing states in which
at least one state capital direct appeal was completed during the 1973-1995 study period. Our 34-state
cohort is: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington and Wyoming. Because capital cases in six states
(Colorado, Connecticut, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio and Oregon) had not advanced far, or at all, into
the state post-conviction stage of review, and no case from those states had completed federal habeas
review, the bulk of the composite data—those covering the state post-conviction and federal habeas stages
and the “overall rates”—omit these states and focus on what we call our 28-state cohort.
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National Composite Capital Punishment Report Card, 1973-1995
History (34 States)
First Death Sentence 1973
First Direct Appeal 1973
First Consensual Execution 1977
First Non-Consensual Execution 1979
Sentences and Executions (34 States)      
Total Number of Death Sentences 5,760
Total Number of Executions 313
Percentage of Death Sentences Carried Out 5%
Error Rates
    State Direct Appeal (34 States) 
Number Reviewed on Direct Appeal 4,578
Number Reversed on Direct Appeal 1,885
Percentage Reversed on Direct Appeal 41%
Number Awaiting Direct Appeal 1,182
Percentage Awaiting Direct Appeal 21%
Number Forward to State Post-Conviction 2,693
    State Direct Appeal (28 States)
Number Reviewed on Direct Appeal 4,364
Number Reversed on Direct Appeal 1,782
Percentage Reversed on Direct Appeal 41%
Number Forward to State Post-Conviction 2,582
    State Post-Conviction (28 States)
Number Reviewed on Post-Conviction                                   Unknown
Number Reversed on Post-Conviction $248
Percentage Reversed on Post-Conviction $10%
Number Forward to Federal Habeas Corpus Unknown
State Direct Appeal and State Post-Conviction Combined (28 States)
Overall Rate of Error Found by State Courts $47%
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Error Rates (Continued)
    Federal Habeas Corpus (28 States)
Number Reviewed on Habeas 599
Number Reversed on Habeas 237
Percentage Reversed on Habeas 40%
    Overall Rates Including [and Excluding] State Post-Conviction (28 States)
Overall Error Rate 68% [64%]
Overall Success Rate 32% [36%]
Time (28 States)
Time From First Death Sentence to First Non-Consensual
Execution
 6
Average Time from Sentence to Execution 9
Average Time from Sentence to Final Federal Relief 7.6
Sentencing and Execution Rates (34 States )                         
                                                                                                               Death States        Whole Nation
Death Sentences per 1000 homicides 14.90 12
Death Sentences per 100,000 pop. 3.9 2.46
NC Executions per 1000 homicides .68 .54
Demographic Information (34 States)
                 Death States        Whole Nation
Average Population 181,374,347 237,905,964
Average Homicides 16,860 21,197
Average Homicides Rate per 100,000  Population 9.3 9
Percentage Population Non-White 19% 20%
Sources : DRCen; Death Row U.S.A., Winter 2000; DADB; HCDB; Appendix C; UCRDB; USCen
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The National Composite Capital Punishment Report Card contains six categories of information
for either the 34 capital-sentencing states in which at least one capital judgment had been finally reviewed
on state direct appeal during the study period, or for the 28 of those states in which at least one capital
judgment was finally reviewed on federal habeas during the study period. Because the same six categories
appear on all of the succeeding report cards—along with a seventh category in the state report cards—this
section describes the types of information that all seven categories contain, then discusses the actual national
composite results for each category.
A. Capital-Sentencing History
In the “History” category of each report card is information about the years in which four important
capital-sentencing events occurred in the jurisdiction or set of jurisdictions in question following the
Supreme Court’s invalidation of all preexisting capital statutes and sentences in Furman v. Georgia.135
The requisite information for the nation as whole (in this case comprised of the 34-state cohort of capital-
sentencing jurisdictions) as revealed by the top category in the National Report Card is as follows: 
!  The first post-Furman death sentences were meted out in 1973.136 
! The first post-Furman state direct appeal decision finally determining the legality of a post-
Furman death sentence also occurred in 1973.137 
! The first post-Furman execution of any sort (Gary Gilmore’s consented-to execution by the
State of Utah) was in 1977.138 
! The first “non-consensual” execution after Furman—i.e., the first time an American
jurisdiction carried out a post-Furman capital judgment that had passed inspection by all available
levels of judicial review—was in 1979, when Florida executed John Spenkelink.139 
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We focus on non-consensual, as well as all, executions because we are interested in error rates,
and only non-consensual executions reveal the inspection system’s conclusion that the death
sentence is free of “serious error” as defined above.140
B. Sentences and Executions  
This section reports the number of death sentences imposed, the number of executions carried out,
and executions as a proportion of death sentences in each jurisdiction or group of jurisdictions. Nationally,
during the years 1973-1995, 34 American jurisdictions imposed 5,760 death sentences141 and carried
out 313 executions .142 In other words, only 5% of the death sentences imposed were carried out.
C. Error and Success Rates 
The third section of the report cards identifies (1)  the rates of serious, reversible error discovered
at each level of judicial inspection,143 (2) the overall error rate, meaning the proportion of capital judgments
undergoing judicial inspection that were thrown out before reaching the end of the inspection process,144
and, conversely, (3) the overall success rate, meaning the proportion of capital judgments found after full
review to be free of serious error. In the “overall rates” category, we give the error and success rates
considering all three judicial inspections and also, in brackets, the rates considering only the direct appeal
and federal habeas inspections. Nationally, our data reveal that:
! Direct appeal. State courts in 34 capital-sentencing jurisdictions finally reviewed 4,578 death
sentences on direct appeal during 1973-1995.145 Because 5,760 death sentences were imposed
during that period, this figure reveals that 1,182—or 21%—of the death sentences were
awaiting direct appellate review at the end of the study period.146 Of the 4,578 
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capital judgments finally reviewed on direct appeal, 1,885—or 41%—were overturned based
on serious error.147 This means that 2,693 death sentences148 from 34 jurisdictions passed the
first judicial inspection and were available to be reviewed at the second, state post-conviction stage
of review.149 Many of our subsequent analyses focus on the 28 capital-sentencing jurisdictions in
which a full complement of review procedures took place in at least one capital case between 1973
and 1995. On the national report card, therefore, we calculate the direct appeal error rates a
second time for just the 28 states. That analysis reveals the same 41% rate of serious  error
detected at that stage (1,782 capital judgments overturned due to serious error, out of 4,364
reviewed at that stage), and shows that 2,582 capital judgments from the 28-state cohort passed
the first judicial checkpoint and were available for state post-conviction review.150
! State post-conviction. As is discussed above and in Appendix C, our state post-conviction data
include only known state post-conviction reversals during the 23-year study period; it does not
contain information about the number of state post-conviction proceedings that actually were
completed during that period.151 For that reason, each report card lists as “Unknown” both the
“Number Reviewed on Post-Conviction” (i.e., the number of capital judgments that went forward
to state post-conviction review and were finally reviewed there), and also the “Number Forward
[from State Post-Conviction] to Federal Habeas Corpus.” What we are able to calculate is the
known reversals152 as a proportion of the number of capital judgments moving forward from state
direct appeal to state post-conviction in our 28-state cohort of capital-sentencing jurisdictions.153
Although we report this calculation as the rate of error discovered on state post-conviction—i.e.,
as the “Percentage 
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Reversed on [State] Post-Conviction”—we in fact underestimate that error rate by a substantial
amount, because we take the known reversals as a percentage of the cases available for review,
rather than as a proportion of the cases actually reviewed, during the study period.154 That
underestimation accounts for our use of the “$” symbol in this row of each report card and our use
of the phrase “at least” in discussing that row. Nationally, for the relevant 28 study states, there
were at least 248 state post-conviction reversals due to serious error during the study period, so
that serious  error was found in more than— probably significantly more than—10% of the
cases reviewed at that stage.155 Although state post-conviction proceedings are not generally
thought to be major sources of post-sentencing reversals of seriously flawed capital judgments, in
fact there were more state post-conviction findings of reversible error infecting American
capital judgments (248) than there were analogous federal habeas findings (237).
! State direct appeal and state post-conviction combined. This item in the national report card
indicates the combined rates of error found at the two state court checkpoints. Nationally, state
courts as a whole found 47%—nearly one out of every two—capital judgments they reviewed
to be infected with serious error.156
! Federal habeas corpus .  Between 1973 and 1995,157 federal habeas courts with jurisdiction over
prisoners in capital-sentencing states around the nation finally reviewed158 599 death sentences.
They overturned 237—or 40%—of those sentences based on serious error.159 
! Overall rates: This portion of the report card gives the overall error (and success) rates, meaning
the proportion of capital judgments from the relevant jurisdiction or set of jurisdictions that
underwent full judicial inspection and were found to have (and to be free 
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of) serious error.160 Overall, between 1973 and 1995, less than one-third—32%—of all death
sentences passing through the  nation’s state and federal judicial inspection system were
cleared of serious error. Conversely, over two-thirds—68%—were thrown out because
of serious error.161
The information presented thus far make this a useful place to discuss error rates over time .
Earlier, in discussing Figure 2, pp. 12-13 above, we touched on patterns of capital error and success rates
over time. There, we noted that, although executions have been on the rise since 1988, the principal cause
of that rise seems to be the steady increase in the number of individuals piled up on death row who are
potentially available to be executed, and not any sharp increase in the success rate of capital judgments.
Figures 3 and 4 below look at patterns over a longer period of time, beginning in 1973.
Figure 3 below depicts the rates of error detected on state direct appeal, federal habeas corpus,
and in those two stages combined, by year, from 1973 to 1995.162 (The first two years for which we plot
the rate of error found on federal habeas review are 1978 and 1980, because no capital habeas
proceedings were completed before 1978 or during 1979.) Figure 3 reveals the following about error rates
detected over time during the first (state direct appeal) and third (federal habeas) inspection stages:
! From the 1970s through 1982, when relatively few cases were under review, rates of error
detected on state direct appeal and federal habeas review were extremely volatile and high.
! As of 1983, as larger numbers of capital judgments came under review at both stages, error rates
stabilized, and they remained relatively stable throughout the remainder of the period. Thus, during
the final 13 study years (1983-1995):
1. Capital-sentencing error rates found on state direct appeal across the nation
consistently remained within the 30% to 45% range.
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2. With the exception of three years (two with a lower rate; one with a higher rate), capital
error rates found on federal habeas review stayed within that same 15-point range.
3. With one exception, the combined error rates detected at those two stages stayed
consistently within the 54% to 69% range. 
4. Broadly speaking: while the error rate found on federal habeas modestly dipped during the
1987-1991 period, the error rate found on state direct appeal (affecting a much larger pool
of cases) modestly rose during that same period. Both rates dipped some during the years
1992 through 1994, then rose sharply in 1995.
Figure 3 is incomplete because it does not contain rates of serious error found, by year, at the state
post-conviction stage, nor thus any overall reversal rate, by year, for the three inspection stages as a
whole. Rates of serious error detected during state post-conviction review cannot be calculated because
only data on the number of reversals—but not on the total number of cases decided, and thus the reversal
rate—are available by year for the state post-conviction stage.163 The next chart, however—Figure
4—provides some information about state post-conviction error rates over time, revealing that in the same
years when a modest downward trend in federal habeas reversal rates was occurring (1987-1994), a
marked increase in state post-conviction reversals occurred.164 If we assume (though we can’t know
for certain) that the number of capital state post-conviction cases finally decided during the 1985-1994
period was fairly steady, then an increase in the error rate detected at the state post-conviction stage would
have occurred and offset the decrease in the federal habeas reversal rate. Making that assumption leads
to an estimate of the overall rate of error detected by all three judicial inspections  during the 1988-
1994 period of roughly 60-65%.
Figure 3: Error Rates Detected on State Direct Appeal, Federal 
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For 1996 through April, 2000, there are 92 known reversals, an average of 21 per 12 month period.










































































D. Length of Time of Review
This section of each report card provides information for the relevant jurisdiction or set of
jurisdictions on (1) the number of years that elapsed between the state’s first death sentence and its first
non-consensual execution (not necessarily in the same case); (2) the average number of years it took death
sentences to proceed through the three-stage inspection process to execution in the small proportion of
cases in which an execution took place; and (3) the average time from death sentence to federal habeas
reversal in the 10% of cases in which reversal occurred at the third (federal habeas) checkpoint, as
opposed to taking place at one of the earlier (state court) checkpoints. The national report card reveals the
following about the length of time required to identify the high amounts of error described above:
! Nationally, 6 years passed between the imposition of the first death sentence and the first non-
consensual execution.165 
! We don’t know how much time was required for judicial inspection of death sentences at the direct
appeal and state post-conviction stages. One of the report-card categories discussed above—the
percentage of death sentences awaiting direct appellate review as of the end of 1995—does,
however, suggest the extent to which the direct appeal stage is a bottleneck in the review process.
Nationally, 21% of all death sentences imposed between 1973 and 1995 were still awaiting
a state direct appeal decision as of 1995.166 That 21% (1,182 death sentences) represents
close to five years’ worth of death sentences backed up at the direct appeal stage as of the
end of 1995, at the average annual rate of 250 death sentences imposed per year.167 This suggests
that, as of 1995, an average of about 5 years was elapsing between imposition of a death sentence
and the end of state direct appeal—and thus that about half of the time required for the entire
review process was being consumed by the first, state direct appeal inspection.
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! In the minority of cases in which death sentences passed the three-stage inspection and
were carried out by execution, the average time, nationally, from sentence to execution
was 9 years . In the last 9 study years (1987-1995), by which point the pile-up on death row was
substantial (see Figure 2, p.12 above), the average time from sentence to execution had  increased
to 10.6 years .168
! In cases in which serious error was detected during the third, federal habeas review, the
average time from sentence to federal reversal was 7.6 years .169
E. Capital-Sentencing and Execution Rates 
The report cards next answer two questions. (1) How often does the relevant jurisdiction or set
of jurisdictions impose death sentences? To answer this question, we consider death sentences as a
proportion of three populations: per 1,000 homicides, per 100,000 population, and (in the state report
cards, but not the national one) per 1,000 incarcerated inmates in the jurisdiction. (2) How often (relative
to homicides, population and prison population) does the jurisdiction execute offenders? Because we are
interested in success rates, we consider only “non-consensual” executions, i.e., ones based on capital
judgments that have been fully reviewed and found to be free of serious error.170 Because not all states have
the death penalty, our national report card computes these figures for the nation as a whole and for our 34-
state cohort.
These numbers are most useful for the comparative purposes to which we put them below.171
Providing a national baseline for those comparisons, the capital-sentencing and execution rates for the
nation as a whole, and for the 34 death-sentencing states that decided at least one direct appeal during the
study period, are as follows:
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! For the 34 capital-sentencing states, an average of 14.9 death sentences were imposed for every
1,000 homicides during the study period. For the same states, an average of 3.9 death sentences
were imposed for every 100,000 people during the same period.172
! Because so few death sentences actually result in executions, the execution rates determined by
each of these population categories are much lower. During the study period, death-sentencing
states carried out an average of: .68 executions for every 1,000 homicides; and .15 executions for
per 100,000 persons.173 
! Comparing the last two points reveals that during the study period, death states capitally
sentenced 22 times more defendants per 1,000 homicides than they executed. And they
sentenced 26 times more defendants per 100,000 population, than they executed.
! For the whole nation during the study period, an average of: (1) 12 death sentences were imposed
for every 1,000 homicides; (2) 2.46 death sentences were imposed for every 100,000 people; and
(3) .54 non-consensual executions were carried out for every 1,000 homicides.174
F. Demographic Factors 
The demographic information reported in the sixth report card category reveals the population
pools against which each jurisdiction’s number of death sentences and executions are compared to
determine sentencing and execution rates. They also provide bases for distinguishing among states and thus,
potentially, for explaining variations among states in terms of the capital error rates detected on direct
appeal and habeas corpus inspection. At the national level we again report data for the 34 death states as
well as for the nation at large.
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“Average population” is the relevant jurisdiction’s yearly average population from 1973-1995. 
For the whole nation, the average population during the study period was 237,905,964. For the 34 death
states, it was 181,374,347.175
“Average homicides” are the total number of homicides from 1973-1995 divided by 23, the
number of years in our study .  For the whole nation, the average number of homicides each year during
the study period was 21,197. For the 34 death penalty states, it was 16,860.176 Comparing this and the
last category reveals that death-sentencing states account for about 76% of the nation’s population and
about 80% of its homicides.
Homicides per population establishes a jurisdiction’s homicide rate. By “average homicides/average
population,” we mean the number of homicides per year for every 100,000 persons in the jurisdiction,
averaged over the population during the study period. For the whole nation, average homicides/average
population during the study period was 9. For the 34 death sentencing states, it was 9.3.177 This again
reveals that homicide rates are slightly higher in death-sentencing than in nondeath-sentencing states.
“Average prison admissions” means the average number of persons admitted each year to the
state’s prisons during the study period.178
“Average prison population” means the jurisdiction’s average population over study period.179
We also report here the percentage of each jurisdiction’s population during the study period that
was nonwhite, which for the nation as a whole was 20% and for the 28 study states was 19%.180
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G. Court Factors: The Context of State Court Decision Making 
In the state (but not the national and circuit/regional) report cards, we report four measures of the
social and political contexts in which judges make decisions.  Contextual measures such as those analyzed
here have been shown in empirical studies to help explain variation in sentencing from county to county
within states and across states.181  We consider them here to see whether they can help explain state
variations in capital-sentencing error rates, and also in capital-sentencing and execution rates themselves.
The “political pressure” index measures the extent to which state judges are subject to electoral
scrutiny and discipline. Although nearly all the state judges in our study are subject to election at some point
if they wish to remain in office, the forms and frequency of elections differ in ways that are likely to increase
or decrease the extent to which judges are put at political risk because of the capital outcomes produced
in their courts (meaning, at the trial level, whether the verdict was death or life and, at the appellate level,
whether a death sentence under review was affirmed or reversed). The index considers whether judges
initially are elected or appointed, whether judicial elections are partisan, the length of judges’ terms of
office, and whether judges’ continuation in office is determined by contested or retention elections.182
The “party competition index” is a composite of the vote share of each party in state gubernatorial
elections from 1968-1996.183
Our penultimate (“state court criminal caseload”) item reports the yearly average number of criminal
case filings in each jurisdiction from 1985-1994 per 1,000 people in the population.184 We include this
figure to test the hypothesis that high criminal caseloads may in some way affect the quality of state-court
capital judgments.
Finally, aiming to test a similar hypothesis having to do with available judicial resources, we report
each state’s average annual court-related expenditures during the fiscal years 1982-1992.185
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VIII. State Comparisons
Appendix A to this Report presents capital punishment report cards for each jurisdiction in our 28-
state cohort, arranged alphabetically. Observers and policymakers in each state may find their state’s report
card to be interesting in and of itself. The report cards are especially informative, however, when used
comparatively. With the help of a number of tables and figures, this section undertakes a variety of state-by-
state comparisons. 
A. Rates of Serious Error Found on State Direct Appeal
Table 4 and Figure 5 below compare the rates of capital error discovered on direct appeal during
the 23-year study period in each of the 28 study states to the rates in the other states and to the national
composite of 41%. Table 4 and Figure 5 show that at the first state inspection stage, elected high
court judges in a large majority (64%) of American capital-sentencing states found that over a
third of their states’ capital judgments were  seriously flawed. In well over half the study states, state
high court judges found serious error in 40% of more of their capital judgments. The error rate found on
direct appeal was 50% or more in a quarter of American death-penalty jurisdictions.
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Table 4: Percent of Capital Judgments Reviewed on Direct Appeal
in Which Reversible Error Was Found, 1973-1995
State Percent Reversed on Direct Appeal
National Composite 41
1.   Wyoming 67
2.   Mississippi 61
2.   North Carolina 61
4.   Alabama 55
5.   South Carolina 54
6.   Maryland 53
7.   Kentucky 50
8.   Florida 49
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Figure 5.  Percent of Death Sentences Reversed 
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Table 4 and Chart 5 identify two states whose records are so different from others as to raise
questions about why: Missouri’s high court finds error only 17% of the time—9 percentage points less often
than the next lowest state (after which the distribution of states becomes more continuous). And the Virginia
Supreme Court finds error only 10% of the time—7 percentage points below Missouri, 16 percentage
points below where the distribution becomes continuous, and 31 percentage points below the national
average. All other states range from two-thirds (67%) to just over 1.5 times the national average of 41%;
by contrast, Missouri’s rate is only 40%, and Virginia’s is less than 25%, of the national average. A
question for further study is whether the fact that all other state high courts discover serious error in
anywhere from 26% to 67% of their capital judgments provides a reason to question the care with which
the Missouri and Virginia high courts screen for such error, given that they find it only 17% and 10% of the
time,186 or whether capital judgments in those states are substantially less prone to error than capital
judgments everywhere else.187
B. Rates of Serious Error Found on State Post-Conviction
Table 5 below reveals what we know about the comparative amounts and rates of serious capital
error found during state post-conviction review proceedings. As we have noted, the available data do not
permit an accurate determination of the rates of error actually found in decided cases, because there is
no accurate count of those cases. The data do, however, enable us to derive a systematically
underestimated proxy for that state post-conviction reversal rate by taking the (incomplete) number of
state post-conviction reversals we have been able to identify as a proportion of the cases that were
available for state post-conviction review (whether or not they actually completed that review) during the
study period.188 Table 5 presents that (under)estimated rate of error found on state post-conviction in each
state.
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Table 5: Known State Post-Conviction Reversals, 1973-1995, By State
State Known Number of State Post-
Conviction Reversals
Reversals as % of Cases
Available for State Post-
Conviction Review*
National Composite 248 10
1.   Maryland 14 52
2.   Wyoming 1 33
3.   Indiana 13 25
4.   Utah 3 23
5.   Mississippi 11 20
6.   South Carolina 10 18
7.   Florida 64 17
7.   Tennessee 13 17
9.   Nebraska 2 13
10. Georgia 24 12
11. Arizona 12 10
11. North Carolina 9 10
13. Alabama   11 9
13. Montana 1 9
15. Nevada 5 8
16. Illinois 10 7
16. Louisiana 4  7
18. Texas 22 6
19. Idaho 1 5
20. Arkansas 2 4
20. California 7 4
20. Missouri 3 4
23. Virginia 3 3
24. Oklahoma 2 2
25. Pennsylvania 1 1
26. Kentucky 0 0
Delaware unknown unknown
Washington unknown unknown
*This  column does  not report the proportion of capital judgments actually reviewed on state post-conviction that were
reversed due to serious error, because that information is not available. It instead reports the reversals known to have
occurred (despite the difficulty of collecting data) as a percentage of all of the capital judgments that were available to
be reviewed (almost all of which eventually  complete state post-conviction review, but many of which had not completed
that review (i.e., they instead were  awaiting final review) at the end of the study period. This  table  thus undercounts
the actual number and rate of reversals on state-post conviction . See infra Appendix C, pp. C-1 to C-2.
Source: Appendix C; DRCen; DADB
49
Table 5 shows the following:
! State post-conviction review is an important source of review in some states, including Florida,
Georgia, Indiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, and Tennessee. In Maryland, at least
52% of capital judgments reviewed on state post-conviction during the study period were
overturned due to serious error; the same was true of at least 25% of the capital judgments that
were similarly reviewed in Indiana, and at least  20% of those reviewed in Mississippi.
! Table 5 is especially revealing when the post-conviction reversal-rate rankings it assigns to
particular states are compared to their direct appeal reversal-rate rankings in Table 4 (p. 47). That
comparison identifies a number of states in which high error rates are found at both state court
review stages. Of particular interest are three southeastern states—South Carolina, North Carolina
and Maryland, all of which fall within the jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit (“Fourth Circuit Court”), based in Richmond, Virginia. All three of those states (and,
most especially Maryland and South Carolina) rank fairly high on both state direct appeal and state
post-conviction reversal rates. In this regard, they contrast sharply with the one remaining state
within the jurisdiction of the federal Fourth Circuit Court—Virginia—which falls in the very bottom
cohort of states in regard to error detection at both state review stages. 
! Other states in which relatively high rates of error manifest themselves at both the state direct
appeal and state post-conviction stage are Wyoming and Mississippi (both falling within the top fifth
of states in terms of capital error rates found at both state court inspection stages) and Florida,
which ranks seventh and eighth on the two error rates.
! Falling in the bottom rank insofar as error detection by both sets of state courts is concerned, in
addition to Virginia, are California, Missouri, and Pennsylvania.
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! By contrast, in some states, close scrutiny at one state-review stage seems to compensate for less
exacting scrutiny at another. In Indiana and Tennessee, for example, relatively low error-detection
rates on direct appeal (the states are ranked 19th and 23rd, respectively, in terms of their reversal
rates at that stage) are partly offset by high error-detection rates on state post-conviction (where
the states are ranked 3rd and 7th, respectively). Georgia, Nebraska and Utah also fit this pattern.
! The inverse pattern—high direct appeal, but low state post-conviction, error-detection
rates—characterizes states such as Kentucky and Oklahoma.
C. Rates of Serious Error Found on State Direct Appeal and State Post-Conviction
Table 6 and Figure 6 below display the combined rates of error detected in the two state-court
inspection phases.
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Table 6: State-by-State Comparisons of Rates of Error Detected
by All State Courts (State Direct Appeal and State Post-Conviction)
State Percent Reversed in State Courts, Overall*
National Composite 47%
1.   Wyoming 78%
2.   Maryland 77%
3.   Mississippi 69%
4.   North Carolina 65%
5.   South Carolina 62%
6.   Alabama 59%
7.   Florida 58%
8.   Kentucky 50%
8.   Louisiana 50%
8.   Utah 50%
8.   Oklahoma 50%

















*This  column does  not report  the proportion of capital judgments  actually reviewed in state court  that were reversed
due to serious error, because the post-conviction information needed to make that calculation is not known. Instead, it
reports the reversals known to have occurred (despite the difficulty of collecting state post-conviction data) as a
percentage of all of the capital judgments that were available to be reviewed on state direct appeal or state post-
conviction (almost all of which were eventually reviewed on state post-conviction but many of which were not finally
reviewed (i.e., they were as yet undecided and awaiting final review) at that stage at the end of the study period. The
actual state court reversal rate thus is higher in most or all instances. See infra Appendix C, pp. C-1 to C-2.
Source: DADP; Appendix C; DRCen
Note: State post-conviction reversal rates for Delaware and Washington are unknown.
Figure 6.  Percent of Death Sentences Reversed on 





















































































































































Table 6 and Figure 6 reveal the extent of serious error detected by state courts as a whole. The
results are remarkable:
!  Even before any federal courts become involved, state courts across the country find
serious error in close to half (at least 47%) of the capital judgments that reach their two
checkpoints. 
! State courts found capital error rates of 40% or more in five-sixths of the death-penalty
states. They found serious  error in 60% or more of the capital judgments in a fifth of
those states.
! A number of the states in the nation’s “death belt” (where most American death sentences are
imposed and the largest death rows exist) have some of the nation’s highest rates of serious capital-
sentencing error—by the lights of the states’ own elected judges: Florida at 58%; Alabama at
59%; South Carolina at 62%; North Carolina at 65%; Mississippi at 69%; and Maryland
at 77%.
! As in other analyses, Virginia is a distinct anomaly. Its courts’ capital error-detection rate during
the study period was less than a third the national average, and 35% below the next nearest state,
Missouri—which itself has an error-detection rate 31% below the next lowest state, after which
the differences among states are small.
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D. Rates of Serious Error Found on Federal Habeas Review
Table 7 and Figure 7 below compare the rates of error detected on federal habeas corpus review
of death sentences in the 28 capital-sentencing jurisdictions with at least one completed federal habeas
proceeding during the study period. As discussed above, virtually all capital judgments reviewed on federal
habeas had previously been given two state court inspections: one on state direct appeal (at which 41%
of the judgments reviewed were thrown out) and a second on state post-conviction (after which, the state
courts together had thrown out 47% of the capital judgments they reviewed). 
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Table 7: Percent of Capital Judgments Reviewed on Federal Habeas Corpus
in Which Reversible Error Was Found, 1973-1995






























    * States with three or fewer completed federal habeas cases during the study period.
    Source: HCDB
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Although Table and Figure 7 include all 28 states, our narrative analysis here puts aside the states
(indicated with an asterisk) with three or fewer federal habeas cases during the study period. Among the
20 capital-sentencing states that had a substantial number of their capital judgments reviewed on federal
habeas during the study period:
! Federal courts found serious  error189 in 40% of the capital judgments they reviewed at
this third inspection point.
! In two-fifths of the study states, federal courts detected error rates of 50% or more at this
third inspection.
! Virginia is again an anomaly in this analysis. The 6% error-detection rate among Virginia
capital habeas cases is well under half that of the next lowest state (South Carolina at
14%), and is exactly 15% of the national average.190
Table 7 and Figure 8 below reveal an important fact about federal habeas review, which
undermines two frequent, but contradictory, criticisms of federal judges. According to one criticism,
unelected federal judges tend to oppose the death penalty, prompting them to overturn capital judgments
whenever they can.191 According to the opposed view, federal judges—especially since appointees of
Presidents Reagan and Bush became a majority in the mid-1980s—are ideologically “conservative” and
prone to uphold state-imposed death sentences at every turn.192 Our data suggest that federal judges are
more discerning and sensitive to context than either view claims. Thus, the same judges on the same federal
circuit court often find very different rates of reversible error in capital judgments they review depending
on the state of origin of the judgments in question. This suggests that factors specific to each states’ capital
judgments have more of an effect of federal judges’ behavior in capital habeas cases than the judges’
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ideological dispositions. Table 8 and Figure 8 below compare the rates of error that 4 federal circuit courts
found in capital judgments imposed by states subject to their jurisdiction during the study period.
Table 8: Error Rates, by Selected States, Found by Federal


































Figure 8.  Percent of Capital Sentences 

















































































E. Rates of Serious Error Found by State Versus Federal Courts
Figures 9 and 10 below compare the rates at which state courts in each of the study jurisdictions
found serious error in that state’s capital judgments to the corresponding rates for federal courts. Figure
9 compares the rate of serious capital error that was found for each state by its courts on direct appeal
to that found by federal courts on habeas review.193 Figure 10 makes a similar comparison of the rate of
serious capital error found for each state by its courts on both state direct appeal and state post-conviction
review to the corresponding serious-error rate found by federal courts on habeas.194
Figures 9 and 10 arrange the states by the extent of the difference between the rates of serious
capital error found on state versus federal review.  On the left side of each chart are states as to which
state courts found more serious capital error than federal courts. On the right side are states as to which
federal courts found more serious error than state courts. In between are states as to which state and
federal courts found similar rates of capital error.
Figure 9.  Percent of Capital Judgments Reversed on State 
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Figure 10.  Percent of Capital Judgments Reversed on State 
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Especially when we put to one side the (asterisked) states that had too few capital habeas reviews
to permit analysis, both charts reveal a strong degree of similarity between the rates of capital-sentencing
error detected by state and federal courts in each state (i.e., in how close together the two lines are). More
important is the even stronger degree of similarity between state and federal courts’ judgments
about the various state’s comparative rates of capital-sentencing error (i.e., in how closely each
line’s upward and downward ticks as it moves from one state to the next are paralleled by the other line’s
upward and downward ticks). What Figures 9 and 10195 thus suggest is that state and federal courts
examining the same pools of capital judgments generally find—and react similarly to—the same relative
levels of serious capital-sentencing error. In plain English: Where state courts find comparatively high,
low or average rates of error in a particular jurisdiction’s capital judgments relative to error rates
found elsewhere, so do the federal courts reviewing the same jurisdiction’s capital cases. Figures
9 and 10 thus refute the notion that elected state judges as a group react differently to the possibility of
error in capital cases from the way that federal judges react as a group. In fact state and federal judges’
reactions to capital error on both these measures of comparative amounts of error196 are very much
in sync.
That said, it is interesting to consider the relatively small numbers of states that fall on the left and
the right edges of the chart where the state and federal error-detection lines diverge.  In doing so, we focus
on Figure 10 (the more informative of the two charts197) and on the (non-asterisked) states with sufficient
numbers of federal habeas cases. 
One interpretation of Figure 10 is that the courts of North Carolina, South Carolina, Louisiana,
Florida and Alabama—the states on the left side of the chart—are doing the lion’s share of error detection
for capital judgments in those states, leaving significantly less error to be detected by the relevant federal
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courts. Alternatively, the courts of those five states may have increased their level of vigilance to
compensate for what they perceive (based, e.g., on past experience and (more probably) on information
transmitted by lawyers) to be unusually lax error-detection by the federal courts. This latter interpretation
might explain the North and South Carolina courts’ robust error-detection in capital cases. Both states fall
within the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which has by far the lowest capital-error
detection rate of any federal judicial circuit in the country.198 
The corresponding interpretation for Georgia, Montana and California—on the right side of the
chart—is that federal courts have taken the lead error-detection role as to capital judgments from those
states to compensate for low state court error-detection. 
The hypotheses offered in the preceding two paragraphs present important questions for future
research. 
We conclude our discussion of Figure 10 by again noting a discrepancy between Virginia and the
other states. Unlike almost every other state (Missouri, again, and Texas are in an intermediate category)
Virginia’s state-review “square” and its federal-review “circle” are both located at the very bottom of the
chart. In this respect, the Virginia courts may be contrasted to those of the other states in the Fourth Circuit,
which are discussed on pp. 51 and 65 above: unlike the courts of the neighboring states, there is no
evidence that Virginia’s courts have tried to compensate for very low error detection by the Fourth Circuit.
Quite the contrary, Virginia courts have the lowest error-detection rates of the 28 study states. As a
consequence of simultaneously low state and federal error detection, the rate of error detected in Virginia
capital judgments is both extremely, and unusually, low.
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F. Overall Rates of Serious Error Found on State Direct Appeal, State Post-
Conviction, and Federal Habeas Corpus 
Tables 9 and 10, and corresponding Figures 11 and 12, compare the various study states based
on their overall rates of serious  capital-sentencing error (i.e., the rates of serious error found during
full state and federal court review199). Table 9 and Figure 11 consider only the first (state direct appeal) and
third (federal habeas) review stages.200  A more comprehensive picture is provided by Table 10 and Figure
12, which include, in addition, what we know about the second, state post-conviction stage.  For that
reason, we display and discuss Table 10 and Figure 12 here. Table 9 and Figure 11 are in Appendix E (pp.
E-5 and E-6).   
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Table 10: Overall Error Rates, by State, 1973-1995
Including State Post-Conviction
State Overall Error Rate, Including State Post-Conviction*
1.   Kentucky* 100%
1.   Maryland* 100%
1.   Tennessee* 100%
4.   Mississippi   91%
5.   Wyoming* 89%
6.   California 87%
6.   Montana 87%
8.   Idaho 82%






15. North Carolina 71%
16. Arkansas 70%
17. Nevada 68%











* States with three or fewer federal habeas cases.
Sources : DADB; Appendix C; DRCen; HCDB
* States with three or fewer federal habeas cases.  
Note: The number of state post-conviction reversals in Washington and Delaware are unknown.
Figure 12.  Combined Error Rate on State Direct Appeal,  State 
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Table 10 and Figure 12 reveal that:
! For the study states as a whole, the overall rate of serious error was 68%.201
! Overall error rates vary enormously, from 18% in Virginia to 91% in Mississippi.202
! All but two states (Virginia and Missouri) had overall error rates of 52% or higher.  All
but four states (those two, plus Texas and Pennsylvania) had overall error rates of 64%
or higher.
! Put the other way around, only two states out of 26 produced capital judgments that
passed inspection for serious error more than half the time .
! Numerous states, in all sections  of the country—including Alabama, Arizona, California,
Georgia, Indiana,  Mississippi, Montana and Oklahoma—had error rates of three-
quarters or more, with Mississippi’s being more than 9 out of 10 (a success rate of less
than 1 in 10).
! As noted above, the Governor of Illinois cited evidence of high rates of serious error in Illinois
capital judgments, and particularly a spate of exonerations of innocent men released from death
row, as the reason for declaring a moratorium on executions there.203 This prompted other
policymakers, including the Governors of Florida and Texas, to suggest that actions in Illinois are
not relevant elsewhere, because high error rates are unique to Illinois.204 In fact, the rate of error
detected by state and federal courts in Illinois capital sentences, 66%—while high in
absolute terms—is not at all unique. On the contrary, the Illinois error rate is very close to,
and a bit lower than, the national average of 68%. 
! As one would expect from our previous discussion, and as Figure 12 demonstrates, Virginia is a
distinct outlier here, falling almost literally “off the charts” on the low side of error detection.
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Virginia’s overall rate of detected error is barely half that of the next closest state (Missouri, which
itself is much lower than all the other states), and barely a quarter the national rate. In technical
terms, Virginia’s overall-error detection rate is nearly 3 standard deviations below the mean (2.88).
Figure 13 below plots (1) the combined state direct appeal and state post-conviction reversal rates,
(2) the federal habeas reversal rate, and (3) the overall error rate that is a composite of the other two.205
Figure 13 illustrates three points that (for the most part) we have discussed above:
! High overall error rates across most states.
! Similar state and federal patterns of error detection in most states, with some exceptions
where high state court error detection compensates for low federal court error detection (e.g.,
North and South Carolina state courts compensating for the federal Fourth Circuit), and vice versa
(e.g, the federal Ninth and Eleventh Circuits compensating for low state court error detection in
California and Georgia, respectively).
! Virginia’s outlier status.
* States with three or fewer federal habeas cases.  
Note: State post-conviction reversals in Delaware and Washington are unknown.
Figure 13.  Overall Error Rate (Including State Post-
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G. Length of Time of Review
The multiple inspections needed to detect all this error take time—a 23-year average of about 9
years if the outcome is execution (with that figure rising to 10.6 years in the latter third of the study period),
and 7.6 years if the outcome is reversal on habeas corpus.206 Figures 14-16 below provide a variety of
perspectives on the length of time required to cleanse capital judgments of chronically high rates of error.
Figure 14207 below compares states on the basis of how many years elapsed between each state’s
first death sentence and its first non-consensual208execution (not necessarily in the same case):
! In 16 (57%) of the 28 study states, it took (or will take209) 15 or more years to get from
the state’s first death sentence to its first execution following full review.
! In 71% of the states it took 10 or more years .
Figure 15210 compares the 23 study states in which at least one execution (consensual or non-
consensual) took place between 1973 and 1995 based on the amount of time that elapsed, on average,
between the same prisoner’s death sentence and execution. Subject to missing data, and the fact that the
table counts consensual executions, which causes it to understate the time needed for full review,211 Figure
15 reveals that:
! In the vast majority of states, executions took place on average 7 or more years  after
death sentences during the study period.
! In over two-thirds of the states, executions  took place an average of 9 or more years  after
the death sentence was imposed.
* The first nonconsensual execution occurred after the end of the study period (i.e., after 1995) in the year indicated.
**  As of this publication there has not yet been a nonconsensual execution.
Figure 14.  Years from First Death Sentence 















































































































































*  States with only consensual executions.































































































































Figure 16212 below compares states based on the proportion of their 1973-1995 death sentences
that were awaiting direct review in 1995. As is discussed above, this comparison provides a rough measure
of the extent to which state direct appeal is a bottleneck in the inspection process.213 Nationally, 21% of
capital sentences imposed between 1973 and 1995—about 5-years-worth of death sentences—were
awaiting direct appeal in 1995:
! In over a third of the 28 states, 20% or more of all post-Furman death sentences were backed
up at the state direct appeal stage 23 years after Furman. 
! In three of the nations most prolific capital-sentencing states, Texas, Pennsylvania and California,
the 1995 log-jam of cases awaiting state direct appeal contained (respectively) 27%, 27% and
47% of the state’s post-1972 cases. In Washington and Wyoming, the 1995 logjam contained 45
and 70% of the post-Furman cases. 
! Of note, although the federal Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is sometimes blamed for holding up
executions in the states within its jurisdiction, the three states in that circuit with the largest death
rows—California, Arizona and Washington—were all in the top cohort of states as of 1995 in
terms of the proportion of cases bottled up in the state courts awaiting direct appeal.
Figure 16.  Percentage of 1973-95 Death Sentences 



















































































































































H. Capital-Sentencing and Execution Rates, and the Two Compared
This section compares states to each other based on (1) how many death sentences they impose
“per capita” and (2) how many executions the carry out “per capita.” We use three different per capita
measures—sentences and executions per 1,000 homicides, per 100,000 population, and per 1,000 prison
population.214 The middle measure is particularly interesting, given the expectation that the number of death
sentences each  jurisdiction imposes and carries out would be responsive to the number of homicides
committed there. This section also asks whether, as one would expect, states that undertake to capitally
sentence more offenders per capita than other states also execute more people per capita.
Figure 17 below compares states based on their death sentencing rates per 1,000 homicides, per
100,000 population and per 1,000 prisoners. Figure 18 below compares states based on their non-
consensual execution rates per the same three populations. 

























































































































































Death Sentences per 1,000 Homicides
Death Sentences per 100,000 Population
Death Sentences per 1,000 Prison Population



























































































































































Executions per 1,000 Homicides
Executions per 100,000 Population
Executions per 1,000 Prison Population
79
Figures 17 and 18 reveal huge variations among states in both their death-sentencing rates and their
execution rates measured per homicides and per population:215
! Measured against both populations, some death-sentencing states have death-sentencing
rates that are 10 times those in other death sentencing states.
! In Wyoming, for example, nearly 6% of all homicides result in a death sentence—over four times
the national average for death-sentencing states. In Maryland, less that six-tenths of 1% of
homicides lead to a death sentence. 
! Nevada condemns nearly 11 people out of every 100,000—about three times the national average
for death-sentencing states. Washington State does so to less than 1 person out of every 100,000.
! Similar disparities characterize the execution rates in the various death-sentencing jurisdictions.
! The disparities among states in death sentences and executions per 1,000 homicides are particularly
interesting, revealing the absence of what one would expect to be a consistent relationship between
homicides and capital punishment. 
Figures 19-21 below consider whether high (or low) death-sentencing rates (per homicide, per
population or per prisoners) translate, as one would expect, into high (or low) execution rates. 
Figure 19.  Death Sentences and Executions 
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Figure 20.  Death Sentences and Executions 
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Figure 21.  Death Sentences and Executions 
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Judging from figures 19-21, there is no relationship between death-sentencing and execution
rates. When states are arranged in order of their death sentences per capita, the line representing their
executions per capita fluctuates wildly and randomly:
! Idaho, Nevada, Arizona and Oklahoma rank 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 6th (and range from 3 to 4 times
the national average) when it comes to how often homicides result in death sentences. Those same
states, however, are tied for 23rd, tied for 24th, 17th, and 14th among 28 states (near or well
below the national average) when it comes to how often homicides result in execution. 
! On the other hand, Texas, Virginia and Louisiana rank 18th, 22nd, and 25th in death sentences per
homicide (ranging from slightly above, down to two-thirds, the national average) but 4th, 2d, and
7th in executions per homicide (ranging from over twice to nearly four times the national
average).216  Thus, the three states most associated in the public’s mind with executions—
Louisiana, which was the nation’s execution capital in the late 1980s,217 and Texas and Virginia
which claimed that distinction in the 1990s218—did not attain that status by sentencing
disproportionately large numbers of people to death row. Instead, they have done so by translating
below-average death-sentencing rates into above-average execution rates.
Figure 22 below asks a related question: Are states that are most likely to punish homicides with
death also most likely to translate death sentences into executions?
Figure 22.  Per Capita Death Sentences and 
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Figure 22 reveals no relationship between death sentencing and execution rates. Indeed, for nearly
half the states—Louisiana, Virginia, Missouri, and Texas  (with comparatively low death-sentencing but
high death-sentences-carried-out rates) and Wyoming, Idaho, Nevada, Arizona, Oklahoma, Florida,
Alabama, and Mississippi (with comparatively high  death sentencing rates but low death-sentences-
carried-out rates), the relationship is the inverse: the more frequently states sentence killers to die, the less
frequently they execute them, and vice versa.
Overall, therefore, it seems clear that a powerful disposition to sentence offenders to die does not
go hand in hand with a strong capacity to carry out the death sentences that are imposed. Figuring out why
this is so is a question we will address in a subsequent report. Our analysis so far, however, suggests one
place to look for the source of the discrepancy: the distribuingly high rates of capital-sentencing error that
we document above.
I. Demographic Factors 
This section considers two other possible explanations for the frequency with which states sentence
individuals to die, and the frequency with which they carry out the capital sentences they impose. The first
is violent crime—measured by each state’s homicide rate per 100,000 population.219 The second is
race—based on the proportion of each state’s population that is non-white.220
Figures 23 and 24 below consider the relationship between homicide rates per 100,000 population
and, respectively, capital-sentencing and execution rates.
Figure 23.  Death Sentencing Rates Per 1,000 Homicides and 
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If there is any relationship at all between homicide and capital-sentencing rates (a matter requiring
more sophisticated analysis), Figure 23 suggests that it is weak and inverse. Figure 24 asks whether
variations in rates of serious crime, as measured by homicides per 100,000 population, can explain
variations in execution rates, or vice versa. Figure 24's decisive answer is that there is no such relationship
between a state’s serious crime rate and its willingness or capacity to execute its citizens.
Turning to the issue of race, Figure 25 below compares capital-sentencing states’ relative death-
sentencing rates (per 1,000 homicide) to their percent nonwhite population. 
Surprisingly, perhaps, this chart suggests that proportionately larger minority populations are
associated with somewhat lower death-sentencing rates, and vice versa. Figure 25 also reveals the sharp
variation among capital-sentencing states in terms of the proportion of their populations that are nonwhite,
ranging from 5% in Idaho (which, incidently, has a very high death sentencing rate per homicide) to 37%
in Mississippi (where the death-sentencing rate per homicide is relatively low).
Figure 26 below considers whether race influences execution, as opposed to death-sentencing,
rates. Here, the relationship is weaker than in Figure 25, and runs in the opposite direction: Although states
with larger proportions of racial minorities tend to capitally sentence less often than states with
proportionately smaller minority populations, those same states tend to carry out relatively more of the
death sentences they impose.
Figure 25. Per Capita Death Sentencing Rate 
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J.  Court Factors
Here, we consider whether differences among states’ judicial systems account for the marked
variability in their capital-case error rates, death-sentencing rates, and execution rates. Relevant, reliable,
and comparable state-court contextual data are difficult to obtain. For purposes of this initial report, we
have developed three comparative measures: “political pressure” (the extent to which state sentencing and
appellate judges are subject to electoral discipline for actions they take as judges221), judicial workloads
(which we measure by comparing the various states’ criminal court caseloads per 1,000 persons during
the relevant period) and judicial resources (comparing the dollars the respective states spent on their courts
per capita during the relevant period).222 The details of each of these measures are described at pp. 44-45
above.223
Figure 27 and Figure 28 below consider the impact of political pressure on, respectively, death-
sentencing and execution (more specifically, death-sentences-carried-out) rates. Because error rates and
the rates at which death sentences are carried out are so highly correlated (see Figure 1,  supra p. 11), the
latter chart is also a rough measure of the relationship between political pressure and capital error rates.
Figure 27.  Political Pressure and 
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Figure 28.  Political Pressure and Percent of 
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Figures 27 and 28 reveal a curious and potentially significant pattern: In general, the more electoral
pressure a state’s judges are under, the higher the state’s death-sentencing rate, but the lower the rate at
which it carries out its death sentences. Assuming a causal relationship, this suggests that political pressure
tends to impel judges—or to create an environment in which prosecutors and jurors are impelled—to
impose death sentences, but then tends to interfere with the state’s capacity to carry out the death
sentences that are imposed. 
Whether it is fair to infer a causal relationship here and, if so, what might account for that
relationship is a question for further research. One hypothesis is suggested by possible relationships
between high death-sentencing rates and high error rates, and between the latter and low execution rates:
Public opinion may place a premium on obtaining death sentences.224 If so, a desire to curry favor with
voters may lead elected prosecutors and judges to cut corners in an effort to secure that premium—
simultaneously causing death-sentencing rates, and error rates, to increase. In that event, high rates of
reversible error would explain why high political-pressure states, after imposing so disproportionately many
death sentences—making so many errors in the process—end up carrying out so disproportionately few
of their death sentences. These are questions for further research. 
Figures 29 and 30 below relate, respectively, states’ death-sentencing rates, and the rates at which
they carry out death sentences, to their per capita court expenditures. 
Figure 29.  Per Capita Spending on Courts and Per Capita 
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Figure 30.  Per Capita Spending on Courts and Percent of 
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With some exceptions, Figure 29 appears to indicate that comparatively high expenditures on
courts are associated with relatively high death-sentencing rates. It is difficult to know what to make of this
relationship, especially because capital cases are themselves costly and thus may partly account for high
expenditures. It may be, however, that states whose courts have substantial amounts of resources are more
capable of handling capital cases—and thus do so more often—than states with less well-funded courts.
As was the case when we looked at capital punishment and political pressure, the relationship
between capital punishment and spending reverses when we move from analyzing death sentencing rates
to rates of death sentences carried out: Figure 29 shows a direct relationship between court expenditures
and death sentencing (the higher the one is, the higher the other tends to be); by contrast, Figure 30 shows
a weak inverse relationship between court expenditures and death sentences carried out—as states’
spending on their courts increases, the proportion of the death sentences imposed that are carried out tends
to decrease. The cause of that relationship (if any exists) is unclear. If, however, it were the case that the
processing of death cases is itself responsible for significantly driving up court expenditures, then Figures
29 and 30 might suggest that spending relatively large sums to secure relatively large numbers of death
sentences has little pay off—and, indeed, is counterproductive—when it comes to securing executions.
If so, the policy alternative of spending less by securing fewer death sentences225—each of which, however,
is more likely to be carried out—would be indicated.
Figures 31 and 32 below consider the relationship between state court caseloads and, respectively,
death sentencing rates and the rate of death sentences carried out. 
Figure 31.  State Court Caseloads 
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Figure 32.  State Court Caseloads and Percent of Death 
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Judging from Figure 31, there is no relationship between how many cases per capita state courts
handle and the rate at which those courts impose death sentences. Figure 32 does, however, suggest a
weak relationship between court caseloads and death sentences carried out: As per capita caseloads drop,
the rate of death sentences carried out also tends to drop.  One might hypothesize that states with smaller
courts (ones with lower caseloads) are more likely to generate seriously flawed death sentences at the trial
level, thus depressing the rate at which their death sentences are carried out. Alternatively, state appellate
courts with lower caseloads may be superior error detectors, thus (given high error rates across all states)
accounting for lower rates of executions—or, in this scenario, lower rates of flawed executions. Further
research is called for.
IX. Federal Circuit Court and Regional Comparisons 
Appendix B contains report cards for the nine federal judicial circuits that conducted federal habeas
corpus review of state death sentences during the 1973-1995 study period.226 Those circuits reviewed
between 2 (Sixth Circuit) and 215 (Eleventh Circuit) death sentences in that period
Referring to these tables as Federal Circuit report cards is at times misleading, because much of
the information in them considers results generated by state courts or other state actors in the states (noted
at the top of on each report card) that are grouped in that circuit. For purposes of the latter sorts of
information, these are actually regional report cards, which aggregate the results of actions by a variety
of state actors in multiple states in particular segments of the nation. Only the three items falling within the
“Federal Habeas Corpus” category of each report (which we have marked with a number sign (#)) report
the results of actions exclusively by the federal courts in the relevant circuit. An additional six rows of
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information (which we mark with a plus sign (+)) report on a mixture of actions by the relevant state courts
and the federal courts in the circuit. 
In this section, we focus on information generated either by the federal courts alone, or by them
in conjunction with state courts.
Table 25 displays the rates of error detected on federal habeas review and overall (state and
federal review) by circuit. Figure 33 below compares the circuits’ error detection rates on habeas. 
Table 25: Error Rates Detected on Habeas Review
and Overall (State Direct Appeal and Federal Review Combined)
by Federal Circuit/Multi-State Regions
Circuit Number Re-







Sixth 2 2 100% 100%
Ninth 34 21 62% 78%*
Eleventh 215 108 50% 77%
Tenth 17 8 47% 74%
Seventh 14 6 43% 68%
Fourth 52 8 15% 62%
Fifth 200 63 32% 61%
Third 7 2 29% 55%*
Eighth 58 19 33% 54%
National
Composite
599 237 40% 68%
* Does not include state post-conviction information for Washington (9th Cir.) or Delaware (3d Cir.)
Source: HCDB; DADB; Appendix C; DPCen
Figure 33.  Rate of Errors Detected on Habeas 













































































Table 25 and Figure 33 reveal that:
! During the 23-year study period, 7 of the 9 federal death-penalty circuit courts (including the
three circuits with the most cases) found serious  error in a third or more of the death
sentences they reviewed at the final (federal habeas) inspection stage— notwithstanding that two
state court inspections had already occurred. 
! Over half the circuits detected error 40% or more of the time .
! The Eleventh Circuit—the nation’s most active capital reviewing federal court (with
jurisdiction over Alabama, Florida and Georgia capital judgments)—detected error in 50% of
the death sentences it reviewed.
! Even after excluding the Sixth Circuit (which only reviewed two capital judgments), there is much
wider variation among the rates of serious error detected by the circuits on federal habeas review
alone (ranging from 15% to 62%) than the rates of error detected overall by a combination of
state and federal courts (which only range from 54% to 78%). This indicates, as we have already
suggested,227 that state and federal court review may somewhat compensate for each other, tending
to moderate variations that occur when the results of only state court or federal court inspection
is considered.
! Although there is substantial variation among circuits, there also—as we already have noted (see
Table 8 and Figure 8, supra pp. 60, 61)—is substantial variation in federal habeas error detection
within circuits. The Fifth Circuit, for example, finds error in 71% of the Mississippi death sentences
it reviews but only 26% of the Texas death sentences it reviews—suggesting that more is at issue
in determining error detection rates than a federal court’s uniform disposition with regard to error
affecting capital sentences.
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As did Figure 8 (p. 61) above, Table 25 and Figure 33 identify the Fourth Circuit—with jurisdiction
over Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Maryland—as an outlier on the low end of federal
habeas corpus error detection. The Fourth Circuit finds error only half as often as the next lowest circuit
and just under a third as often as do the other circuits as a whole minus the Fourth.228 Interestingly, though,
as we already have noted (pp. 51, 65-66 above), state courts in three of the four states within the Fourth
Circuit—all those save the Virginia courts229—largely compensate for the Fourth Circuit’s low error
detection rate with unusually high direct appeal and state post-conviction error detection rates of their own.
Thus, although the Fourth Circuit is way below the other circuits in error detection on habeas, when state
and federal error detection are combined, the overall rate of error detected in the Fourth Circuit region
(62%) is higher than the overall rate of error detected in three other regions (the Fifth, Third and Eighth
Circuit) and not much lower than the national average (68%). If Virginia (whose Supreme Court rarely
detects error) is excluded, the overall error rate for capital judgments from the other three states in the
Fourth Circuit region rises to 76%, significantly above the national average. The “double whammy” effect
noted earlier (p. 66) of distinctly lower error detection rates at the checkpoints operated both by the
Virginia Supreme Court and by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit thus is a unique feature
of Virginia capital judgments.230
In considering whether Virginia capital judgments are substantially less error prone than all others
in the nation or, on the other hand, whether laxer error detection takes place there, the death-sentencing
states that surround Virginia and lie within its same federal judicial circuit—Maryland, North Carolina and
South Carolina—may be treated as partial “natural controls.”231 Insofar as philosophical, cultural or
historical factors—which probably do not vary much between Virginia and its neighbors—are thought to
be the main influences on the amount of expected error in capital judgments, the fact that high capital error
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rates are consistently found in states bordering Virginia casts doubt on the hypothesis that Virginia capital
sentences are starkly less error-prone. For this analysis to show convincingly that Virginia courts are laxer
detectors of serious capital error than courts in the surrounding states, there would have to be an
explanation for that difference among presumably similar states. One such explanation is the unusual extent
to which the Virginia courts limit review of capital judgments: (1) enforcing the region’s (and nation’s)
strictest procedural default doctrine (the rule permitting even egregious error to be ignored on appeal if it
was not objected to at trial); (2) often appointing substandard trial attorneys to represent the indigents who
make up 97% of the state’s death row, thus increasing the probability that necessary objections will not
be made at trial, and thus that appellate review will be cut off; (3) applying a very strict test for reversing
capital judgments based on incompetent lawyering (until the Supreme Court overturned Virginia’s test
earlier this year232; (4) limiting defendants’ ability to petition for a new trial based on innocence to a 21-day
period following conviction, the shortest such time-frame in the region (and nation); and (5) failing to
provide legal assistance to indigent (meaning nearly all) capital prisoners or funds for it at the state post-
conviction phase, thus limiting the capacity of that second inspection (which has proved so important in
Maryland, North Carolina, and South Carolina) to detect and correct serious error.233  These questions
bear further study.
We close this section with a circuit comparison documenting the actions of state officials within
the states that are regionally grouped in the respective circuits. Figure 34 compares the circuits based on
their component states’ death sentencing rates (death sentences per 100,000 population) and execution
rates (non-consensual executions234 per 100,000 population).235 
Figure 34.  Per Capita Death Sentencing and 
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Like their state counterparts,236 the regional comparisons in Figure 34 show that relatively high
death-sentencing rates often go hand in hand with relatively low execution rates, and vice versa.  For
example:
! Alabama, Florida and Georgia (the states in the Eleventh Circuit region) impose nearly 60% more
death sentences per capita than Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas (the states in the Fifth Circuit
region), but carry out 60% fewer executions.
! The states in the Eleventh Circuit (Alabama, Florida and Georgia) likewise sentence nearly three
times as many people to death as Arkansas, Missouri, and Nebraska (in the Eighth Circuit region),
but the two regions’ execution rates are very similar.
As we already have suggested, the impulse to make frequent use of death sentences does not translate into,
and may even interfere in some way with, the capacity to do so reliably enough to permit death sentences
to pass judicial inspection for serious error and be carried out.
X. Conclusion: A Broken System; the Need for Research into Causes
Over the course of the 23-year study period, a large majority of death sentences subjected
to judicial inspection nationally and in nearly all death-sentencing states were found to be
seriously flawed and were reversed by the courts. The 60% and 70% rates of serious  error that
have existed nationally and in the vast majority of states have obliged courts to provide, and have
obliged taxpayers to foot the bill for, a elaborate and lengthy judicial inspection process—one that,
even so, almost inevitably must fail to catch and correct some amount of the error that has flooded
the system. As an inevitable result of so many serious errors and the multi-tiered process needed to catch
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them, it has taken nearly a decade—more recently, it has taken over a decade—for the small
number of death sentences that pass inspection to be carried out.  
Very few death sentences succeed, and it takes years to cull out the majority of failures.
So far we have used the rate of serious error detected by state and federal courts as the measure
of the success or failure of our capital punishment system. But there is another important measure that bears
consideration. Presumably, the most immediate goal of a system of capital punishment is the execution of
capital sentences. In this light, the most obvious measure of the “success” of our death penalty
system—indeed, the most obvious measure of the system’s sheer rationality—is its capacity to
translate the death sentences it imposes into executions . 
By this measure, the capital punishment system revealed by our 23-year study is not a
success, and is not even minimally rational. Figure 35 below plots the proportion of the death
sentences imposed at some point during the 23-year study period that had been carried out by the end of
that period—comparing the 28-state cohort of capital-sentencing jurisdictions and the national average.237












































































































































As Figure 35 reveals:
! Nationally, during the study period, the proportion of death sentences actually carried out
was a meager 5.4%, one in nineteen.
! Given high error rates, and the painstaking review needed to catch it, well over half of all
American death-sentencing states that have been in the business the longest failed to
carry out 95% or more of their death sentences. Nearly half failed to convert more than
1 in 30 death sentences into executions . Three-quarters carried out fewer than 7% of their
death sentences. The vast majority (86%) carried out 15% or fewer.
! Only 1 state, Virginia, managed to carry out more that a quarter of the death sentences
it imposed over the 23-year study period—and there is serious question whether it did so only
by dint of inferior error detection.238
* * * * * 
Through a variety of measures, our 23 years worth of findings reveal a capital punishment
system collapsing under the weight of its own mistakes. In so doing, they pose three principal
questions  (and a host of subsidiary ones) that will be the subject of a second report later this year:
! What has remained the same, and what has changed, since 1995? By all indications examined
here, the error-proneness and irrationality documented by our study of thousands of cases
reviewed by hundreds of state and federal judges, in three separate review processes, in
34 states across the nation over the course of nearly a quarter century has not somehow
evaporated in the succeeding four years.239 In none of those four years, for example, as in none of
the preceding 23, has the nation managed to execute even 3% of its death row inmates—and in
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1996 and 1998, it executed fewer than 2% (about the same proportion as it had executed in, e.g.,
1984, 1987, 1993 and 1995).240 Indeed, if the recent findings of a variety of media investigations
across the nation are any indication, error rates and the consequent confounding of the death
penalty system may be getting worse.241 In this regard, we hope to explore whether the surge of
state and federal court reversals in the last study year (1995) was a harbinger,242 and any other
patterns that may appear.
! What accounts for the generally high rates of serious error that state and federal courts have
detected in American capital judgments? In this Report, we have briefly examined the types of
errors that predominate (incompetent lawyering and prosecutorial misconduct leading the way243);
identified differences among the respective states and federal courts—for example,
disproportionately low error-detection by the Virginia courts and the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit; noted the relationship between high error rates and low execution rates
(especially rates of death sentences carried out); discovered some potentially suggestive evidence
that low execution rates (especially, low rates of death sentences carried out) are associated with
high death-sentencing rates; and considered the effect on death-sentencing and execution rates of
(1) some demographic factors (finding that homicide rates seem to have no effect on death-
sentencing and execution rates, and that the size of nonwhite populations may be inversely related
to death-sentencing rates but directly related to execution rates) and (2) judicial-contextual factors
(finding that political pressure on state judges and that state expenditures on courts may be
positively correlated with death-sentencing rates but negatively correlated with the rate at which
death sentences are carried out). These analyses represent our first steps towards the main goal
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or our next research phase: Identifying the causes of the huge amounts of serious error infecting
American capital convictions and sentences.
! What policy responses are called for? In advance of these additional efforts to explore the causes
of our capital system’s error-proneness and irrationality, we have the least to say here about the
policy implications of our findings. That, however, will be a third important focus of our next phase
of research.
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*.   An abridged version of this Report will be published in the Texas Law Review, October 2000.
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2, George Will concluded:
You could fill a book with . . . hair-curling true stories of blighted lives and justice traduced [as a
result of the capital conviction of innocent defendants]. Three authors have filled one.  It should
change the argument about capital punishment and other aspects of the criminal justice system.
Conservatives, especially, should draw this lesson from the book: Capital punishment, like the rest of
the criminal justice system, is a government program, so skepticism is in order.
George F. Will, Innocent On Death Row, Wash. Post, Apr. 6, 2000, at A23, available in 2000 WL 2295245.
22.   See Brooke A. Masters, Pat Robertson Urges Moratorium On U.S. Executions, Wash. Post, Apr.
8, 2000, at A1, available in 2000 WL 2295691 (quoting Robertson’s statement that “a moratorium would be
appropriate”); Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast,  May 7, 2000) (interviewing Rev. Pat Robertson,
who explained his simultaneous support for the death penalty and for a moratorium on executions); Robertson
Backs ,Moratorium, Says Death Penalty Used Unfairly, Chi. Trib. Apr. 8, 2000, at N12, available in 2000
WL 3654070.
23.   See the views expressed by Fallwell, Frum and Methvin,  supra note 5 and accompanying text.
24.   See the views expressed by Robertson, Will and others, supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
25.   Kroll, supra note 20.
26.   Much of the information reported here is contained in ten data bases. The authors generated four of
those data bases; the other six were generated at least in part by others.
The first (electronically stored) data base the authors generated—referred to herein as
“DADB”—contains information on all 4,578 state capital direct appeals that were finally decided between
1993 and 1995. To be “finally decided” within that time period, the highest state court with jurisdiction to
review capital judgments in the relevant state must have taken one of two actions during the study period: (1)
affirmed the capital judgment, or (2) overturned the capital judgment (either the conviction or sentence) on
one or more grounds. See also infra pp. 25-26. (Capital judgments are overturned on direct appeal only on
the basis of “serious error,” as defined infra note 33; infra p.5 & nn.42, 43.) If one of those two actions
occurred prior to or during 1995, and the United States Supreme Court thereafter denied certiorari review,
the case is included in the study, because the Supreme Court’s action did not affect the finality of the state
decision. If the Supreme Court instead granted certiorari in a case but did not decide the case before or
during 1995, the case is omitted from the study because the Supreme Court’s action withdrew the finality of
the decision. DADB contains:  the sentencing state; the year; outcome; citation; and subsequent judicial
history (rehearing, certiorari) of the decision finally resolving the appeal; and information about the basis for
reversal of the capital judgment  under review, if a reversal occurred.
The second (electronically stored) data base that the authors generated—referred to herein as
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“HCDB” —contains information on all 599 initial (i.e., nonsuccessive) capital federal habeas corpus cases
that were finally decided between 1993 and 1995. To be “finally decided” within that time period, all of the
following events must have occurred in the case within the study period: (1) a United States District Court
must have (a) denied habeas corpus relief, thereby approving the capital judgment, or (b) granted habeas
corpus relief from the capital judgment (either the conviction or sentence) on one or more grounds; (2) if an
appeal was timely filed, a United State Court of Appeals must have taken or approved action (1)(a) or (1)(b);
and (3) if certiorari review was timely filed, the United States Supreme Court must have either (a) denied
review or (b) granted review and taken or approved action (1)(a) or (1)(b).  See also infra p.24. (Federal
habeas relief from capital judgments is granted only on the basis of “serious error,” as defined infra notes
33, 38; infra p.5 & nn.42, 43.) HCDB contains: the sentencing state; the timing of the habeas petition and
its adjudication at the various stages; the outcome at the various stages; information about the petitioner,
lawyers, judges, courts, victim, offense; the aggravating and mitigating circumstances found at trial;
procedures used during the habeas review process; and the asserted and the judicially accepted bases for and
defenses to habeas relief from the capital judgment was under review.
The third data set generated by the authors is laid out in full in Appendix C to this Report. It contains
an incomplete list of the capital cases in which state post-conviction relief was granted between 1973 and
April 2000, and provides available information about citations or other identifying information, the basis for
the grant of relief, the outcome on retrial, and timing.  A full description of that data set and of the manner
in which it was gathered, and its limitations, is set out infra Appendix C, pp. C-1 to C-2.
Our fourth and final author-generated data base, PolPres, collects information about the constitutional
and statutory law governing the selection and retention of judges in each of the 28 capital-sentencing states
that we study. It includes information on method of selection and retention of judges, length of judicial terms,
frequency of judicial elections, and types of judicial elections (e.g., selection, retention and recall elections).
The first of the data bases relied upon here that was generated at least in part by others —referred
to herein as “DRCen”—is a compilation of the information used to produce the NAACP Legal Defense
Fund’s quarterly death row census, Death Row U.S.A., supra note 4. This data base has the name of all
individuals who were on a state death row between 1973 and 1995, the state where their death sentence was
imposed, and the sentencing year. Death Row U.S.A.  is also our source of information about executions:
when and where they occurred and whether they were consensual or non-consensual, as described infra
notes 31, 208; infra p.32 & n.140.
Three additional data sources used here contain information collected by the United States
Government.“USCen” is a compilation of information collected by the United States Census Bureau. In order
to estimate the racial composition of each state and circuit (region) in our study, we used Unpublished Census
data PE-19 1970-79 and three Census Bureau publications: State Estimates by Age, Sex, and Race; Estimates
of the Population of States by Age, Sex, Race and Hispanic Origin: 1981 to 1989; and Estimates of the
Population of State by Age, Sex, Race and Hispanic  Origin: 1990 to 1998. (Figures for 1980 were estimated
by averaging 1979 and 1981). “UCRDB” is a compilation of information reported in U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
FBI Uniform Crime Reporting Program Data [United States]: County Level Arrest and Offense Data, for
the years 1973 through 1996. “PrisCen” is a compilation of information collected by the Bureau of Justice
Statistics and reported in the Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics for the years 1977 through 1996. 
Our penultimate data base—CtCaLd—has information for each state in our 28-jurisdiction cohort
about the state’s average annual criminal case filings per 1,000 persons in the population for years 1985-1994.
These data, and the underlying case load measure, are taken from Inter-University Consortium for Political
and Social Research, State Court Statistics 1985-1994 (ICPSR 9266, 1995). Our final data
base—CtExpen—has information for each of the same 28 states on its average annual court-related
expenditures for fiscal years 1982-1992. These data, and the underlying measure, are taken from Expenditure
and Employment Data for the Criminal Justice System 1992 (ICPSR 6579, 1993). 
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27.   408 U.S. 238 (1972).
28.   Although the Justice Department collects aggregate data on capital cases by state, its data (1) have only
37 variables, (2) contain no case- or event-specific information, (3) are derived from reports by prison officials
who lack information about some individuals under sentence of death who are incarcerated in local jails or
for some other reason are not physically located on death row, and (4) are derived from answers to questions
about outcomes that (a) do not distinguish between state and federal court reversals, and (b) provide no
information on the reason  for a  reversal. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics, Capital
Punishment 1998, at 1 <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cp98.pdf>   (Dec. 1999; NCJ 179012)
(supporting documentation is available on line) [hereinafter, BJS 1998 Report]. Likewise, although the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund’s quarterly death row census, see Death Row U.S.A., supra note 4, lists
inmates on death row, it provides very little information about each. See infra note 123 (discussing these and
other limitations of the data in Death Row U.S.A.).
29.   We are now conducting complex multivariate statistical analyses to identify potential causes of those
results. We will report on those analyses later in the year.
30.   Our study considers only state, not federal, death sentences.
31.   DRCen; Death Row U.S.A., supra note 4, at 8-22. The figure in the text refers to all executions during
the study period. For the reasons discussed infra pp.32, 41, it often is sensible to consider only the executions
that were “non-consensual,” meaning that the prisoner availed himself of the full review process before he
was executed. The number of non-consensual executions between 1973 and 1995 was 273, or 4.7% of the
total number of death sentences.
32.   DRCen; DADB. The state direct appellate process is described infra pp. 18-19.
33.   DADB. In calculating error rates, we count only errors that result in reversal of a capital conviction or
sentence. To do so, the error must be “serious” in three respects that render our calculation of “error”
conservative. First, to be reversible, error must be prejudicial, either because the defendant has actually
shown that it probably affected the outcome of his case or because it is the kind of error that almost always
has that effect. See generally 2 James S. Liebman & Randy Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and
Procedure §§ 32.1, 32.3, 32.4 (3d ed. 2000) (generally discussing the harmless error doctrine). The vast
majority of error that state appellate courts discover is deemed harmless and does not result in reveral. In
Illinois, for example, in addition to reversing half of the capital judgments it has reviewed, “the Illinois Supreme
Court has upheld scores of death sentences while forgiving trial errors that benefited prosecutors, dismissing
the errors as harmless.” Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Death Row Justice Derailed, Chi. Trib., Nov. 14,
1999, at 1, available in 1999 WL 2932178. One such case was Anthony Porter’s case, in which the Illinois
Supreme Court based its harmlessness findings on the “‘overwhelming’” evidence of Porter’s guilt; Porter
was later released as innocent when another man confessed to his crime. Id. Another study of harmless error
found that:
Between 1993 and 1997, there were 167 published opinions in which the Illinois Appellate Court or
Illinois Supreme Court found that prosecutors committed some form of misconduct that could be
considered harmless. In 122 of those cases—or nearly three out of four times—the reviewing court
affirmed the conviction, holding that the misconduct was “harmless.”
Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Break Rules, Be Promoted, Chi. Trib., Jan. 14, 1999, at 1, available in
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1999 WL 2834609. And in Oklahoma, although at least four convicted murderers have received new trials
“based upon appellate findings that [Oklahoma City’s District Attorney] broke the rules,”  that same office
has been criticized by courts for similar misconduct in “at least 17 other” cases in which the errors were
found to be harmless. Ken Armstrong, ‘Cowboy Bob’ Ropes Wins—But at Considerable Cost, Chi. Trib.,
Jan. 10, 1999, at N13.
Second, to be reversible, error generally must have been properly preserved. Most state direc t
appeal courts will not grant relief based on error—no matter how egregious and prejudicial—that the
defendant did not properly preserve by way of (1) a timely objection at trial, (2) reiteration in a timely new
trial motion at the end of trial, and (3) timely and proper assertion on appeal. See 1 Liebman & Hertz, supra
§§ 7.1a, at 276-77 & n.29, 26.1. This is true even in cases in which the failure to preserve the error was the
fault of counsel, not the defendant, and even in many instances in which the lawyer’s mistake resulted from
inexperience, incompetence or sheer stupidity, and not a valid exercise of professional judgment. See Stephen
B. Bright, Death by Lottery—Procedural Bar of Constitutional Claims in Capital Cases Due to
Inadequate Representation of Indigent Defendants, 92 W.  VA . L. REV. 679, 683 (1990); Randall Coyne
& Lyn Entzeroth, Report Regarding Implementation of the American Bar Association’s
Recommendations and Resolutions Concerning the Death Penalty and Calling for a Moratorium on
Executions, 4 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 3, 28-30 (1996). Numerous prisoners have been executed
despite acknowledged prejudicial errors affecting their convictions and sentences, because they failed to
preserve their objections.  Examples include the capital prisoners in Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-70
(1996); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 747-49 (1991); Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 408 (1989);
Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533-35 (1986), each of whom had an evidently meritorious constitutional claim
that he was capitally convicted or sentenced in violation of the United States Constitution but nonetheless was
denied relief in state (and then, as a consequence, federal) court based on his failure to assert the claim at
the time or in the manner required by state law and was subsequently executed. See Death Row U.S.A.,
supra note 4, at 9-22.
Finally and most obviously, error—no matter how prejudicial—only results in reversal if it is
discovered. If it is not discovered, because, for example, the party responsible for it fails to disclose it, see,
e.g., infra note 98, reversal will not occur and the error will not be deemed “serious” by our measure.
Hundreds of examples of “serious error” found in state post-conviction proceedings are collected in
Appendix C infra. Dozens of examples of the even narrower category of “serious error” that warrants
federal habeas relief are collected in Appendix D infra. See also cases cited infra notes 36, 44, 97-106.
34.   The state post-conviction process is described infra pp.19-20.
35.   Our post-conviction data are set out in Appendix C. For discussion of the incomplete nature of these
data, see infra n.39; infra pp. 26-27, 33-34; infra Appendix C, pp. C-1 to C-2.
36.   Appendix C; Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina and Tennessee Capital
Punishment Report Cards, infra Appendix A. We say “at least” in the text for the reasons set out infra note
39; infra pp.26-27 & n.132, 33-34 & n.152; Appendix C, infra pp. C-1 to C-2. 
For the reasons stated in Appendix C, p. C-13 n.10, Georgia has used a variety of post-conviction
procedures to derail many more death sentences than we count as post-conviction reversals (e.g., by ordering
hearings on mental retardation (which poses a constitutional bar to execution in Georgia)—that very often
never take place, leaving the prisoner with a tacit life sentence). 
The category of “serious error” that leads to state post-conviction reversal is narrower than “serious
error” at the direct appeal stage, cf . supra note 33, because, generally, only properly preserved state and
federal constitutional violations that (1) were not, and (2) could not have been raised on direct appeal can
be the basis for state post-conviction reversal. As at the direct appeal stage, moreover, error—no matter how
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egregious and how much it undermines the accuracy of the capital verdict—never gets corrected at the state
post-conviction stage (and thus does not count as “serious error” in our analysis) unless it is discovered and
litigated. See supra note 33. And given the failure of a number of capital-sentencing states—Virginia,
prominent among them—to provide any lawyers or funding for them at all at the state post-conviction stage,
the likelihood that serious error will not be discovered and litigated in state post-conviction proceedings is
often very high. See, e.g., American Civil Liberties Union of Virginia, Unequal, Unfair and Irreversible:
The Death Penalty in Virginia (Apr. 2000) <http://www.aclu.org/news/2000/n040700a.html> (visited Apr.
28, 2000) [hereinafter, Virginia Report]; infra notes 232-33 and accompanying text.
The United States Supreme Court itself occasionally grants relief in capital cases on review of state
direct review proceedings. See, e.g. , Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 411 (1991) (overturning conviction due
to prejudicial jury instructions giving the defendant the burden of proof); Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578,
585-90 (1988) (overturning death sentence that state prejudicially based on unconstitutional and unreliable
aggravating circumstance); ; Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987) (overturning two death sentences
that were imposed absent proof of the constitutional minimum level of criminal culpability required to impose
death); Truesdale v. Aiken, 480 U.S. 527 (1987) (overturning death sentence imposed after trial court forbade
defendant to inform jury of important aggravating information about his demonstrated prospects for
rehabilitation). We treat these Supreme Court cases reviewing state post-conviction decisions as findings of
serious (in all these cases, federal constitutional) error infecting capital sentences. For many additional
examples of “serious error” that was caught and corrected during state post-conviction proceedings, see infra
Appendix C. See also cases cited infra notes 97-106.
37.   HCDB. “Final review” is defined supra note 26; infra pp.24-26.
38.   HCDB. The definition of “serious error” that warrants reversal in federal habeas corpus proceedings
is even narrower than the analogous definitions at the direct appeal stage (which is set out supra note 33 and
accompanying text) and at the state post-conviction stage (see supra note 36). This is because error is only
reversible on habeas if it meets the three criteria for “seriousness” on direct appeal—the error must be (1)
prejudicial, (2) properly preserved and (3) discovered, see Liebman & Hertz, supra note 33, §§ 7.1a, 11.2b,
26.1, 32.1-32.5; supra note 33—and if, in addition, the error (4) violates the federal Constitution, see 28
U.S.C. §§2241(c)(3), 2254(a); (5) not arise the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule (search and seizure
violations, that is, cannot be the basis for federal habeas relief), see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 495
(1976); (6) in habeas cases litigated in 1989 and after, is not based on a “new rule” of federal law,  see
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 299 (1989), and (7) in habeas cases litigated in 1993 and after, meets an
especially high standard of prejudice or “harmful error,” see Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993).
See generally Liebman & Hertz, supra note 33, §§ 9.1, 9.2, 25.1, 32.1 (discussing constraints (4)-(7) on
habeas relief). Dozens of examples of  “serious error” warranting federal habeas relief from capital
judgments imposed by nearly all of the study states are collected in Appendix D infra.  See also cases cited
infra notes 97-106, 140.
39.   The production-line/product-inspection analogy helps explain how these figures are calculated. The
“overall error rate” is the proportion of capital judgments thrown out during the first (state direct appeal)
inspection due to serious error, plus the proportion of the original judgments that survive the first inspection
but are thrown out at the second (state post-conviction) inspection, plus the proportion of the original
judgments that survive both state inspections but are thrown out at the final (federal habeas) stage. The
“overall success rate” is the converse. In note 40 infra, we use this method to calculate the national
composite “overall error rate.”
As we indicate by our use of the phrase “at least” in our narrative, and by our use of the “$” symbol
in the national, state and circuit Report Cards, see Appendix A, the “overall error rates” calculated here are
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in fact underestimates. Due to incomplete data, we assume that all death sentences that survived the direct
appeal inspection and are not known to have been reversed during the state post-conviction inspection passed
muster during that inspection. In fact, many capital judgments affirmed on direct appeal were pending in,
but had not yet been finally decided by, state post-conviction proceedings by the end of the study period.
Inflating the denominator in this way—i.e., using the class of cases available for review as a proxy for the
cases that actually underwent final review—leads us systematically to overestimate the success rate and
underestimate the error rate. See infra pp.26-27 & n.132, 33-34 & n.152; infra Appendix C, pp. C-1 to C-2.
40.   DADB; Appendix C; HCDB. Because 41% of the capital judgments reviewed on state direct appeal
were found to be tainted by serious error, only 59% of those judgments were available for state post-
conviction review. Because at least 10% (this figure is probably higher, see supra note 39; infra Appendix
C, pp. C-1 to C-2) of that 59%—meaning at least 5.9% of the original pool ($.10 x .59 = $.059)—failed this
second, state post-conviction inspection, the overall rate of error found by state courts is 47% (41% + 6%)
of the original pool. Then, of the 53% (100%-47% = 53%) of capital judgments that were available for federal
habeas review, 40%—meaning 21% of the original pool (.40 x .53)—failed the federal inspection. The
“overall error rate” thus is at least 68% of the overall pool (41% +$6%+ 21% = $68%). In other words: At
least 68% of the capital judgments that were fully inspected were found seriously flawed at some stage.
(We have simplified the above calculation by omitting fractions represented by numbers after the
decimal points. In computing overall rates in the various report cards, we included the numbers after the
decimal point until the error rate was obtained, at which point we applied the normal rounding convention.)
Our “overall error rate” is not the rate of error in the 5,760 death sentences imposed between 1973
and 1995. That number cannot be calculated because, at the end of 1995, many of those death sentences
were pending in some court awaiting review, but had not yet been finally resolved at one of the three
inspection stages. This rate instead uses the outcomes of the 4,578 cases in which state direct review
occurred during the study period, and the 599 of those cases in which subsequent federal habeas review
occurred, together with the 248 known state post-conviction reversals (taken as a proportion of the 2,693
capital judgments that had “cleared” state direct appeal) to calculate the error rate found in capital judgments
that were finally reviewed.
41.   See supra notes 33, 36, 38; infra p.5.
42.   The data in this Report on the types of “serious error” that led to the reversal of capital judgments come
from our study of state post-conviction reversals, set out in Appendix C. See State Post-Conviction National
Composite Results, infra Appendix C, p. C-3. A variety of prejudicial errors in the instructions given to
jurors—which by legal definition lead to reversal only if they probably affected the outcome of the trial, see
Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1994)—account for another 20% of the reversals, and, together with
lawyer incompetence and law enforcement misconduct, account for three-fourths of all state post-conviction
reversals. When reversals due to demonstrably prejudicial judicial or juror bias are added, the total for the
four types of claims discussed so far (ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct,
unconstitutional jury instructions and judge/jury bias) reaches 80% of all reversals. See State Post-Conviction
National Composite Results, infra Appendix C, p. C-3.
43.   See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 120 U.S. 1495, 1496 (2000); Strickler v. Green, 527 U.S. 263, 264 (1999).
44.   See State Post-Conviction National Composite Results, infra Appendix C, p. C-3. If a capital conviction
is overturned on appeal or post-conviction review, the defendant may be (1) released for lack of evidence
of guilt (as, for example, in the Bowen/Oklahoma, Brown/Florida, Jimerson/Illinois, Nelson/Georgia and
Williamson/Oklahoma (among many other) cases summarized in Appendix C and Appendix D); (2) permitted
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to accept a plea to a lesser offense or to the same offense but a lesser penalty (as in the Carriger/Arizona,
Jent & Miller/Florida cases in Appendix C); (3) retried and (a) acquitted (as in the Munson/Oklahoma case
summarized in Appendix C and in the Wallace/Georgia case summarized in Appendix D ), (b) released upon
the jury’s failure to agree on a verdict (as in the Kyles case summarized in Appendix D), (c) reconvicted of
a noncapital offense (as in numerous cases in Appendix C and Appendix D), (d) reconvicted of a capital
offense but awarded a lesser sentence (ditto), or (e) reconvicted and resentenced to die. If only the death
sentence was overturned, the defendant may be (1) offered and accept a plea or other arrangement resulting
in a lesser sentence; or (2) subjected to a new sentencing hearing at which the outcome is (a) a lesser
sentence or (b) a death sentence. For a listing of outcomes in recent North Carolina cases, see Stephen Dear,
A Death Penalty Cease-Fire for N.C., News & Observer (Raleigh), Apr. 16, 2000, at A31, available in 2000
WL 3924050:
Last May, a Superior Court [state post-conviction] judge overturned the murder conviction
and death sentence of Charles Munsey . . . because it was clear that he was innocent of murder, and
that the district attorney who prosecuted him . . . as well as other law officials withheld exculpatory
evidence. Tragically, Munsey died . . . awaiting a new trial.
Last summer, a Guilford County prosecutor told a [state post-conviction] hearing judge that
he “just plain forgot” about a credible independent witness who could have provided a solid alibi for
[death row inmate] Stephen Mark Bishop. Bishop is awaiting a second trial.
In November [1999], Alfred Rivera had been on North Carolina’s death row for two years
for a double murder . . . when, in a second trial, a jury acquitted him. The N.C. Supreme Court [on
direct appeal] had ordered the new trial, ruling that the trial judge should have allowed jurors to hear
testimony that Rivera had been framed by his co-defendants.
[Governor] Hunt commuted the death sentence of Wendell Flowers . . . in December over
doubts about his guilt . . . .
45.   As revealed by the data collected in Appendix C, the post-reversal outcomes in our state post-conviction
study were as follows:






















247 22 54 301 1 37 3 342
*The “Not Guilty of Capital Crime” column, a subset of the “Sentence Less than Death” column,
includes individuals as to whom murder charges either were dropped by the prosecutor, dismissed
by the trial judge, or rejected by the jury. Individuals who were reconvicted of murder—even
noncapital degrees of murder—and were given a sentence other than the death penalty are included
in the “Sentence Less than Death” column but not the “Not Guilty of Capital Crime” column.
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46.   See supra note 39; infra pp.26-27 & n.132, 33-34 & n.152; infra Appendix C, infra pp. C-1 to C-2 (all
explaining why we say “at least”).
47.   DADB; Appendix C; HCDB. See Table 10 and Figure 12, infra pp.68, 69. Recently, the regional press
has discovered the same patterns our study demonstrates, in a variety of states: California, Florida, Illinois,
Nevada, Tennessee, Utah and Washington. See infra note 241 (summarizing the journalists’ findings).
48.   See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
49.   See, e.g., Governor Says He Will Not Impose Moratorium on Executions, A.P. Newswires, Feb. 15,
2000 (quoting Florida Governor Jeb Bush as stating: “Illinois appears to have a unique problem with the
administration of capital punishment. Here in Florida, there is no competent evidence that suggests an innocent
person has been wrongly executed.”); Sara Rimer & Raymond Bonner, Bush Candidacy Puts Focus on
Executions, N.Y.  Times, May 12, 2000, at A1 (quoting Texas Governor George W. Bush explaining on Meet
the Press that he did not consider events in Illinois relevant to Texas’s death penalty system because in
Illinois, but not in Texas, “‘they’ve had some problems in their courts . . . they’ve had some faulty
judgments’”).
50.   DADB; Appendix C; HADB. See National Composite and Illinois Report Cards, infra Appendix A, pp.
A-5, A-25; Figures 6-13 and Tables 4-10, infra pp.47, 50, 53, 54, 57, 58, 60, 61, 63, 64, 68, 69, 72, E-5, E-6
(state comparisons).
51.   See Figure 3, Table 3, infra pp.38, E-4.
52.   See Figure 4, Table 3, infra pp.39, E-4; infra pp.35-37.
53.   Data on direct appeal and post-conviction outcomes in noncapital cases are sketchy, but suggest the
following conclusions: (1) At the direct appeal stage, serious, or reversible, error is detected in about 12 to
20% of the noncapital criminal judgments that are appealed. (2) Noncapital criminal judgments that are
appealed make up only a small subset of the criminal convictions that are obtained. The vast majority of
criminal convictions  are a result of bargained guilty pleas, and most convictions based on pleas are not
appealed. (By contrast, virtually every capital conviction and sentence is appealed. See infra notes 87-88 and
accompanying text.) (3) The best available evidence is that serious error is detected in about 3% of the
noncapital federal habeas corpus petitions that are filed, and that such petitions are filed by about 3 or 4 out
of every 1,000 state prisoners each year. (4) Although there are no similar data for noncapital state post-
conviction proceedings, most criminal lawyers believe noncapital error is detected less often there than on
federal habeas corpus, and that prisoners are no more likely to seek state post-conviction than federal habeas
corpus review. (These conclusions are based on evidence presented in James S. Liebman, The
Overproduction of Death, 100 Colum. L. Rev.  (forthcoming 2000); Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus
Jurisdiction: The Limits of Models, 66 So. Cal. L. Rev. 2507, 2524 (1993) (“of every thousand person
convicted in state prosecutions and committed to custody in any given year, only three to four actually file
habeas corpus petitions challenging their custody”); Brief Amicus Curiae of Benjamin Civiletti, et al., in
Support of Frank R. West in Wright v. West, No. 91-542, 505 U.S. 277 (1992) (filed Mar. 4, 1992), at App.
A, Table I & n.1 (providing data on the rate of relief granted to state prisoners from 1963-1981).
Assume, very conservatively, that 70% of all criminal judgments are reviewed on direct appeal,
among which 20% (14% of the original pool) are found to contain serious error; that 10% of the cases that
were affirmed on direct appeal (i.e., 6% of the original pool) go on to state post-conviction review, at which
stage 5% (.3% of the original pool) are found to contain serious error; and that 10% of the cases that were
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affirmed on direct appeal and were not overturned on state post-conviction (another 6% of the original pool)
go on to federal habeas review, at which stage another 5% (.3% of the original pool) are found to contain
serious error. Even vastly overestimating the appeal and reversal rates in this way generates only a 15%
(14% + .3% + .3% = 14.6%) overall error rate.
54.   See, e.g., 142 Cong. Rec. S3362 (daily ed. April 16, 1996) (Sen. Hatch) (“[O]ne of the biggest [Federal
habeas corpus] problems [is] looney judges in the Federal courts who basically will grant a habeas corpus
petition for any reason at all.”).
With two exceptions (Delaware and Maryland), all of the capital-sentencing states in the 28-state
cohort on which most of our analyses focus make their judges stand for election either by the public directly
(in 24 of the states) or periodically by the state legislature (in South Carolina and Virginia). See Stephen B.
Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and
the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. Rev. 759, 776-80 (1995).
55.   DADB, Appendix C; HCDB. See National Composite Capital Punishment Report Card, infra Appendix
A, pp. A-5 o A-6. Because some post-convic tion reversals are unknown, see supra note 39; infra Appendix
C, pp. C-1 to C-2, while all federal court reversals are known, the ratio of state to federal reversals is actually
higher. On the other hand, we count a handful of United States Supreme Court reversals on certiorari
following direct appeal and state post-conviction as, respectively, direct appeal and state post-conviction
findings of error. See, e.g., supra note 36; infra note 93 and accompanying text.
56.   See, e.g., Slack v. McDaniel, 120 S. Ct. 1595, 1605 (2000); Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000);
Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 644 (1998); Liebman & Hertz, supra note 33, §§ 2.4, 30.2.
57.   HCDB. See National Composite Capital Punishment Report Card, infra p.30 and infra Appendix A,
p. A-6. Judicial review of the 120 individuals executed in the years 1989-1995 consumed a total of 1274.53
case-years, meaning 10.6 years per case. HCDB. A Justice Department study concludes that the time from
death sentence to execution has increased over time to about 11 years for 1998 executions. See BJS 1998
Report, supra note 28, at 1.
58.   The data underlying Figure 1—taken from DRCen, DADB, Appendix C and HCDB—are displayed in
Tables 1, 10 and 28, infra p.68; infra Appendix E, pp. E-2, E-22.
59.   Between 1984 and 1991, there were an average of 15 non-consensual executions each year; that
number rose to 27 between 1992 and 1994, to 53 in the succeeding four-year period and then to 88 in 1999.
See Death Row U.S.A. supra note 4, at 8-22. On the reasons for focusing on non-consensual execution, see
supra note 31; infra p.32& n.140.
60.   The data depicted in Figure 2—which are taken from BJS 1998 Study, supra note 28; Death Row
U.S.A., supra note4, at 8-22—are displayed in Table 1, infra Appendix E, p. E-2.
61.   See Table 2, infra Appendix E, at E-3.
62.   The proportion of death row executed each year has moved up modestly during the 1990s—albeit at
nothing like the rate at which the number of executions has risen, and staying mainly within the 1.5% to
2.5%  range. See Table 2, infra Appendix E, p. E-3. Even this increase may be the result of swelling numbers
of prisoner piled up on death row—as overburdened judicial inspectors, faced with ever-expanding numbers
126
of cases under and awaiting their review, inadvertently miss more serious error, or become more tolerant of
it and more often let it through.
63.   See infra note 190; infra pp.51, 59 & n.190, 65, 106-07. 
64.   For this view, see the statements by Virginia officials quoted in Brooke A. Masters, A Rush on Va.’s
Death Row, Wash. Post, Apr. 28, 2000, at A1, available in 2000 WL 19606141 (presenting the arguments
of Virginia officials who attribute the pronounced discrepancy between Virginia and other states to Virginia’s
prosecutorial restraint and narrow sentencing statutes).
65.   For a report taking this position, see Virginia Report, supra note 36 (discussed infra p.107).
66.   For this purpose, 1989 was an average year. See BJS 1998 Report, supra note 28, at 12, tbl. 12.
67.   See id. at 13, app. tbl. 1.
68.   See id.
69.   See id.
70.   Id. at 1, 14 & app. tbl. 2; Death Row U.S.A., supra note 4, at 1.
71.   BJS 1998 Report, supra note 28, at 1, 14 & app. tbl. 2; Death Row U.S.A., supra note 4, at 1. (The
6,700 figure used here covers the 1973-1999 period, and includes an estimate of death sentences imposed
in 1999, which is not covered by the Justice Department’s 1998 report.) 
Returning to our 1989 example, the 13 executions by 1998 of individuals sentenced to die in 1989
represent only 1 in 20 of the 263 people condemned in 1989.
72.   See BJS 1998 Report, supra note 28, at 13, app. tbl. 1; id. at 6, tbl. 5.
73.   See supra Part II, pp.3-14.
74.   The trial, incarceration and execution of sentence in capital cases cost from $2.5 to $5 million dollars
per inmate (in current dollars), compared to less than $1 million for each killer sentenced to life without parole.
See, e.g., Aaron Chambers, Resources a Concern in Death Penalty Reform,  Chi. Daily L. Bull., Apr. 24,
1999, at 19, available in Westlaw, News Library, CHIDLB file (estimating that a capital case costs $5.2
million from pretrial proceedings to execution); Margot Garey, The Cost of Taking a Life: Dollars and
Sense of the Death Penalty, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1268, 1268-70 (1985); Samuel R. Gross, The Romance
of Revenge: Capital Punishment in America, 13 STUDIES L., POL. & SOC. 71, 78 (1993) (reporting a $3.2
million cost per execution in Florida, and Kansas’ rejection of the death penalty because of the cost); Paul
W. Keve, The Costliest Punishment—A Corrections Administrator Contemplates the Death Penalty,
Federal Probation, Mar. 1992, at 11; Duncan Mansfield, The Price of Death Penalty? Maybe Millions, A.P.
Newswires, Mar. 26, 2000, available in Westlaw News Library, APWIRES file (estimated $1 to $2 million
cost per Tennessee execution); David Noonan, Death Row Cost Is a Killer: Capital Cases Can’t Be
Handled Fairly and Affordably, Critics Claim, N.Y. Daily News, Oct. 17, 1999, at 27, available in 1999
WL 23488045  (giving cost of prosecuting and defending New York capital cases at the trial phase, in a
period during which only five capital sentences were imposed (from 1994 to 1999), as $68 million); A.
Wallace Tashima, A Costly Ultimate Sanction, The Los Angeles Daily J., June 20, 1991 (cost per execution
to California taxpayers is $4 to $5 million).
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75.   When post-trial review costs are factored in, the cost comparison between capital and noncapital cases
is something like $24 million dollar per executed prisoner, compared to $1 million for each inmate serving a
sentence of life without possibility of parole.  See S.V.  Date, The High Price of Killing Killers, Palm Beach
Post, Jan. 4, 2000, at 1A, available in 2000 WL 7592885. See also Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Inept
Defenses Cloud Verdicts, With Their Lives at Stake, Chi. Trib., Nov. 15, 1999, at N1, available in 1999 WL
2932352 (“in Illinois, the resources rallied on appeal often dwarf those summoned to keep a defendant off
Death Row in the first place”); Armstrong & Mills, Justice Derailed, supra note 33, at N1 (discussing the
“staggering” costs of capital case reversals and exonerations in Illinois: “Taxpayers have not only had to
finance multimillion-dollar settlements to wrongly convicted Death Row inmates—[Dennis] Williams alone
received $13 million from Cook County—but also have had to pay for new trials, sentencing hearings and
appeals in more than 100 cases where a condemned inmate’s original trial was undermined by some
fundamental error.”). 
76.   Cf. Maurice Possley & Ken Armstrong, The Flip Side of a Fair Trial, Chi. Trib, Jan. 11, 1999, at N1
and Maurice Possley & Ken Armstrong, Prosecution on Trial in DuPage, Chi. Trib., Jan. 12, 1999, at 1
(study of effects of prosecutorial misconduct in Illinois homicide and capital cases, concluding that “the
reversals exact a toll on victims and their families who are forced to come back to court, reopening sometimes
barely healed emotional wounds”).
77.   See supra p.4; National Composite State Post-Conviction Results, infra Appendix C, p. C-3.
78.   For example, see Armstrong & Mills, Justice Derailed, supra note 33:
Capital punishment in Illinois is a system so riddled with faulty evidence, unscrupulous trial
tactics and legal incompetence that justice has been forsaken, a Tribune investigation has found. .
. . 
The findings reveal a system so plagued by unprofessionalism, imprecision and bias that they
have rendered the state’s ultimate form of punishment its least credible.
79.   See Figure 35, infra p. 111; Tables 28 and 29, infra Appendix E, pp. E-22, E-23.
80.   See supra Figure 2, p.13.
81.   See Dan Rather, Dead Wrong: Did the State of Texas Execute an Innocent Man?, CBS 60 Minutes
II, Apr. 12, 2000 <http://cbsnews.cbs.com/now/story/0,1597,182812-412.shtml> (visited May 17, 2000)
(contending that there is strong evidence that Jerry Lee Hogue, whom Texas executed in 1998, was
innocent). Between 1972 and the beginning of 1998, 68 people were released from death row on the grounds
that their convictions were faulty, and there was too little evidence to retry the prisoner. See Samuel R. Gross,
Lost Lives: Miscarriages of Justice in Capital Cases, 61 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 125, 130-32 (1998);
Michael L. Radelet et al., Prisoners Released from Death Rows Since 1970 Because of Doubts About
Their Guilt, 13 COOLEY L. REV. 907, 916 (1996) . As of this writing (May 2000), the number of inmates
released from death row as factually or legally innocent apparently has risen to 87, including nine released
in 1999 alone. See Frank Green, Question of Life or Death: Illinois Exonerations Spark a Debate,
Richmond Times-Dispatch, Apr. 2, 2000, at A1, available in 2000 WL 503442. 
82.   See Scheck, Neufeld & Dwyer, supra note 2, at 172-92 (attributing the conviction of the innocent in
large part to incompetent lawyers and prosecutorial suppression of evidence—the two most common errors
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detected in the reversals discussed in this study, see supra p. 5; National Composite State Post-Conviction
Results, infra Appendix C, p. C-3).
83.   Cf. Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Flawed Murder Cases Prompt Calls for Probe, Chi. Trib., Jan.
24, 2000, at N1, available in 2000 WL 3629579 (reporting that Illinois paid $36 million to settle lawsuits by four
men who were wrongly convicted of murder, and two of whom were sentenced to die); Sasha Abramsky,
Trial by Torture, Mother Jones, March 3, 2000 ($1 million paid to civil rights plaintiffs who were tortured into
confessing to (and then being falsely convicted of) capital crimes); Laurie Goering, Florida Lets Speed
Govern Executions,  Chi. Trib. Feb. 28, 2000, at 1, available in 2000 WL 3640614 (noting that Florida paid
$1 million in damages for falsely incarcerating two inmates on death row for 12 years); Paul M. Valentine,
Maryland to Give Cleared Man $300,000, Wash. Post, June 23, 1994, at B1, available in 1994 WL
2426459.
84.   See Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Trial & Error: How Prosecutors Sacrifice Justice, Chi. Trib.
Jan. 13, 1999, at N1, available in 1999 WL 2834238 (detailing how, 12 years after the “Ford Heights 4" were
falsely convicted in Chicago (two capitally) of two rape-murders, and five years before the four were
exonerated following several judicial decisions ordering a new trial, one of the actual perpetrators still at large
suffocated a third woman to death in a vacant apartment near the scene of the earlier crimes); Brooke
Masters, Lucky Release from Behind Bars, Wash. Post, Apr. 28, 2000, at A23 (discussing David Vasquez’s
incarceration in Virginia for a capital murder he did not commit, and the murder spree on which the real killer
embarked in the meantime).
85.   See supra note 21 (discussing George Will’s conclusion that innocent men and women have been
executed); supra note 33 (discussing how close the Illinois Supreme Court came to missing the miscarriage
of justice in Anthony Porter’s case).
All the implications of our findings that we discuss in text are poignantly illustrated by a recent article
in the Seattle Times about Seattle murder victim, Esther Vinikow. After prosecutors said they would consider
the views of the victims’ family before deciding whether to seek the death penalty against the alleged killer,
Robert Wentz, a reporter interviewed Ms. Vinikow’s children:
Like most Americans, Esther Vinikow's children support the death penalty. But they say
Wentz, if found guilty, should not be executed. Not because whoever killed her doesn't deserve it, but
because it takes too long and costs too much. 
To Jerome Vinikow, 58, Esther Vinikow's only son, the death penalty seems to only protract
the tragedy . . . . “As long as he's away permanently, I'm not sure . . .,”  he trails off.  “If he does
get the death penalty, and it's 10 to 12 years of waiting,  I don't know what good that does.”
In many ways, the family's misgivings reflect a growing national impatience and unease about
capital punishment.  In the aftermath of a tragedy, they have become drawn into a discussion
that provides no easy answers. 
Superior Court trials cost taxpayers an average of $388,680. State and federal appeals of
death-penalty cases take an average of 11 years, according to a recent study by state Supreme Court
Justice Richard Guy. That's eroded public confidence in the justice system, Guy said. 
But polls also suggest growing unease about capital punishment, particularly after several
death-row inmates in Illinois were released when new evidence proved their innocence. 
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The decades it takes to execute an inmate may have saved lives, notes Jerome Vinikow .
. . . That possibility should not be lost in the rush for justice.  “I'm not against the death penalty. I used
to wonder why it took 10 or 12 years, but it's obvious when you see all the mistakes in Illinois, you
have to be careful,” he said. 
. . . .
At first, [the victim’s daughter, Dolores] Beck-Schwartz, 62, of Putnam Valley, N.Y.,
wanted whomever a jury convicted to be put to death. It seemed an appropriate punishment for
someone who took the life of such a defenseless, gentle person, she said. 
But Beck-Schwartz had second thoughts when she considered the years that pass between
trial and execution—if the sentence isn't overturned along the way. “If it happened within a year, I'm
fine with that. But if it dragged on year after year, it won't make it any easier,” she said. “It won't
bring her back. It won't make me feel better.”
Alex Fryer, Victim’s Family Wrestles Death-Penalty Issue, Seattle Times, May 14, 2000,
<http://archives.seattletimes.com/cgi-bin/texis/web/vortex/display?slug=deth14m&date=20000514&query
=vinikow.
86.   See, e.g., Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 874-80 (1983); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 204-06
(1976); Furman, 408 U.S. 238.
87.   Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 174 & n.1 (1990) (citing statutes).
88.   See id. at 174-75 (“since the reinstitution of capital punishment in 1976, only one person, Gary Gilmore,
has been executed without any appellate review of his case”).
89.   See generally Leigh B. Bienen, The Proportionality Review of Capital Cases by State High Courts
After Gregg: Only ‘The Appearance of Justice,’ 87 J. CRIM . L. & CRIMINOLOGY 130, 131-33 (1996);
Penny J. White, Can Lightening Strike Twice? Obligations of State Courts After Pulley v. Harris, 70 U.
COLO. L. REV. 813, 816-17 (1999).
90.   For a brief overview of the direct appellate process with citations to other works, see Liebman & Hertz,
supra note 33, § 3.4a, at 177-79.
91.   See supra notes 33, 36, 38; supra p.5 & nn.42, 43. 
92.   See Liebman & Hertz, supra note 33, at 178 (recommending the filing of certiorari petitions, particularly
in capital cases). By making certiorari the prisoner’s last opportunity to raise novel federal claims, the
Supreme Court has strongly encouraged prisoners, especially ones under sentence of death, to file certiorari
petitions. See id., § 25.1, at 940-41.
93.   See, e.g., Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 119 S. Ct. 1887, 1898 (1999) (reversing capital conviction);
Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 631-32 (1991) (affirming capital conviction); Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S.
415, 421 (1991) (affirming capital sentence); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (reversing capital
sentence).
94.   See, e.g., Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 527 (1997); Stringer v. Balck, 503 U.S. 222, 226 (1992).
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95.    The Supreme Court’s certiorari jurisdiction is limited to federal questions, which in criminal cases almost
always means federal constitutional questions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257.
96.   See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(b), 2254(c); O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 119 S. Ct. 1728, 1731-33 (1999).
97.   See generally Liebman & Hertz, supra note 33, § 7.1b, at 290-92, § 7.2e, at 314-17 & n.87, §§ 20.3e,
26.3b (providing examples and citing other sections of the treatise with additional examples).
98.   See, e.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 441-45 (1995) (overturning conviction based on prosecutorial
suppression of evidence demonstrating, among other things, that the eyewitnesses who confidently identified
petitioner at trial as the attacker had originally described a different perpetrator and had only focused on
petitioner as a result of suggestive photo arrays).
99.   See, e.g., Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214 (1988) (holding that prosecutor’s failure to make public his
instructions to the jury commissioner to under-represent African-Americans on the jury venire provided
“cause” for the habeas petitioner’s failure to make a jury challenge in a timely manner).
100.   See, e.g., Williams v. Withrow, 507 U.S. 680, 688 (1993) (violations of the right to counsel “would often
go unremedied” if left to review at trial and on direct review”); other authority cited in Liebman & Hertz,
supra note 33, § 25.4, at 969-70 n.42.
101.   See, e.g., Liebman & Hertz, supra note 33, § 26.3b, at 1093-94 & n.28.
102.    See, e.g., People v. Fields, 690 N.E.2d 999 (Ill. 1998).
103.   See, e.g., Porter v. State, 723 So.2d 191 (Fla. 1998); Suarez v. State, 604 So.2d 488 (Fla. 1992); People
v. Fields, 690 N.E.2d 999 (Ill. 1998).
104.   See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000); State v. Freeman, 605 So.2d 1258 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1992).
105.   See, e.g., Turpin v. Todd, 519 S.E.2d 678 (Ga. 1999); Simants v. State, 277 N.W.2d 217 (Neb. 1979).
106.   See, e.g., Liebman & Hertz, supra note 33, § 26.3b, at 1090-92 & n.27.
107.   See Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336 (1965) (granting certiorari to consider whether a constitutional
right to state post-conviction review exists, but dismissing the grant after Nebraska adopted a comprehensive
state post-conviction review scheme). But cf. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1989) (plurality
opinion) (“State collateral proceedings are not constitutionally required . . . .”); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481
U.S. 551, 554-55 (1989) (plurality opinion) (similar). See generally Liebman & Hertz, supra note 33, § 7.1b.
108.   See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d), 2254(e)(1) (providing a laxer standard of review for certain kinds of claims
that were “adjudicated on the merits” in state court proceedings).
109.   See Liebman & Hertz, supra note 33, § 3.5a, at 179-80, § 6.1 & n.1 (citing authority).
110.   See McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 1256, 1261 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from the denial of
certiorari) (“State habeas corpus proceedings are a vital link in the capital review process, not the least
because all federal habeas claims first must be adequately raised in the state court ... [to avoid being denied
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in federal court] as procedurally defaulted or waived . . . .”); Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 956-57
(1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (describing typical post-trial course of proceedings
in capital cases, which includes a state post-conviction petition); Liebman & Hertz, supra note 33, §§ 6.4c,
7.1a, 7.1b, 7.2f  (describing counsel’s legal and ethical obligations in regard to pursuing state post-conviction
remedies in capital cases).
111.   See generally Liebman & Hertz, supra note 33, §§ 3.5a(6), 6.1, 6.2, 7.1.
112.   See, e.g. , Rimer, supra note 9, at A1, A9 (describing new state post-conviction procedures recently
adopted in Florida but then invalidated, see supra note 9, that, inter alia, gave capital prisoners 180 days after
the filing of their direct appeal brief to file a state post-conviction petition; barred all claims that were or could
have been raised at trial or on direct appeal; forbade extensions of time, even if delays were the result of the
state’s illegal withholding of exculpatory evidence or a court’s failure to compel legally required disclosure
of public records; barred successive petitions unless they were based on previously undiscoverable evidence
establishing a constitutional violation and the prisoner’s factual innocence; and imposed strict time limits on
the adjudication of state post-conviction and public records act petitions). See generally Liebman & Hertz,
supra note 33, § 3.3b nn.9-12 (discussing “unitary review” procedures).
113.   See Liebman & Hertz, supra note 33, § 3.5a(6).
114.   See id., § 6.4 & n.13.
115.   See supra note 36.
116.    See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2254.
117.   See id. § 2243; Rules 2, 3 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases.
118.   See 28 U.S.C. § 2253; Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 892-93 (1983); Liebman & Hertz, supra  note
33, § 34.4.
119.   See Liebman & Hertz, supra note 33, §§ 39.1, 39.3c.
120.   See 28 U.S.C. § 2251; Liebman & Hertz, supra note 33, §§ 13.1, 13.2.
121.   See supra note 33. Some state capital prisoners file, and in rare instances secure the stay of execution
needed to allow them to litigate, a second or “successive” federal habeas petition after their first petitions are
denied. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244; Liebman & Hertz, supra note 33, §§ 28.1-28.4. For the reasons given infra
note 126, this study only considers error detected during initial federal habeas proceedings.
122.   An early and very preliminary count of cases is reported in Memorandum to Senator Joseph F. Biden,
Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee from James S. Liebman (July 15, 1991), reprinted in Statement of John
J. Curtin, Jr., President of the American Bar Association, and of James S. Liebman, Professor of Law,
Columbia University School of Law and Member, ABA Task Force on Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, on
behalf of the American Bar Association, Hearings before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights
of the Comm. on the Judiciary of the U.S. House or Rep. Concerning Fairness and Efficiency in Habeas
Corpus Adjudication, 102d Cong., 1st Sess (July 17, 1991).
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123.   See Death Row U.S.A., supra note 4. By combining the data on LDF  reports produced periodically
over the period from 1973 to 1995, one can collect the name of and a small amount of information (e.g., race
of defendant and race and number of victims) about all individuals who have been incarcerated on death row
for at least some period of time between those dates. Although helpful, the LDF census did not narrow our
case-gathering task very much, because it contains nearly 6000 individuals who were on death row at some
point during the period, the vast majority of whom have never had their cases reviewed on federal habeas
corpus (many having received relief or still being in the process of seeking relief in the state courts), and
bec ause the information—a name and a state, e.g., Charles Williams of Georgia— often leads to many false
positives in follow-up computer research. See also supra note 28.
124.   See supra p.3 & nn.28-29.
125.   HCDB. Habeas corpus cases typically become final upon the Supreme Court’s denial of a petition for
certiorari either by the prisoner or by the state challenging an adverse decision of a U.S. Court of Appeals.
Many more such denials are announced by the Court on the first Monday in October than on any other day,
because that is when the Court generally rules on cases that have accumulated over the summer months
when the Court is not in session. We accordingly chose the first Monday in October, 1995, as our termination
point.
126.   Although we collected data on the published outcomes of capital successive habeas litigation during
our study period, in addition to the outcomes of all initial federal habeas corpus petitions that were finally
adjudicated during the study period, our data on successive petitions are incomplete. (Many successive-
petition cases are never published, and they are difficult to find.) Our data indicate, however, that grants of
habeas review and relied based on successive petitions are rare, but not nonexistent. Grants of successive
petitions include Smith v. Singletary, 61 F.3d 815 (11th Cir. 1995); Aldridge v. Dugger, 925 F.2d 1320 (11th
Cir. 1991); Booker v. Dugger, 922 F.2d 633 (11th Cir. 1991); Songer v. Wainwright, 769 F.2d 1488  (11th Cir.
1985); Schlup v. Bowersox, No. 4:92CV443 JCH (E.D. Mo. 1997).  For these reasons, we only report here
the results of initial habeas corpus proceedings. In this respect, as well as others noted elsewhere, see supra
notes 33, 36, 39; infra pp.26-27 & n.132; infra Appendix C, pp. C-1 to C-2, C-13 n.10, our calculation of
rates of serious error is conservative and omits some judicial findings of even egregious error. (Because the
standards for successive habeas litigation have always been very stringent, see Liebman & Hertz, supra note
33, ch.28, it is only in the case of egregious error that relief is granted at this stage.)
127.   See Table 8 and Figure 8, infra pp.60, 61.
128.   See infra note 190; infra pp.62-66 & n.198 (presenting some data on this question).
129.   See supra note 26.
130.   DADB. See supra notes 33, 36, 38; supra p.5 & nn.42, 43 (defining “serious error”).
131.   See cases collected in Appendix C infra. In some states, even appellate post-conviction decisions are
not generally published or available on line, as in Tennessee prior to 1985 and Nevada and Texas to this day.
132.   It is possible to get a rough sense of how much we have overestimated the denominator (by treating
all cases available for review as if they actually were finally reviewed), by considering three facts. First, one
out of five cases available for state direct review during the study period was not finally decided at that stage
during that period. See infra pp. 32-33; National Composite Capital Punishment Report Card, infra pp.29 &
Appendix A, p. A-5. Second, cases often are pending for longer periods on state post-conviction review than
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on state direct appeal, because the former, but not the latter, include evidentiary and multi-court proceedings.
Third, only 22% (599) of the 2,693 cases that cleared state direct appeal during the study period also cleared
state post-conviction and completed federal habeas review during the study period. See National Composite
Capital Punishment Report Card, infra pp.29 & infra Appendix A, p. A-5.
If, say, 30% (i.e., 809) of the 2,693 cases available for state post-conviction review were not
decided during that period, which would leave a balance of 1,884 cases decided during the period, the state
post-conviction reversal rate, which we very conservatively estimate as 10%, would rise to 13% (still fairly
conservatively estimated), and the national overall rate of error would rise to 70%.
133.   The state report cards themselves are collected in Appendix A, infra. 
134.   The federal judicial circuit/regional report cards are collected in Appendix B, infra.
135.   DRCen. See supra p.3.
136.   DADB. Georgia imposed the nation’s first post-Furman death sentence on Chester Thomas Akins in
early May 1973, about six weeks after Governor Jimmy Carter signed the state’s post-Furman death-penalty
statute into law. Six months later, the state supreme court overturned Akins’ death sentence. See Akins v.
State, 202 S.E.2d 62 (Ga. 1973).
137.   See Akins v. State, 202 S.E.2d 62 (Ga. 1973) (discussed supra note 136).
138.   Death Row U.S.A., supra note 4, at 10. 
139.   See Ramsey Clark, Spenkelink’s Last Appeal, 229 Nation 385 (1979).
140.   See supra notes 33, 36, 38; supra p.5 & nn.42, 43. Of the 313 executions between 1973 and 1995, 273
(87.2%) were non-consensual and 40 (12.8%) were consensual. See Death Row U.S.A., supra note 4, at
8-22. One might hypothesize that individuals who contemplate ending their appeals and being executed do so
in large part because of a belief that their capital judgments are error free, hence that their appeals are
fruitless. If that were the actual motivation for consented-to executions, and if, in addition, death row inmates’
evaluations of their chances on appeal were accurate, it would make sense to treat non-consensual executions
the same as others. The available evidence is inconsistent with these conjectures, however. Numerous
examples exist of men who nearly were executed after they initially gave up their appeals, then changed their
minds and had their death sentences—in some cases, multiple death sentences—overturned. See, e.g., Potts
v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512 (11th Cir. 1987) (reinstating, in pertinent part, Potts v. Zant, 734 F.2d 526, 529-30,
535-35 (11th Cir. 1984) (overturning multiple capital convictions of prisoner who previously came within days
of being voluntarily executed, then decided at the last minute to pursue his appeals, based on trial court’s
failure to instruction the jury on essential elements of capital murder, and based on the prosecutor’s inaccurate
statements in closing argument that “prior decisions of the state supreme court mandated the imposition of
the death penalty in this case”)); Vickers v. Ricketts, 798 F.2d 369, 373 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1054 (1987) (overturning conviction of prisoner who came within days of being voluntarily executed, then
changed his mind, because the jury instructions at his trial kept the jurors from considering a lesser included
offense supported by evidence); Clark v. Louisiana State Penitentiary, 694 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1982)
(overturning capital conviction of prisoner who originally attempted to end his appeals, then changed his mind,
because the jury at his trial was instructed that he had the burden of proving a critical element of capital
murder). See generally Liebman & Hertz, supra note 33, § 4.2 (discussing factors other than likelihood of
success on appeal that lead condemned inmates to give up their appeals and ask to be executed).
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141.   DRCen. All of these death sentences were imposed by state courts.
142.   See Death Row U.S.A., supra note 4, at 8-22.
143.   The three levels of judicial inspection are described supra pp. Part V, pp.18-22.
144.   See supra pp.4-5 & nn.39, 40.
145.   DADB. See supra note 26; supra pp.25-26 (defining “final review”).
146.   DRCen; DADB. Death sentences imposed (5760) - death sentences finally reviewed on direct appeal
(4578) = death sentences awaiting direct review (1182).  
Death sentences awaiting direct review (1182) ÷ death sentences imposed (5760) = percentage
awaiting direct appeal (21%).
147.   DADB. See supra note 33 (defining “serious error,” meaning in this context, only error that was
discovered, preserved and prejudicial). 
Additional information on most of the direct appeal decisions discussed here is contained in the state
report cards in Appendix A infra. Appendix A contains state report cards for the 28 states with at least one
federal habeas corpus decision. Direct appeal information for the remaining 6 capital-sentencing states is as
follows: 
Direct Appeal Reversal Rates in States in Which No Capital Judgments
       Had Completed Federal Habeas Review by End of Study Period










Colorado   16 7/8 88
Connecticut     4 3/3 100
New Jersey   43 33/38 87
New Mexico     9 2/8 25
Ohio 183 30/125 24
Oregon   32 28/32 88
Total 287 103/214 48
148.   DADB. Number reviewed (4578) - number reversed (1885) = number carried forward to next
inspection stage (2693).
149.   DADB. The vast majority of capital prisoners who remain alive seek state post-conviction review. See
supra note 100 and accompanying text. Some number of prisoners die of natural causes or foul play, see,
e.g., BJS 1998 Report, supra note 28, or forgo state post-conviction review and volunteer to be executed,
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see supra notes 31; supra p.32 & n.140 and accompanying text.
150.   DADB. Number reviewed (4364) - number reversed (1782) = number carried forward to next
inspection stage (2582).
151.   See supra note 39; supra pp. 26-27 & n.132; infra Appendix C, pp. C-1 to C-2.
152.   The number of known reversals is set out in the “Number Reversed on Post-Conviction” row within
the “Error Rates/State Post-Conviction” section of each report card. Because it is not possible to obtain
information on all state post-conviction reversals, see supra note 39; supra pp. 26-27 & n.132; infra
Appendix C, pp. C-1 to C-2, these figures are reported with the “$” symbol.
153.   The number of capital judgments moving forward from state direct appeal to state post-conviction is
listed in the last row of the “Error Rates/State Direct Appeal” section of each report card.
154.   See supra note 39; supra pp. 26-27 & n.132; infra Appendix C, pp. C-1 to C-2.
155.   Appendix C; DRCen; DADB. See supra note 132. 
156.   Appendix C; DRCen; DADB. Following the same procedure used to (under)estimate the state post-
conviction reversal rate (in which we use the number of capital judgments available for state post-conviction
review as a rough proxy for the number of capital judgments actually reviewed at that stage), see supra note
39; supra pp. 26-27 & n.132, 33-34 & n.152; infra Appendix C, pp. C-1 to C-2, we calculate this figure by
taking the sum of the reversals at the state direct appeal and state post-conviction stages as a proportion of
the total number of capital judgments reviewed on direct appeal. In the national composite report card, we
use the figures for the 28-state cohort of states with cases furthest along in the review process: (1782 + 248)
÷ 4364 = .47.
157.   Actually, the first Monday in October 1995. See supra note 125.
158.   See supra note 26 and supra p.24 (defining “finally review”).
159.   HCDB. See supra notes 33, 38 (defining “serious error,” meaning, in this context, that the error was:
discovered, preserved, prejudicial, not based on an invalid search and seizure, violated the U.S. Constitution,
and (in the post-1988 cases) not based on “new law”).
160.   See supra pp. 4-5 & nn.39, 40 (discussing the calculation of these rates, and showing how the 68%
overall error rate for the nation was calculated). The error and success rates in brackets are for only the state
direct appeal and federal habeas stages; the nonbracketed numbers include state post-conviction reversals,
as well.
161.   DADB; DRCen; Appendix C; HCDB. As is shown in brackets on the national report card, if only the
(first) state direct appeal and the (third) federal habeas stages are considered, the combined national error
rate was 64% and the combined success rate was 36%. Although our information on cases at those two
stages is more accurate than our information about the state post-conviction stage, the information that is
available on the intermediate stage provides a reliably conservative estimate of what took place there. See
supra note 39; supra pp. 26-27 & n.132; infra Appendix C, pp. C-1 to C-2. For this reason, we usually focus
on the more comprehensive, three-stage “overall” rates.
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162.   The data in Figure 3—drawn from DADB, HCDB—are presented in Table 3, infra Appendix E,  p.
E-4.
163.   See supra note 39; supra pp. 26-27 & n.132; infra Appendix C, pp. C-1 to C-2.
164.   The data in Figure 4, which are compiled from Appendix C, are also displayed in Table 3, infra
Appendix E, p. E-4.
165.   This figure is likely to be more meaningful when only cases from a single state are considered.
166.   DRCen; DADB; National Composite Capital Punishment Report Card, supra p.29 & infra Appendix
A, p. A-5.
167.   See Table 2, infra Appendix E, p. E-3.
168.   HCDB; Death Row U.S.A., supra note 4, at 8-22.
169.   HCDB.
170.   See supra note 31; supra p.32.
171.   See infra notes pp. 78-87.
172.   DRCen; UCRDB; USCen.
173.   Death Row U.S.A., supra note 4, at 8-22; UCRDB; USCen.
174.   DRCen; Death Row U.S.A., supra note 4, at 8-22; UCRDB; USCen.
175.   USCen.
176.   UCRDB.
177.   UCRDB; USCen.
178.   PrisCen. This category of information and the next are omitted from the national, but presented in the
state and regional, report cards.
179.   PrisCen.
180.   USCen.
181.   See, e.g., James Eisenstein & Herbert Jacob, Felony Justice: An Organizational Analysis of Criminal
Courts (1977); Martha Myers and Suzette Talarico, The Social Contexts of Sentencing (1987).
182.   See PolPres. See also Bright & Keenan, supra note 54, at 76-80 (describing types of judicial
elections); supra note 54 (listing study states with judicial elections); infra note 221 (political pressure on
judges).
183.   This measure is from Stanley & Niemi, Vital Statistics on American Politics 1997-1998 (1999).
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184.   CtCaLd.
185.   CtExpen.
186.   See Virginia Report, supra note 36 (taking this position in regard to Virginia).
187.   See supra note 64 (newspaper article quoting Virginia law enforcement officials taking this view).
188.   See supra note 39; supra pp. 26-27 & n.132; infra Appendix C, pp. C-1 to C-2. Data on the number
of cases available for state post-conviction review in each state is found in the “Number Forward to State
Post-Conviction” category of each state’s report card, infra Appendix A. We derive that number from
DRCen and DADB. The number of state post-conviction reversals, also provided on each report card, is
computed from the data in Appendix C.
189.   The narrow category of error sufficiently egregious to qualify as “serious” and “reversible” at the
federal habeas stage is described supra note 38.
190.   On one interpretation, there are actually four anomalies among the non-asterisked states on Figure 7.
Although 16 of the 20 non-asterisked states fall in the range of two-thirds to 1.5 times the national 40% rate
of error, four states—North Carolina, Missouri, South Carolina and Virginia—are below half the national
average. (As we noted, however, even compared to other anomalies, Virginia is an anomaly, at 15% of the
national average.)  
The status of Virginia and Missouri here may seem to support the hypothesis (see supra note 64 and
accompanying text) that both states have lower rates of serious capital error than other states, because low
error rates are detected at successive state and federal inspection points. Although possibly valid for Missouri,
this hypothesis is confounded as to Virginia by a striking fact about that state and the other federal habeas
outlying states besides Missouri: All are states in which the availability of federal habeas relief is largely
controlled by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which, as we show elsewhere, has
markedly lower error detection rates than the other federal circuit courts. See Figures 8 and 33, infra pp.61,
104; Table 25, infra p.103; infra p.106. (By contrast, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, which presides
over Missouri habeas cases, does not consistently detect low rates of serious capital error. Contrasting with
the 15% rate of serious error it finds in Missouri capital judgments is the 48% rate of serious error it finds in
Arkansas judgments.) Given the Fourth Circuit’s consistent and pronounced inclination to find low error rates
in all capital judgments it reviews—including capital judgments from states (Maryland, North Carolina, and
South Carolina) whose own courts find exceptionally high rates of serious error in those states’ capital
judgments, see Table 6, Figure 6, supra pp.53, 54; supra p.55; infra pp.66 & n.198, 106-07—the Fourth
Circuit’s discovery of low rates of serious error in Virginia cases provides little confirmation of the low-error-
rate hypothesis, and little disproof of the lax-error-detection hypothesis.
191.   See supra note 54.
192.   See  Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences,
Two Answers, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 2466, 2470 (1996).
193.   The data underlying Figure 9—compiled from DADB and HCDB—are displayed in Tables 4 and 7,
supra pp. 47, 57.
194.   The data underlying Figure 10—compiled from DRCen, Appendix C and HCDB—are displayed in
Tables 6 and 7, supra pp.53, 57.
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195.   Figure 10 is the more informative of the two charts because it permits us to compare all relevant state
judicial behavior to all relevant federal judicial behavior. See supra note 161.
196.   The two measures, again, are (1) how much error judges (here, state vs. federal judges) detect when
reviewing capital judgments from the same state; and (2) how much error judges (state vs. federal) find
relative to the amount of error found in capital judgments from other states.
197.   See supra notes 161, 195.
198.   See also supra p.51. The Fourth Circuit’s low rates of error detection in capital (and, especially,
Virginia capital) cases are well known. See, e.g., Green,  Virginia Bucks Death Row Flow, supra note 4;
Masters, A Rush on Va.’s Death Row, supra note 64.
The courts of another state in the Fourth Circuit, Maryland, also have very high capital error-detection
rates. See Table 6, supra p.53; Figure 6, supra pp.51, 54. Although Maryland’s federal habeas reversal rate
appears to be high as well, the state had only a small number of habeas cases reviewed during the study
period, and all were decided at the federal district court level, with the Fourth Circuit court of appeals never
becoming involved. See HCDB.
In contrast to the courts of Maryland, North Carolina and South Carolina, it is less likely that the
Louisiana, Florida and Alabama courts have ratcheted up their error detection to compensate for predictably
low error detection by the Fifth Circuit (in reviewing Louisiana capital judgments) and the Eleventh Circuit
(in reviewing Florida and Alabama capital judgments). Unlike the Fourth Circuit’s uniformly low error-
detection, the Fifth Circuit and Eleventh Circuits error-detection rates vary state to state, and are quite high
for some states (respectively, Mississippi and Georgia). See Table 8, supra p.60; Figure 8, supra p.6. This
variance suggests that the Fifth and Eleventh Circuit courts are sensitive to differences in the amounts of
error infecting the cases they review, see supra pp.59-60, and thus that it is those two  federal courts (and
not the state courts) that are doing the compensating, based on how relatively error-prone or error-free they
find capital judgments from each of the states within their jurisdiction.
199.   See supra pp.4-5 & nn.39, 40.
200.   See supra note 161, explaining why we sometimes report reversal rates for state direct appeal and
federal habeas corpus, excluding state post-conviction, and on other occasions report the overall rates for all
three stages.
201.   Two states from our cohort of 28, Delaware and Washington, are omitted from this analysis because
state post-conviction information is not available for them. Both in any event have less than three federal
habeas cases, making them relatively unreliable targets of comparison.
202.   Kentucky, Maryland and Tennessee have 100% error rates, but only small numbers of final federal
habeas cases (2, 3 and 1 respectively).
203.   See sources cited supra note 10.
204.   See supra note 49.
205.   The data underlying Figure 13 are displayed in Tables 6, 7 and 10, supra pp.53, 57, 68.
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206.   See supra note pp.40-41; National Composite Capital Punishment Report Card, supra p.30 & infra
Appendix A, p. A-6.
207.   The same information—taken from DRCen; Death Row U.S.A., supra note 4, at 8-22—is in Table
11, infra Appendix E, p. E-7.
208.   By non-consensual executions, we mean ones occurring after the prisoner insisted upon and received
full judicial review.  For further explanation of the difference between consensual and non-consensual
executions and the reasons for looking at the latter, and for some data about the relative frequency of each
type of execution, see supra note 31; supra 0p.32 & n.140, 41.
209.   Two of the study states (Idaho and Pennsylvania) have yet to have a post-1973 non-consensual
execution.
210.   The same information—from DRCen and Death Row U.S.A., supra note 4, at 8-22—is in Table 12,
infra Appendix E, p. E-8.
211.   See supra notes 31, 140, 208.
212.   The same information—from DRCen and DADB—is in Table 13, infra Appendix E, p. E-9.
213.   See supra pp.40-41.
214.   The data underlying all the comparisons in this section—which come from DRCen, Death Row U.S.A.,
supra note 4, UCRDB, USCen, PrisCen—are displayed in Tables 14-19, infra Appendix E, pp. E-10 to E-15.
Tables 14, 15, and 16 compare states’ death sentencing rates, respectively, per homicides, population and
prison population. Tables 17, 18, and 19 then make the same comparisons of the respective states’ non-
consensual execution rates. 
215.   Variations are not quite as great per prison population, suggesting that some part of the variation in
death-sentencing and execution rates per homicides and population is due to variable punitiveness among the
states.
216.   Similarly, Nevada and Idaho are among the top three states when it comes to the proportion of
homicides that result in death sentences, but both states are in the very bottom cohort of states when it comes
to the proportion of their death sentences that are validated on judicial review and result in executions. See
also infra note 238. (Nevada and Idaho are also among the top four states when it comes to the proportion
of their prison population under sentence of death, but they are in the very bottom category of states when
it comes to executions.) Conversely, Virginia and Louisiana are in the top four states when it comes to the
proportion of their prison population that they execute but in the bottom cohort of states when it comes to the
proportion of their prison population that is under sentence of death.
217.   See Jason DeParle, Abstract Death Penalty Meets Real Execution, N.Y.  Times, Sept. 28, 1991, §
4, at 2 (discussing a period in 1987 when Louisiana executed eight men in 11 weeks and was “so enthusiastic
about capital punishment that a legal newspaper dubbed it ‘Death Mill, U.S.A.’”).
(Notes continue on the next page)
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218.   During the 1990s, Texas and Virginia have consistently executed about as many individuals as all the
other states combined:
        Total Number of Executions Compared to 
        Executions by Texas and Virginia 










Total 455 226 (49.7%)
Death Row U.S.A., supra note 4, at 11-19. See Green, Virginia Bucks Death Row Flow, supra note 4;
Masters, A Rush on Va.’s Death Row, supra note 64; supra note 4.
219.   The relevant states’ average homicides rate per 100,000 population during the 23-year study
period—taken from UCRDB, USCen—are in Table 20, infra Appendix E, p. E-16. See supra pp.43
(explaining how average homicide rates are calculated). As Table 20 demonstrates, average homicide rates
varied greatly among death-sentencing states during the study period, ranging from 3.28 per 100,000
population in Utah to 15.19 per 100,000 population in Louisiana.
220.   Average percent nonwhite populations for our 28-state cohort during the 23-year study period—taken
from USCen—are set out in tabular form in Table 21, infra Appendix E, p. E-17.
221.   A number of authorities (1) have noted instances in which elected judges’ careers were positively or
negatively affected by whether their prior actions on the bench had seemed (respectively) sympathetic to,
or skeptical about, capital punishment, and (2) have concluded that political pressure is likely to skew capital
decision making by state court judges. See, e.g., Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 519-20 & n.5 (1995)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The ‘higher authority’ to whom present-day capital judges may be ‘too responsive’
is a political climate in which judges who covet higher office—or who merely wish to remain judges—must
constantly profess fealty to the death penalty. . . .  The danger [is] that they will bend to political pressures
when pronouncing sentence in highly publicized capital cases.”); Bright & Keenan, supra note 54, at 760
(“Decisions in capital cases have increasingly become campaign fodder in both judicial and nonjudicial
elections.  The focus in these campaigns has been almost entirely on the gruesome facts of particular
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murders, not the reason for the judicial decisions.  Judges have come under attack and have been removed
from the bench for their decisions in capital cases—with perhaps the most notable examples in states with
some of the largest death rows and where the death penalty has been a dominant political issue. Recent
challenges to state court judges in both direct and retention elections have made it clear that unpopular
decisions in capital cases, even when clearly compelled by law, may cost a judge her seat on the bench, or
promotion to a higher court.”); Coyne & Entzroth, supra note 33, at 13  (“The death penalty and politics . .
. are inseparable,” particularly because “the vast majority of judges who preside over capital cases must
answer to the electorate” and because “‘judges are far less likely to . . . take . . . tough action if they must
run for reelection or retention every few years’” (quoting ABA, Report of the Comm’n on Professionalism,
112 F.R.D. 243, 293 (1986)); Symposium, Politics and the Death Penalty: Can Rational Discourse and
Due Process Survive the Perceived Political Pressure?, 21 Fordham Urb. L.J. 239 (1994).
222.   Tables 22, 23 and 24—set out infra Appendix E, pp. E-18 to E-20—compare the 28 study states in
regard to, respectively, electoral pressure on judges, court expenditures per capita, and court caseloads per
capita.
223.    We developed the political pressure measurement ourselves, using statutory information about how
judges are elected and retained in the various states. See supra note 26. We are fairly confident about the
quality of the underlying data. The other measures come from state-self-reported data, see id., the accuracy
and computational-comparability of which we are less sure of.
224.   See sources cited supra note 221.
225.   This proposal (were it supported by the data) would not call for spending less on each death sentence
obtained. Rather, it would call for spending less overall, by seeking and securing fewer death sentences
overall. The spending on each death sentence that is obtained might actually increase.
226.   Included are report cards on the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits.
227.   See supra note 190; supra pp.14, 51, 59 & n.190, 65-66 & n.198.
228.   Not counting the Fourth Circuit, federal courts found serious error in 229 (42%) of 547 death sentences
reviewed.
229.   See supra Table 6 and Figure 6, supra pp.53, 54; supra pp. 51, 65-66 & nn.190, 198.
230.   Outside the Fourth Circuit, the only other state where there are relatively low state and federal error
detection rates—although not nearly as low (in either case) as in Virginia—is Missouri, which falls within the
jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Cf. supra note 190.
231.   Without changing this analysis, one could expand it to the two other death-sentencing states that border
Virginia, but are not in the same federal judicial circuit: Kentucky and Tennessee. (West Virginia and the
District of Columbia do not have the death penalty.) 
232.   See Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000).
233.   See Virginia Report, supra note 36, at 11-37; Green, Virginia Bucks Death Row Flow, supra note 4;
Masters, A Rush on Va.’s Death Row, supra note 64.
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234.   See supra note 31; supra p.32 & n.140; supra note 208 (explaining the reasons for focusing on non-
consensual executions).
235.   Tables 26 and 27—derived from DRCen and Death Row U.S.A., supra note 4, and set out infra
Appendix E, p. E-27—compare the federal circuit courts based on, respectively, their component states’
death-sentencing and execution rates per 100,000 population.
236.   See Figures 19-22, supra pp.82-84, 86.
237.   Figure 35 is based on the information—taken from DRCen and Death Row U.S.A., supra note 4—in
Table 28, infra Appendix E, p. E-22. Figure 35 and Table 28 look at all executions, both consensual and non-
consensual.  For the reasons discussed supra note 31; supra pp.32 & n.140, 41, a better measure of success
might be the proportion of death sentences carried out non-consensually. For that information, in tabular and
graphic form, see Table 29 and Figure 36, infra Appendix E, pp. E-23 to E-24.
(Notes continue on the next page)
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238.   See supra pp.14, 51, 59 & n.190, 65-66 &n.198, 105-07.
Comparing Figure 35 to Figure 19, supra p. 82, helps confirm a point made above—that the path to
more executions is not, as one might expect, more death sentences. See supra pp.82-87. A comparison of
Figures 35 and 19 reveals that:
! Six of the top 11 (of 28) states when it comes to death sentences per 1,000 homicides, including the
top 4 states, are in the bottom half of the states when it comes to percent of death sentences carried
out after full review: 
State Rank in Death Sentences Rank in Percent Death
per 1,000 Homicides Sentences Carried Out
Following Full Review
Wyoming 1 (of 28) 16 (of 28)
Idaho 2 23
Nevada              3 26
Arizona              4 20
Oklahoma 6 19
Mississippi            11 18
 ! On the other hand, of the top 5 states when it comes to percent of death sentences carried out after
full review are in the bottom 11 states in regard to death sentences per 1,000 homicides:
State Rank in Percent Death Rank in Death Sentences
Sentences Carried Out per 1,000 Homicides
Following Full Review
Virginia            1 (of 28)  22 (of 28)
Louisiana            2  25
Texas            3  18
Missouri            5  20
239.   See supra pp.12-13 & Figure 2, 35-37.
240.   See Table 1, infra Appendix E, p. E-2.
241.   States in which recent press accounts have linked high capital error rates and the state’s incapacity to
make its death penalty work in a rational fashion include:
California: See Paul Elias & Rinat Fried, A Failure to Execute, The Recorder, Dec. 15, 1999, at 1 (“Since
1978, when . . . California . . . reinstitut[ed] the death penalty, 647 men and women have been sentenced to
death. Only [seven] have been executed. [Over] four times as many California death row inmates have died
in San Quentin of causes other than execution. Fifty-seven sentences have been overturned.”); Howard
Mintz, Slow Death: The Capital Punishment Gridlock in California,  San Jose Mercury News, Mar. 12,
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2000, at A1, available in Westlaw, News Library, SJMERCURY file (reporting that between 1992 and 2000,
California’s death row grew from 350 to about 550 inmates, but it only executed 7 men; in the same period,
state courts overturned approximately 10 death sentence, and federal courts overturned 13).
Florida: Rene Stutzman, High Court Puts Death Cases Back into Play: Errors Were Found in 10 of 12
Capital Punishment Cases Reviewed this Year, Orlando Sentinel, Aug. 24, 1999, at D1, available in 1999
WL 2829798 (in the first eight months of 1999, the Florida Supreme Court found trial errors requiring retrial,
resentencing, or imposition of a life sentence in 83% of the first-time death penalty appeals it has reviewed;
the figure for all of 1998 was 77% (20/26)).
Illinois:
An Illinois Supreme Court ruling on Friday pushed the number of death-penalty cases in Illinois that
have been reversed for a new trial or sentencing hearing to 130—exactly half the total of those
capital cases that have completed at least one round of [state] appeals, according to a Tribune
analysis.
Ken Armstrong & Christi Parsons, Half of State’s Death-Penalty Cases Reversed, Chi. Trib., Jan. 22, 2000,
at 1, available in 2000 WL 3629108.
Nevada: See Sean Whaley, Nevada’s Death Row History Criticized, Las Vegas Rev.-J., Feb. 7, 2000, at
1B, available in Westlaw, News Library, LV-RJ-C file (finding that since 1979, 8 Nevada Death Row inmates
have been executed (all but one consensually, i.e., in advance of full judicial review, see Death Row U.S.A.,
supra note 4, at 8-22); since 1993, the same number, 8, have had their capital judgments reversed by the state
and federal courts, among whom 3 (as of this writing, 4, see Brendan Riley, Emotional Mazzan Released,
Las Vegas Rev.-J., May 7, 2000, at 1) were thereupon released from prison). 
Tennessee:  Duncan Mansfield, The Price of Death Penalty? Maybe Millions, AP Newswires , Mar. 26,
2000, available in Westlaw, News Library, APWIRES file (“Tennessee, with 97 people on death row [who
have accumulated over at least 23 years] is [still awaiting] its first execution since 1960.”).
Utah: See Lee Davidson, Death Row the End?: Most Get Out Alive, Deseret News (Salt Lake City), Dec.
13, 1999, at B1, available in 1999 WL 26543645 (noting that since Utah reinstated the death penalty in 1973,
16 prisoners have left the state’s death row, 6 by execution and 10 (63%) because their convictions or
sentences were overturned by the courts).
Washington:  See, e.g., Mike Carter, Court Orders Retrial in 1986 Kitsap Rape-Murder Case, Seattle
Times, July 15, 1999, at B1, available in 1999 WL 6282738 (noting that 7 Washington State capital sentences
were overturned in 8 years, at a time when there were a total of only 14 men on Washington’s death row,
see BJS 1998 Report, supra note 28, app. tbl. 2).
242.   See supra pp. 36-38 & Figure 3.
243.   See supra p.5; State Post-Conviction National Composite Results, infra Appendix C, p.C-3..
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Appendix A: State Capital Punishment Report Cards  
Description of Information in State Capital Punishment
Report Cards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1
National Composite Capital Punishment Report Card . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-5
Table 30: State-by-State Comparisons of Direct Appeal, 
State Post-Conviction, and Federal Habeas Corpus Reversal 
Rates and Overall Error Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-7
Alabama Capital Punishment Report Card . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-9 
Arizona Capital Punishment Report Card . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-11
Arkansas Capital Punishment Report Card . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-13
California Capital Punishment Report Card . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-15
Delaware Capital Punishment Report Card . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-17
Florida Capital Punishment Report Card . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-19
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Appendix A: State Capital Punishment Report Cards
This Appendix contains two-page capital punishment report cards on all 28 capital-sentencing
states that reviewed at least one death sentence on direct appeal and federal habeas corpus during the
1973-1995 study period.  For comparison purposes, this collection of report cards begins with the national
composite capital punishment report card (discussed in the main Report (hereinafter, “Report”) pp. 28-45)
and then Table 30, which compares the rates of capital-sentencing error that were discovered for each
state on state direct appeal, state post-conviction review, and federal habeas corpus, and the total error
and success rates for each state. (For a description of how those rates are calculated, see Report, pp.
4-5 & notes 39, 40).
Description of Information in State Capital Punishment Report Cards
The state capital punishment report cards collected in this Appendix contain seven categories of
information: 
1.      Capital-sentencing history.
In the “History” section has information about the years in which four important capital-sentencing
events occurred in each state following the Supreme Court’s invalidation of all preexisting capital statutes
and sentences in Furman v. Georgia1—the state’s first death sentence, first direct appeal, first
consensual execution and first non-consensual execution.2
2.     Sentences and executions. 
This section of each state capital punishment report card provides information about how many
death sentences were imposed in each state and how many, and what proportion, of those death sentences
3There are three levels of judicial inspection—state direct appeal, state post-conviction and federal
habeas corpus. See Report, Part V, pp.18-22.
4See Report, pp. 4-5 & notes 39,  40.
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were carried out, during the study period.
3.      Error and success rates. 
The third section of the report cards identifies for each state (a)  the rates of serious error
discovered at each level of judicial inspection,3 (b) the overall error rate, meaning the proportion of capital
judgments undergoing judicial inspection that were thrown out before reaching the end of the inspection
process,4 and, conversely, (c) the overall success rate, meaning the proportion of capital judgments found
after a full complement of inspections to be free of serious error.
4.     Length of time of review.
This section reports information for each state on (a) the number of years that elapsed between the
state’s first death sentence and its first non-consensual execution (not necessarily in the same case); (b) the
average number of years it took death sentences to proceed through the three-stage inspection process to
execution in the small proportion of cases in which an execution took place, and (c) the average time from
death sentence to federal habeas corpus reversal in the minority of cases in which reversal occurred at the
third (federal habeas corpus) checkpoint, as opposed to taking place at one of the first two (state court)
checkpoints. 
5.     Capital-sentencing and execution rates. 
This part of each report card answers two questions. First, how often did the state impose death
sentences? To answer this question, we consider death sentences per 1,000 homicides, per 100,000
population, and per 1,000 incarcerated inmates in the jurisdiction. Second, how often (relative to
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homicides, population and prison population) did the state execute offenders? Because we are interested
in success and error rates, we consider here only “non-consensual” executions, i.e., ones  that were
subjected to full review and found to be free of serious error.
6.     Demographic information.
The demographic information reported in this sixth report card category reveals the population
pools against which each state’s number of death sentences and executions are compared to determine the
sentencing and execution rates. This part of the report card also provides bases for distinguishing among
states—and thus, potentially, for explaining variations among states—in terms of the capital-sentence error
rates detected on direct appeal and habeas corpus inspection.
“Average population” is the state’s yearly average population from 1973-1995.  
“Average homicides” are the total number of homicides in each state from 1973-1995 divided by
23, the number of years in our study . 
Homicides per population establishes a state’s homicide rate. By “average homicides/average
population,” we mean the average number of homicides per year during the study period for every 100,000
persons in the jurisdiction, averaged over the state’s population during the study period.
“Average prison admissions” means the average number of persons admitted each year to the
state’s prisons during the study period.
“Average prison population” means the jurisdiction’s average population over study period. 
We also report here the percentage of each state’s population that was nonwhite during the study
period.
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7.     Court factors: the context of state court decision making. 
In the state capital punishment report cards, we report four pieces of information about state courts
and judges that may help explain state variations in capital-sentencing success/error rates, capital-sentencing
rates themselves and execution rates. These figures are most informative when used for comparative
purposes.
The “political pressure” index measures the extent to which state judges are subject to electoral
scrutiny and discipline. Although nearly all the state judges in our study are subject to voter scrutiny at some
point if they wish to remain in office, the forms and frequency of elections differ in ways that are likely to
increase or decrease the extent to which judges are politically at risk as a result of capital outcomes
produced in their courts (meaning, at the trial level, whether the verdict was death or life and, at the
appellate level, whether a death sentence under review was affirmed or reversed). More specifically, our
index considers whether judges initially are elected or appointed, whether judicial elections are partisan,
the length of judges’ terms of office, and whether judges’ continuation in office is determined by contested
or retention elections. (See Report, notes 54, 221)
The “party competition index” is a composite of the vote share of each party in state gubernatorial
and legislative elections from 1968-1996.
Our penultimate (“state court criminal caseload”) category reports the yearly average number of
criminal case filings in each jurisdiction from 1985-1994 per 1,000 people in the population.
Finally, we report each state’s average annual court-related expenditures during the fiscal years
1982-1992.
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National Composite Capital Punishment Report Card
History (34 States)
First Death Sentence 1973
First Direct Appeal 1973
First Consensual Execution 1977
First Non-Consensual Execution 1979
Sentences and Executions (34 States)
     
Total Number of Death Sentences 5,760
Total Number of Executions 313
Percentage of Death Sentences Carried Out 5%
Error Rates
    State Direct Appeal (34 States) 
Number Reviewed on Direct Appeal 4,578
Number Reversed on Direct Appeal 1,885
Percentage Reversed on Direct Appeal 41%
Number Awaiting Direct Appeal 1,182
Percentage Awaiting Direct Appeal 21%
Number Forward to State Post-Conviction 2,693
    State Direct Appeal (28 States)
Number Reviewed on Direct Appeal 4,364
Number Reversed on Direct Appeal 1,782
Percentage Reversed on Direct Appeal 41%
Number Forward to State Post-Conviction 2582
    State Post-Conviction (28 States)
Number Reviewed on Post-Conviction                                   Unknown
Number Reversed on Post-Conviction $248
Percentage Reversed on Post-Conviction $10%
Number Forward to Federal Habeas Corpus Unknown
State Direct Appeal and State Post-Conviction Combined (28 States)
Overall Rate of Error Found by State Courts $47%
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Error Rates (Continued)
    Federal Habeas Corpus (28 States)
Number Reviewed on Habeas 599
Number Reversed on Habeas 237
Percentage Reversed on Habeas 40%
    Overall Rates Including [and Excluding] State Post-Conviction (28 States)
Overall Error Rate 68% [64%]
Overall Success Rate 32% [36%]
Time (28 States)
Time From First Death Sentence to First Non-Consensual
Execution
 6
Average Time from Sentence to Execution 9
Average Time from Sentence to Final Federal Relief 7.6
Sentencing and Execution Rates (34 States )                         
                                                                                                               Death States        Whole Nation
Death Sentences per 1000 homicides 14.90 12
Death Sentences per 100,000 pop. 3.9 2.46
NC Executions per 1000 homicides .68 .54
Demographic Information (34 States)                         
                                                                                                            Death States        Whole
Nation
Average Population 181,374,347 237,905,964
Average Homicides 16,860 21,197
Average Homicides Rate per 100,000  Population 9.3 9
Percentage Population Non-White 19% 20%
Sources: DRCen; Death Row U.S.A., Winter 2000; DADB; HCDB; Appendix C; USCen; UCRDB; USCen
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Table 30: State-by-State Comparisons of Direct Appeal, 
State Post-Conviction, and Federal Habeas Corpus 
Reversal Rates and Overall Error Rates
State   % Reversed 
on State Direct  
















Alabama 55 9 59 45 75 77
Arizona 42 10 47 60 77 79
Arkansas 40 4 43 48 69 70
California 31 3 33 80 86 87
Delaware 26 unknown unknown 0 26 unknown
Florida 49 17 58 37 68 73
Georgia 35 12 43 65 77 80
Idaho 42 5 44 67 81 82
Illinois 39 7 43 40 63 66
Indiana 32 25 49 50 66 75
Kentucky 50 0 50 100 100 100
Louisiana 46 7 50 27 61 64
Maryland 53 52 77 100 100 100
Mississippi 61 20 69 71 89 91
Missouri 17 4 20 15 29 32
Montana 42 9 47 75 86 87
Nebraska 29 13 38 43 60 65
Nevada 30 8 35 50 65 68
No. Carolina 61 10 65 18 68 71
Oklahoma 48 2 50 50 74 75
Pennsylvania 28 1 29 40 57 57
So. Carolina 54 18 62 14 60 67
Tennessee 29 12 38 100 100 100
Texas 31 6 35 26 49 52
Utah 35 23 50 33 56 67
Virginia 10 3 13 6 15 18
Washington 45 unknown unknown 33 63 unknown
Wyoming 67 33 78 50 84 89
* Because state post-conviction data are incomplete, the figures in these columns are in most cases lower than the actual figure. See Report, note
39; pp. 26-27, 33-34; infra Appendix C, pp. C-1 to C-2. 






First Death Sentence                                          1975
First Direct Appeal 1977
First Consensual Execution NONE
First Non-Consensual Execution 1983
Sentences and Executions
Total Number of Death Sentences                                            308
Total Number of Executions 12
Percentage of Death Sentences Carried Out 4%
Error Rates
State Direct Appeal
Number Reviewed on Direct Appeal 264
Number Reversed on Direct Appeal 145
Percentage Reversed on Direct Appeal 55%
Number Awaiting Direct Appeal 44
Percentage Awaiting Direct Appeal 14%
Number Forward to State Post-Conviction 119
State Post-Conviction
Number Reviewed on Post-Conviction                                  Unknown
Number Reversed on Post-Conviction $11
Percentage Reversed on Post-Conviction $9%
Number Forward to Federal Habeas Corpus Unknown
State Direct Appeal and State Post-Conviction Combined
Overall Rate of Error Found by State Courts $59%
Federal Habeas Corpus
Number Reviewed on Habeas Corpus 22
Number Reversed on Habeas Corpus 10
Percentage Reversed on Habeas Corpus 45%
Overall Rates Including [and Excluding] State Post-Conviction
Overall Error Rate  77% [75%]
Overall Success Rate  23% [25%]
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Timing
Time From First Death Sentence to First Non-Consensual
Execution
8.00
Average Time from Sentence to Execution 9.44
Average Time from Sentence to Final Federal Relief 8.50
Sentencing and Execution Rates
Death Sentences per 1000 Homicides                                         28.93
Death Sentences per 100,000 Population 7.75
Death Sentences per 1000 Prison Population 27.31
Non-Consensual Executions per 1000 Homicides 1.13
Non-Consensual Executions per 100,000 Population 0.30
Non-Consensual Executions per 1000 Prison Population 1.06
Demographic Information
Average Population                                  3,938,785
Average Homicides 463
Average Homicides/Average Population 11.75
Average Prison Admissions 4,023
Average Prison Population 11,278
Percentage Population Non-White 27%
Court Factors
Political Pressure (judicial elections) 8
Party Competition (gubernatorial elections) 0
State Court Criminal Caseload per 1000 Population 30.56
Expenditures per Capita on Courts 30.64




First Death Sentence                                          1974
First Direct Appeal 1975
First Consensual Execution 1993
First Non-Consensual Execution 1992
Sentences and Executions
Total Number of Death Sentences                                            247
Total Number of Executions 4
Percentage of Death Sentences Carried Out 2%
Error Rates
State Direct Appeal
Number Reviewed on Direct Appeal 197
Number Reversed on Direct Appeal 82
Percentage Reversed on Direct Appeal 42%
Number Awaiting Direct Appeal 50
Percentage Awaiting Direct Appeal 20%
Number Forward to State Post-Conviction 115
State Post-Conviction
Number Reviewed on Post-Conviction                                  Unknown
Number Reversed on Post-Conviction $12
Percentage Reversed on Post-Conviction $10%
Number Forward to Federal Habeas Corpus Unknown
State Direct Appeal and State Post-Conviction Combined
Overall Rate of Error Found by State Courts $48%
Federal Habeas Corpus
Number Reviewed on Habeas Corpus 15
Number Reversed on Habeas Corpus 9
Percentage Reversed on Habeas Corpus 60%
Overall Rates Including [and Excluding] State Post-Conviction
Overall Error Rate 79% [77%]
Overall Success Rate 21% [23%]
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Timing
Time From First Death Sentence to First Non-Consensual
Execution
18.00
Average Time from Sentence to Execution 16.00
Average Time from Sentence to Final Federal Relief 9.00
Sentencing and Execution Rates
Death Sentences per 1000 Homicides                                         40.98
Death Sentences per 100,000 Population 7.82
Death Sentences per 1000 Prison Population 25.29
Non-Consensual Executions per 1000 Homicides 0.50
Non-Consensual Executions per 100,000 Population 0.09
Non-Consensual Executions per 1000 Prison Population 0.31
Demographic Information
Average Population                                  3,068,591
Average Homicides 262
Average Homicides/ Average Population 8.54
Average Prison Admissions 3,540
Average Prison Population 9,769
Percentage Population Non-White 17%
Court Factors
Political Pressure (judicial elections) 7
Party Competition (gubernatorial elections) 1
State Court Criminal Caseload per 1000 Population 36.69
Expenditures per Capita on Courts 57.76




First Death Sentence                                          1974 
First Direct Appeal 1975
First Consensual Execution 1990
First Non-Consensual Execution 1990
Sentences and Executions
Total Number of Death Sentences                                              89
Total Number of Executions 11
Percentage of Death Sentences Carried Out 12%
Error Rates
State Direct Appeal
Number Reviewed on Direct Appeal 82
Number Reversed on Direct Appeal 33
Percentage Reversed on Direct Appeal 40%
Number Awaiting Direct Appeal 7
Percentage Awaiting Direct Appeal 8%
Number Forward to State Post-Conviction 49
State Post-Conviction
Number Reviewed on Post-Conviction                                   Unknown
Number Reversed on Post-Conviction $2
Percentage Reversed on Post-Conviction $4%
Number Forward to Federal Habeas Corpus Unknown
Overall Rate of Error Found by State Courts
Overall Rate of Error Found by State Courts $43%
Federal Habeas Corpus
Number Reviewed on Habeas Corpus 25
Number Reversed on Habeas Corpus 12
Percentage Reversed on Habeas Corpus 48%
Overall Rates Including [and Excluding] State Post-Conviction
Overall Error Rate 70% [69%]
Overall Success Rate 30% [31%]
App. A-14
Timing
Time From First Death Sentence to First Non-Consensual
Execution
16.00
Average Time from Sentence to Execution 10.00
Average Time from Sentence to Final Federal Relief 14.33
Sentencing and Execution Rates
Death Sentences per 1000 Homicides                                         18.09
Death Sentences per 100,000 Population 3.84
Death Sentences per 1000 Prison Population 17.21
Non-Consensual Executions per 1000 Homicides 2.03
Non-Consensual Executions per 100,000 Population 0.43
Non-Consensual Executions per 1000 Prison Population 1.93
Demographic Information
Average Population                                  2,296,077
Average Homicides 214
Average Homicides/ Average Population 9.32
Average Prison Admissions 2,157
Average Prison Population 5,173
Percentage Population Non-White 18%
Court Factors
Political Pressure (judicial elections) 7
Party Competition (gubernatorial elections) 0
State Court Criminal Caseload per 1000 Population 41.70
Expenditures per Capita on Courts 19.13




First Death Sentence                                          1976
First Direct Appeal 1979
First Consensual Execution 1993
First Non-Consensual Execution 1992
Sentences and Executions
Total Number of Death Sentences                                            531
Total Number of Executions 2
Percentage of Death Sentences Carried Out 0.4%
Error Rates
State Direct Appeal
Number Reviewed on Direct Appeal 281
Number Reversed on Direct Appeal 87
Percentage Reversed on Direct Appeal 31%
Number Awaiting Direct Appeal 250
Percentage Awaiting Direct Appeal 47%
Number Forward to State Post-Conviction 194
State Post-Conviction
Number Reviewed on Post-Conviction                                   Unknown
Number Reversed on Post-Conviction $7
Percentage Reversed on Post-Conviction $4%
Number Forward to Federal Habeas Corpus Unknown
State Direct Appeal and State Post-Conviction Combined
Overall Rate of Error Found by State Courts $33%
Federal Habeas Corpus
Number Reviewed on Habeas Corpus 5
Number Reversed on Habeas Corpus 4
Percentage Reversed on Habeas Corpus 80%
Overall Rates Including [and Excluding] State Post-Conviction
Overall Error Rate 87% [86%]
Overall Success Rate 13% [14%]
App. A-16
Timing
Time From First Death Sentence to First Non-Consensual
Execution
16.00
Average Time from Sentence to Execution 9.00
Average Time from Sentence to Final Federal Relief 12.50
Sentencing and Execution Rates
Death Sentences per 1000 Homicides                                           7.75
Death Sentences per 100,000 Population 2.00
Death Sentences per 1000 Prison Population 8.59
Non-Consensual Executions per 1000 Homicides 0.01
Non-Consensual Executions per 100,000 Population 0.00
Non-Consensual Executions per 1000 Prison Population 0.02
Demographic Information
Average Population                                25,990,813
Average Homicides 2,980
Average Homicides/ Average Population 11.46
Average Prison Admissions 22,864
Average Prison Population 61,818
Percentage Population Non-White 25%
Court Factors
Political Pressure (judicial elections) 5
Party Competition (gubernatorial elections) 1
State Court Criminal Caseload per 1000 Population 15.43
Expenditures per Capita on Courts 67.85




First Death Sentence                                          1978
First Direct Appeal 1981
First Consensual Execution 1992
First Non-Consensual Execution 1993
Sentences and Executions
Total Number of Death Sentences                     24
Total Number of Executions 5
Percentage of Death Sentences Carried Out 21%
Error Rates
State Direct Appeal
Number Reviewed on Direct Appeal 23
Number Reversed on Direct Appeal 6
Percentage Reversed on Direct Appeal 26%
Number Awaiting Direct Appeal 1
Percentage Awaiting Direct Appeal 4%
Number Forward to State Post-Conviction 17
State Post-Conviction
Number Reviewed on Post-Conviction                                  Unknown
Number Reversed on Post-Conviction Unknown
Percentage Reversed on Post-Conviction Unknown
Number Forward to Federal Habeas Corpus Unknown
State Direct Appeal and State Post-Conviction Combined
Overall Rate of Error Found by State Courts Unknown
Federal Habeas Corpus
Number Reviewed on Habeas Corpus 2
Number Reversed on Habeas Corpus 0
Percentage Reversed on Habeas Corpus 0%
Overall Rates [Excluding State Post-Conviction]
Overall Error Rate [26%]
Overall Success Rate [74%]
App. A-18
Timing
Time From First Death Sentence to First Non-Consensual
Execution
15.00
Average Time from Sentence to Execution 7.00
Average Time from Sentence to Final Federal Relief NA
Sentencing and Execution Rates
Death Sentences per 1000 Homicides                                         32.48
Death Sentences per 100,000 Population 3.79
Death Sentences per 1000 Prison Population 9.32
Non-Consensual Executions per 1000 Homicides 2.71
Non-Consensual Executions per 100,000 Population 0.32




Average Homicides/ Average Population 5.52
Average Prison Admissions 617
Average Prison Population 2,576
Percentage Population Non-White 20%
Court Factors
Political Pressure (judicial elections) 3
Party Competition (gubernatorial elections) 2
State Court Criminal Caseload per 1000 Population 32.89
Expenditures per Capita on Courts 58.37




First Death Sentence                                          1973
First Direct Appeal 1974
First Consensual Execution 1993
First Non-Consensual Execution 1979
Sentences and Executions
Total Number of Death Sentences 870
Total Number of Executions 36
Percentage of Death Sentences Carried Out 4%
Error Rates
State Direct Appeal
Number Reviewed on Direct Appeal 760
Number Reversed on Direct Appeal 376
Percentage Reversed on Direct Appeal 49%
Number Awaiting Direct Appeal 110
Percentage Awaiting Direct Appeal 13%
Number Forward to State Post-Conviction 384
State Post-Conviction
Number Reviewed on Post-Conviction                                  Unknown
Number Reversed on Post-Conviction $67
Percentage Reversed on Post-Conviction $17%
Number Forward to Federal Habeas Corpus Unknown
State Direct Appeal and State Post-Conviction Combined
Overall Rate of Error Found by State Courts $58%
Federal Habeas Corpus
Number Reviewed on Habeas Corpus 97
Number Reversed on Habeas Corpus 36
Percentage Reversed on Habeas Corpus 37%
Overall Rates Including [and Excluding] State Post-Conviction
Overall Error Rate 73% [68%]
Overall Success Rate 27% [32%]
App. A-20
Timing
Time From First Death Sentence to First Non-Consensual
Execution
6.00
Average Time from Sentence to Execution 9.39
Average Time from Sentence to Final Federal Relief 10.42
Sentencing and Execution Rates
Death Sentences per 1000 Homicides 30.85
Death Sentences per 100,000 Population 7.74
Death Sentences per 1000 Prison Population 26.09
Non-Consensual Executions per 1000 Homicides 1.24
Non-Consensual Executions per 100,000 Population 0.31




Average Homicides/ Average Population 11.20
Average Prison Admissions 18,243
Average Prison Population 33,348
Percentage Population Non-White 19%
Court Factors
Political Pressure (judicial elections) 7
Party Competition (gubernatorial elections) 0
State Court Criminal Caseload per 1000 Population 26.61
Expenditures per Capita on Courts 48.84




First Death Sentence                                          1973
First Direct Appeal 1973
First Consensual Execution NONE
First Non-Consensual Execution 1983
Sentences and Executions
Total Number of Death Sentences 325
Total Number of Executions 20
Percentage of Death Sentences Carried Out 6%
Error Rates
State Direct Appeal
Number Reviewed on Direct Appeal 303
Number Reversed on Direct Appeal 106
Percentage Reversed on Direct Appeal 35%
Number Awaiting Direct Appeal 22
Percentage Awaiting Direct Appeal 7%
Number Forward to State Post-Conviction 197
State Post-Conviction
Number Reviewed on Post-Conviction                                    Unknown
Number Reversed on Post-Conviction $24
Percentage Reversed on Post-Conviction $12%
Number Forward to Federal Habeas Corpus  Unknown
State Direct Appeal and State Post-Conviction Combined
Overall Rate of Error Found by State Courts $43%
Federal Habeas Corpus
Number Reviewed on Habeas Corpus 96
Number Reversed on Habeas Corpus 62
Percentage Reversed on Habeas Corpus 65%
Overall Rates Including [and Excluding] State Post-Conviction
Overall Error Rate    80% [77%]
Overall Success Rate 20% [23%]
App. A-22
Timing
Time From First Death Sentence to First Non-Consensual
Execution
10.00
Average Time from Sentence to Execution 9.81
Average Time from Sentence to Final Federal Relief 9.23
Sentencing and Execution Rates
Death Sentences per 1000 Homicides 19.24
Death Sentences per 100,000 Population 5.44
Death Sentences per 1000 Prison Population 17.74
Non-Consensual Executions per 1000 Homicides 1.18
Non-Consensual Executions per 100,000 Population 0.33




Average Homicides/ Average Population 12.50
Average Prison Admissions 8,459
Average Prison Population 18,322
Percentage Population Non-White 29%
Court Factors
Political Pressure (judicial elections) 8
Party Competition (gubernatorial elections) 0
State Court Criminal Caseload per 1000 Population 14.71
Expenditures per Capita on Courts 29.77




First Death Sentence 1976
First Direct Appeal 1977
First Consensual Execution 1994
First Non-Consensual Execution NONE
Sentences and Executions
Total Number of Death Sentences                            41
Total Number of Executions 1
Percentage of Death Sentences Carried Out 2%
Error Rates
State Direct Appeal
Number Reviewed on Direct Appeal 36
Number Reversed on Direct Appeal 15
Percentage Reversed on Direct Appeal 42%
Number Awaiting Direct Appeal 5
Percentage Awaiting Direct Appeal 12%
Number Forward to State Post-Conviction 21
State Post-Conviction
Number Reviewed on Post-Conviction Unknown
Number Reversed on Post-Conviction $1
Percentage Reversed on Post-Conviction $5%
Number Forward to Federal Habeas Corpus Unknown
State Direct Appeal and State Post-Conviction Combined
Overall Rate of Error Found by State Courts $44%
Federal Habeas Corpus
Number Reviewed on Habeas Corpus 3
Number Reversed on Habeas Corpus 2
Percentage Reversed on Habeas Corpus 67%
Overall Rates Including [and Excluding] State Post-Conviction
Overall Error Rate 82% [81%]
Overall Success Rate  18% [19%]
App. A-24
Timing
Time From First Death Sentence to First Non-Consensual
Execution
N/A
Average Time from Sentence to Execution missing
Average Time from Sentence to Final Federal Relief 11.00
Sentencing and Execution Rates
Death Sentences per 1000 Homicides 55.03
Death Sentences per 100,000 Population 4.16
Death Sentences per 1000 Prison Population 27.15
Non-Consensual Executions per 1000 Homicides 0.00
Non-Consensual Executions per 100,000 Population 0.00




Average Homicides/ Average Population 3.64
Average Prison Admissions 771
Average Prison Population 1,510
Percentage Population Non-White 5%
Court Factors
Political Pressure (judicial elections) 8
Party Competition (gubernatorial elections) 0
State Court Criminal Caseload per 1000 Population 76.97
Expenditures per Capita on Courts 30.63




First Death Sentence                                          1977
First Direct Appeal 1980
First Consensual Execution 1990
First Non-Consensual Execution 1994
Sentences and Executions
Total Number of Death Sentences                                            262
Total Number of Executions 7
Percentage of Death Sentences Carried Out 3%
Error Rates
State Direct Appeal
Number Reviewed on Direct Appeal 221
Number Reversed on Direct Appeal 86
Percentage Reversed on Direct Appeal 39%
Number Awaiting Direct Appeal 41
Percentage Awaiting Direct Appeal 16%
Number Forward to State Post-Conviction 135
State Post-Conviction
Number Reviewed on Post-Conviction                                   Unknown
Number Reversed on Post-Conviction $10
Percentage Reversed on Post-Conviction $7%
Number Forward to Federal Habeas Corpus Unknown
State Direct Appeal and State Post-Conviction Combined
Overall Rate of Error Found by State Courts $43%
Federal Habeas Corpus
Number Reviewed on Habeas Corpus 10
Number Reversed on Habeas Corpus 4
Percentage Reversed on Habeas Corpus 40%
Overall Rates Including [and Excluding] State Post-Conviction
Overall Error Rate 66% [63%]
Overall Success Rate 34% [37%]
App. A-26
Timing
Time From First Death Sentence to First Non-Consensual
Execution
17.00
Average Time from Sentence to Execution 13.38
Average Time from Sentence to Final Federal Relief 8.50
Sentencing and Execution Rates
Death Sentences per 1000 Homicides                                           9.89
Death Sentences per 100,000 Population 2.29
Death Sentences per 1000 Prison Population 12.99
Non-Consensual Executions per 1000 Homicides 0.23
Non-Consensual Executions per 100,000 Population 0.05
Non-Consensual Executions per 1000 Prison Population 0.30
Demographic Information
Average Population                                11,454,333
Average Homicides 1,152
Average Homicides/ Average Population 10.06
Average Prison Admissions 9,200
Average Prison Population 20,172
Percentage Population Non-White 19%
Court Factors
Political Pressure (judicial elections) 5
Party Competition (gubernatorial elections) 2
State Court Criminal Caseload per 1000 Population 54.39
Expenditures per Capita on Courts 36.91




First Death Sentence                                          1974
First Direct Appeal 1977
First Consensual Execution 1981
First Non-Consensual Execution 1994
Sentences and Executions
Total Number of Death Sentences                                              90
Total Number of Executions 3
Percentage of Death Sentences Carried Out 3%
Error Rates
State Direct Appeal
Number Reviewed on Direct Appeal 76
Number Reversed on Direct Appeal 24
Percentage Reversed on Direct Appeal 32%
Number Awaiting Direct Appeal 14
Percentage Awaiting Direct Appeal 16%
Number Forward to State Post-Conviction 52
State Post-Conviction
Number Reviewed on Post-Conviction                                   Unknown
Number Reversed on Post-Conviction $13
Percentage Reversed on Post-Conviction $25%
Number Forward to Federal Habeas Corpus Unknown
State Direct Appeal and State Post-Conviction Combined
Overall Rate of Error Found by State Courts $49%
Federal Habeas Corpus
Number Reviewed on Habeas Corpus 4
Number Reversed on Habeas Corpus 2
Percentage Reversed on Habeas Corpus 50%
Overall Rates Including [and Excluding] State Post-Conviction
Overall Error Rate  75% [66%]
Overall Success Rate 25% [34%]
App. A-28
Timing
Time From First Death Sentence to First Non-Consensual
Execution
20.00
Average Time from Sentence to Execution 5
Average Time from Sentence to Final Federal Relief 6.50
Sentencing and Execution Rates
Death Sentences per 1000 Homicides                                       10.15
Death Sentences per 100,000 Population 1.63
Death Sentences per 1000 Prison Population 9.18
Non-Consensual Executions per 1000 Homicides 0.11
Non-Consensual Executions per 100,000 Population 0.02




Average Homicides/ Average Population 7.01
Average Prison Admissions 4,288
Average Prison Population 9,807
Percentage Population Non-White 9%
Court Factors
Political Pressure (judicial elections) 8
Party Competition (gubernatorial elections) 1
State Court Criminal Caseload per 1000 Population 14.14
Expenditures per Capita on Courts 24.29




First Death Sentence 1978
First Direct Appeal 1980
First Consensual Execution NONE
First Non-Consensual Execution 1997
Sentences and Executions
Total Number of Death Sentences 61
Total Number of Executions 0
Percentage of Death Sentences Carried Out 0%
Error Rates
State Direct Appeal
Number Reviewed on Direct Appeal 50
Number Reversed on Direct Appeal 25
Percentage Reversed on Direct Appeal 50%
Number Awaiting Direct Appeal 11
Percentage Awaiting Direct Appeal 18%
Number Forward to State Post-Conviction 25
State Post-Conviction
Number Reviewed on Post-Conviction Unknown
Number Reversed on Post-Conviction 0
Percentage Reversed on Post-Conviction 0%
Number Forward to Federal Habeas Corpus Unknown
State Direct Appeal and State Post-Conviction Combined
Overall Rate of Error Found by State Courts 50%
Federal Habeas Corpus
Number Reviewed on Habeas Corpus 1
Number Reversed on Habeas Corpus 1
Percentage Reversed on Habeas Corpus 100%
Overall Rates Including [and Excluding] State Post-Conviction
Overall Error Rate [100%]
Overall Success Rate [0%]
App. A-30
Timing
Time From First Death Sentence to First Non-Consensual
Execution
19
Average Time from Sentence to Execution N/A
Average Time from Sentence to Final Federal Relief N/A
Sentencing and Execution Rates
Death Sentences per 1000 Homicides                                           9.32
Death Sentences per 100,000 Population 1.67
Death Sentences per 1000 Prison Population 9.52
Non-Consensual Executions per 1000 Homicides 0.00
Non-Consensual Executions per 100,000 Population 0.00




Average Homicides/ Average Population 8.10
Average Prison Admissions 2,781
Average Prison Population 6,410
Percentage Population Non-White 8%
Court Factors
Political Pressure (judicial elections) 7
Party Competition (gubernatorial elections) 0
State Court Criminal Caseload per 1000 Population 31.64
Expenditures per Capita on Courts 30.62




First Death Sentence 1977
First Direct Appeal 1978
First Consensual Execution NONE
First Non-Consensual Execution 1983
Sentences and Executions
Total Number of Death Sentences                                            131
Total Number of Executions 22
Percentage of Death Sentences Carried Out 17%
Error Rates
State Direct Appeal
Number Reviewed on Direct Appeal 112
Number Reversed on Direct Appeal 52
Percentage Reversed on Direct Appeal 46%
Number Awaiting Direct Appeal 19
Percentage Awaiting Direct Appeal 15%
Number Forward to State Post-Conviction 60
State Post-Conviction
Number Reviewed on Post-Conviction Unknown
Number Reversed on Post-Conviction $4
Percentage Reversed on Post-Conviction $7%
Number Forward to Federal Habeas Corpus Unknown
State Direct Appeal and State Post-Conviction Combined
Overall Rate of Error Found by State Courts $50%
Federal Habeas Corpus
Number Reviewed on Habeas Corpus 37
Number Reversed on Habeas Corpus 10
Percentage Reversed on Habeas Corpus 27%
Overall Rates Including [and Excluding] State Post-Conviction
Overall Error Rate  64% [61%]
Overall Success Rate 36% [39%]
App. A-32
Timing
Time From First Death Sentence to First Non-Consensual
Execution
6.00
Average Time from Sentence to Execution 5.60
Average Time from Sentence to Final Federal Relief 6.67
Sentencing and Execution Rates
Death Sentences per 1000 Homicides                                           9.29
Death Sentences per 100,000 Population 3.08
Death Sentences per 1000 Prison Population 9.33
Non-Consensual Executions per 1000 Homicides 1.56
Non-Consensual Executions per 100,000 Population 0.52
Non-Consensual Executions per 1000 Prison Population 1.57
Demographic Information
Average Population                                  4,208,501
Average Homicides 636
Average Homicides/ Average Population 15.19
Average Prison Admissions 4,029
Average Prison Population 14,043
Percentage Population Non-White 32%
Court Factors
Political Pressure (judicial elections) 4
Party Competition (gubernatorial elections) 0
State Court Criminal Caseload per 1000 Population 41.85
Expenditures per Capita on Courts 35.72




First Death Sentence 1979
First Direct Appeal 1980
First Consensual Execution 1994
First Non-Consensual Execution 1997
Sentences and Executions
Total Number of Death Sentences 60
Total Number of Executions 1
Percentage of Death Sentences Carried Out 2%
Error Rates
State Direct Appeal
Number Reviewed on Direct Appeal 57
Number Reversed on Direct Appeal 30
Percentage Reversed on Direct Appeal 53%
Number Awaiting Direct Appeal 3
Percentage Awaiting Direct Appeal 5%
Number Forward to State Post-Conviction 27
State Post-Conviction
Number Reviewed on Post-Conviction                                   Unknown
Number Reversed on Post-Conviction $14
Percentage Reversed on Post-Conviction $52%
Number Forward to Federal Habeas Corpus Unknown
State Direct Appeal and State Post-Conviction Combined
Overall Rate of Error Found by State Courts $77%
Federal Habeas Corpus
Number Reviewed on Habeas Corpus 3
Number Reversed on Habeas Corpus 3
Percentage Reversed on Habeas Corpus 100%
Overall Rates Including [and Excluding] State Post-Conviction
Overall Error Rate  [100%] [100%]
Overall Success  [0%]     [0%]
App. A-34
Timing
Time From First Death Sentence to First Non-Consensual
Execution
18
Average Time from Sentence to Execution 2.00
Average Time from Sentence to Final Federal Relief missing
Sentencing and Execution Rates
Death Sentences per 1000 Homicides 5.72
Death Sentences per 100,000 Population 1.34
Death Sentences per 1000 Prison Population 4.45
Non-Consensual Executions per 1000 Homicides 0.00
Non-Consensual Executions per 100,000 Population 0.00




Average Homicides/ Average Population 10.23
Average Prison Admissions 5,224
Average Prison Population 13,480
Percentage Population Non-White 27%
Court Factors
Political Pressure (judicial elections) 8
Party Competition (gubernatorial elections) 0
State Court Criminal Caseload per 1000 Population 31.62
Expenditures per Capita on Courts 46.24




First Death Sentence 1974
First Direct Appeal 1975
First Consensual Execution NONE
First Non-Consensual Execution 1983
Sentences and Executions
Total Number of Death Sentences 165
Total Number of Executions 4
Percentage of Death Sentences Carried Out 2%
Error Rates
State Direct Appeal
Number Reviewed on Direct Appeal 137
Number Reversed on Direct Appeal 83
Percentage Reversed on Direct Appeal 61%
Number Awaiting Direct Appeal 28
Percentage Awaiting Direct Appeal 17%
Number Forward to State Post-Conviction 54
State Post-Conviction
Number Reviewed on Post-Conviction                                  Unknown
Number Reversed on Post-Conviction $11
Percentage Reversed on Post-Conviction $20%
Number Forward to Federal Habeas Corpus Unknown
State Direct Appeal and State Post-Conviction Combined
Overall Rate of Error Found by State Courts $69%
Federal Habeas Corpus
Number Reviewed on Habeas Corpus 24
Number Reversed on Habeas Corpus 17
Percentage Reversed on Habeas Corpus 71%
Overall Rates Including [and Excluding] State Post-Conviction
Overall Error Rate  91% [89%]
Overall Success Rate 9% [11%]
App. A-36
Timing
Time From First Death Sentence to First Non-Consensual
Execution
9.00
Average Time from Sentence to Execution 7.00
Average Time from Sentence to Final Federal Relief 8.71
Sentencing and Execution Rates
Death Sentences per 1000 Homicides 24.10
Death Sentences per 100,000 Population 6.47
Death Sentences per 1000 Prison Population 26.05
Non-Consensual Executions per 1000 Homicides 0.58
Non-Consensual Executions per 100,000 Population 0.16




Average Homicides/ Average Population 12.40
Average Prison Admissions 2,422
Average Prison Population 6,335
Percentage Population Non-White 37%
Court Factors
Political Pressure (judicial elections) 5
Party Competition (gubernatorial elections) 0
State Court Criminal Caseload per 1000 Population 13.49
Expenditures per Capita on Courts 18.43




First Death Sentence 1979
First Direct Appeal 1981
First Consensual Execution 1990
First Non-Consensual Execution 1989
Sentences and Executions
Total Number of Death Sentences 133
Total Number of Executions 17
Percentage of Death Sentences Carried Out 13%
Error Rates
State Direct Appeal
Number Reviewed on Direct Appeal 98
Number Reversed on Direct Appeal 17
Percentage Reversed on Direct Appeal 17%
Number Awaiting Direct Appeal 35
Percentage Awaiting Direct Appeal 26%
Number Forward to State Post-Conviction 81
State Post-Conviction
Number Reviewed on Post-Conviction                                   Unknown
Number Reversed on Post-Conviction $3
Percentage Reversed on Post-Conviction      $4%
Number Forward to Federal Habeas Corpus Unknown
State Direct Appeal and State Post-Conviction Combined
Overall Rate of Error Found by State Courts $20%
Federal Habeas Corpus
Number Reviewed on Habeas Corpus 26
Number Reversed on Habeas Corpus 4
Percentage Reversed on Habeas Corpus 15%
Overall Rates Including [and Excluding] State Post-Conviction
Overall Error Rate 32% [29%]
Overall Success Rate 68% [71%]
App. A-38
Timing
Time From First Death Sentence to First Non-Consensual
Execution
10.00
Average Time from Sentence to Execution 9.85
Average Time from Sentence to Final Federal Relief 10.00
Sentencing and Execution Rates
Death Sentences per 1000 Homicides                                         12.18
Death Sentences per 100,000 Population 2.64
Death Sentences per 1000 Prison Population 12.70
Non-Consensual Executions per 1000 Homicides 1.37
Non-Consensual Executions per 100,000 Population 0.30
Non-Consensual Executions per 1000 Prison Population 1.43
Demographic Information
Average Population                                  5,007,494
Average Homicides 475
Average Homicides/ Average Population 9.48
Average Prison Admissions 4,142
Average Prison Population 10,476
Percentage Population Non-White 12%
Court Factors
Political Pressure (judicial elections) 5
Party Competition (gubernatorial elections) 0
State Court Criminal Caseload per 1000 Population 33.69
Expenditures per Capita on Courts 27.49




First Death Sentence 1973
First Direct Appeal 1974
First Consensual Execution NONE
First Non-Consensual Execution 1995
Sentences and Executions
Total Number of Death Sentences 20
Total Number of Executions 1
Percentage of Death Sentences Carried Out 5%
Error Rates
State Direct Appeal
Number Reviewed on Direct Appeal 19
Number Reversed on Direct Appeal 8
Percentage Reversed on Direct Appeal 42%
Number Awaiting Direct Appeal 1
Percentage Awaiting Direct Appeal 5%
Number Forward to State Post-Conviction 11
State Post-Conviction
Number Reviewed on Post-Conviction                                  Unknown
Number Reversed on Post-Conviction $1
Percentage Reversed on Post-Conviction $9%
Number Forward to Federal Habeas Corpus Unknown
State Direct Appeal and State Post-Conviction Combined
Overall Rate of Error Found by State Courts $47%
Federal Habeas Corpus
Number Reviewed on Habeas Corpus 4
Number Reversed on Habeas Corpus 3
Percentage Reversed on Habeas Corpus 75%
Overall Rates Including [and Excluding] State Post-Conviction
Overall Error Rate 87% [86%]
Overall Success Rate  13% [14%]
App. A-40
Timing
Time From First Death Sentence to First Non-Consensual
Execution
22.00
Average Time from Sentence to Execution 17.33
Average Time from Sentence to Final Federal Relief 10.67
Sentencing and Execution Rates
Death Sentences per 1000 Homicides 28.25
Death Sentences per 100,000 Population 2.50
Death Sentences per 1000 Prison Population 18.14
Non-Consensual Executions per 1000 Homicides 1.41
Non-Consensual Executions per 100,000 Population 0.13




Average Homicides/ Average Population 4.02
Average Prison Admissions 370
Average Prison Population 1,102
Percentage Population Non-White 8%
Court Factors
Political Pressure (judicial elections) 7
Party Competition (gubernatorial elections) 2
State Court Criminal Caseload per 1000 Population 38.42
Expenditures per Capita on Courts 37.43




First Death Sentence 1975
First Direct Appeal 1977
First Consensual Execution NONE
First Non-Consensual Execution 1994
Sentences and Executions
Total Number of Death Sentences 24
Total Number of Executions 1
Percentage of Death Sentences Carried Out 4%
Error Rates
State Direct Appeal
Number Reviewed on Direct Appeal 21
Number Reversed on Direct Appeal 6
Percentage Reversed on Direct Appeal 29%
Number Awaiting Direct Appeal 3
Percentage Awaiting Direct Appeal 13%
Number Forward to State Post-Conviction 15
State Post-Conviction
Number Reviewed on Post-Conviction                                  Unknown
Number Reversed on Post-Conviction $2
Percentage Reversed on Post-Conviction $13%
Number Forward to Federal Habeas Corpus Unknown
State Direct Appeal and State Post-Conviction Combined
Overall Rate of Error Found by State Courts $38%
Federal Habeas Corpus
Number Reviewed on Habeas Corpus 7
Number Reversed on Habeas Corpus 3
Percentage Reversed on Habeas Corpus 43%
Overall Rates  Including [and Excluding] State Post-Conviction
Overall Error Rate 65% [60%]
Overall Success Rate  35% [40%]
App. A-42
Timing
Time From First Death Sentence to First Non-Consensual
Execution
19.00
Average Time from Sentence to Execution 16
Average Time from Sentence to Final Federal Relief 14.00
Sentencing and Execution Rates
Death Sentences per 1000 Homicides 21.74
Death Sentences per 100,000 Population 1.51
Death Sentences per 1000 Prison Population 12.35
Non-Consensual Executions per 1000 Homicides 0.91
Non-Consensual Executions per 100,000 Population 0.06




Average Homicides/ Average Population 3.36
Average Prison Admissions 776
Average Prison Population 1,944
Percentage Population Non-White 7%
Court Factors
Political Pressure (judicial elections) 8
Party Competition (gubernatorial elections) 1
State Court Criminal Caseload per 1000 Population 32.67
Expenditures per Capita on Courts 28.46




First Death Sentence 1975
First Direct Appeal 1977
First Consensual Execution 1979
First Non-Consensual Execution 1996
Sentences and Executions
Total Number of Death Sentences 108
Total Number of Executions 5
Percentage of Death Sentences Carried Out 5%
Error Rates
State Direct Appeal
Number Reviewed on Direct Appeal 96
Number Reversed on Direct Appeal 29
Percentage Reversed on Direct Appeal 30%
Number Awaiting Direct Appeal 12
Percentage Awaiting Direct Appeal 11%
Number Forward to State Post-Conviction 67
State Post-Conviction
Number Reviewed on Post-Conviction                                  Unknown
Number Reversed on Post-Conviction $5
Percentage Reversed on Post-Conviction $8%
Number Forward to Federal Habeas Corpus Unknown
State Direct Appeal and State Post-Conviction Combined
Overall Rate of Error Found by State Courts $35%
Federal Habeas Corpus
Number Reviewed on Habeas Corpus 4
Number Reversed on Habeas Corpus 2
Percentage Reversed on Habeas Corpus 50%
Overall Rate Including [and Excluding] State Post-Conviction
Overall Error Rate  68% [65%]
Overall Success Rate  32% [35%]
App. A-44
Timing
Time From First Death Sentence to First Non-Consensual
Execution
21
Average Time from Sentence to Execution 2.25
Average Time from Sentence to Final Federal Relief 14.5
Sentencing and Execution Rates
Death Sentences per 1000 Homicides 43.10
Death Sentences per 100,000 Population 10.91
Death Sentences per 1000 Prison Population 28.23
Non-Consensual Executions per 1000 Homicides 0.00
Non-Consensual Executions per 100,000 Population 0.00




Average Homicides/ Average Population 12.13
Average Prison Admissions 1,564
Average Prison Population 3,826
Percentage Population Non-White 15%
Court Factors
Political Pressure (judicial elections) 8
Party Competition (gubernatorial elections) 1
State Court Criminal Caseload per 1000 Population 7.81
Expenditures per Capita on Courts 68.66




First Death Sentence 1977
First Direct Appeal 1979
First Consensual Execution 1984
First Non-Consensual Execution 1984
Sentences and Executions
Total Number of Death Sentences 271
Total Number of Executions 8
Percentage of Death Sentences Carried Out 3%
Error Rates
State Direct Appeal
Number Reviewed on Direct Appeal 218
Number Reversed on Direct Appeal 132
Percentage Reversed on Direct Appeal 61%
Number Awaiting Direct Appeal 53
Percentage Awaiting Direct Appeal 20%
Number Forward to State Post-Conviction 86
State Post-Conviction
Number Reviewed on Post-Conviction                                  Unknown
Number Reversed on Post-Conviction $9
Percentage Reversed on Post-Conviction $10%
Number Forward to Federal Habeas Corpus Unknown
State Direct Appeal and State Post-Conviction Combined
Overall Rate of Error Found by State Courts $65%
Federal Habeas Corpus
Number Reviewed on Habeas Corpus 11
Number Reversed on Habeas Corpus 2
Percentage Reversed on Habeas Corpus 18%
Overall Rates Including [and Excluding] State Post-Conviction
Overall Error Rate  71% [68%]
Overall Success Rate  29% [32%]
App. A-46
Time
Time From First Death Sentence to First Non-Consensual
Execution
7.00
Average Time from Sentence to Execution 9.40
Average Time from Sentence to Final Federal Relief 9.00
Sentencing and Execution Rates
Death Sentences per 1000 Homicides 19.08
Death Sentences per 100,000 Population 4.34
Death Sentences per 1000 Prison Population 15.73
Non-Consensual Executions per 1000 Homicides 0.49
Non-Consensual Executions per 100,000 Population 0.11




Average Homicide Rate per 100,000 Population 10.01
Average Prison Admissions 10,342
Average Prison Population 17,225
Percentage Population Non-White 24%
Court Factors
Political Pressure (judicial elections) 7
Party Competition (gubernatorial elections) 0
State Court Criminal Caseload per 1000 Population 55.62
Expenditures per Capita on Courts 25.50




First Death Sentence 1977
First Direct Appeal 1980
First Consensual Execution 1995
First Non-Consensual Execution 1990
Sentences and Executions
Total Number of Death Sentences                                            220
Total Number of Executions 6
Percentage of Death Sentences Carried Out 3%
Error Rates
State Direct Appeal
Number Reviewed on Direct Appeal 192
Number Reversed on Direct Appeal 93
Percentage Reversed on Direct Appeal 48%
Number Awaiting Direct Appeal 28
Percentage Awaiting Direct Appeal 13%
Number Forward to State Post-Conviction 99
State Post-Conviction
Number Reviewed on Post-Conviction                                  Unknown
Number Reversed on Post-Conviction $2
Percentage Reversed on Post-Conviction $2%
Number Forward to Federal Habeas Corpus Unknown
State Direct Appeal and State Post-Conviction Combined
Overall Rate of Error Found by State Courts $50%
Federal Habeas Corpus
Number Reviewed on Habeas Corpus 12
Number Reversed on Habeas Corpus 6
Percentage Reversed on Habeas Corpus 50%
Overall Rates Including [and Excluding] State Post-Conviction
Overall Error Rate 75% [74%]
Overall Success Rate 25% [26%]
App. A-48
Time
Time From First Death Sentence to First Non-Consensual
Execution
13.00
Average Time from Sentence to Execution 14.67
Average Time from Sentence to Final Federal Relief 9.00
Sentencing and Execution Rates
Death Sentences per 1000 Homicides 39.16
Death Sentences per 100,000 Population 7.06
Death Sentences per 1000 Prison Population 24.07
Non-Consensual Executions per 1000 Homicides 0.89
Non-Consensual Executions per 100,000 Population 0.16




Average Homicide Rate per 100,000 Population 8.33
Average Prison Admissions 4,213
Average Prison Population 9,138
Percentage Population Non-White 16%
Court Factors
Political Pressure (judicial elections) 8
Party Competition (gubernatorial elections) 0
State Court Criminal Caseload per 1000 Population 37.77
Expenditures per Capita on Courts 24.55




First Death Sentence 1979
First Direct Appeal 1981
First Consensual Execution 1995
First Non-Consensual Execution NONE
Sentences and Executions
Total Number of Death Sentences 274
Total Number of Executions 2
Percentage of Death Sentences Carried Out 1%
Error Rates
State Direct Appeal
Number Reviewed on Direct Appeal 200
Number Reversed on Direct Appeal 56
Percentage Reversed on Direct Appeal 28%
Number Awaiting Direct Appeal 74
Percentage Awaiting Direct Appeal 27%
Number Forward to State Post-Conviction 144
State Post-Conviction
Number Reviewed on Post-Conviction                                  Unknown
Number Reversed on Post-Conviction $1
Percentage Reversed on Post-Conviction $1%
Number Forward to Federal Habeas Corpus Unknown
State Direct Appeal and State Post-Conviction Combined
Overall Rate of Error Found by State Courts $29%
Federal Habeas Corpus
Number Reviewed on Habeas Corpus 5
Number Reversed on Habeas Corpus 2
Percentage Reversed on Habeas Corpus 40%
Overall Rates Including [and Excluding] State Post-Conviction
Overall Error Rate 57% [57%]
Overall Success Rate 43% [43%]
App. A-50
Time
Time From First Death Sentence to First Non-Consensual
Execution
N/A
Average Time from Sentence to Execution 11.50
Average Time from Sentence to Final Federal Relief 10.00
Sentencing and Execution Rates
Death Sentences per 1000 Homicides 16.73
Death Sentences per 100,000 Population 2.30
Death Sentences per 1000 Prison Population 17.47
Non-Consensual Executions per 1000 Homicides 0.00
Non-Consensual Executions per 100,000 Population 0.00




Average Homicide Rate per 100,000 Population 5.98
Average Prison Admissions 4,306
Average Prison Population 15,684
Percentage Population Non-White 11%
Court Factors
Political Pressure (judicial elections) 6
Party Competition (gubernatorial elections) 2
State Court Criminal Caseload per 1000 Population 13.40
Expenditures per Capita on Courts 40.17




First Death Sentence 1977
First Direct Appeal 1979
First Consensual Execution NONE
First Non-Consensual Execution 1985
Sentences and Executions
Total Number of Death Sentences 138
Total Number of Executions 5
Percentage of Death Sentences Carried Out 4%
Error Rates
State Direct Appeal
Number Reviewed on Direct Appeal 119
Number Reversed on Direct Appeal 64
Percentage Reversed on Direct Appeal 54%
Number Awaiting Direct Appeal 19
Percentage Awaiting Direct Appeal 14%
Number Forward to State Post-Conviction 55
State Post-Conviction
Number Reviewed on Post-Conviction                                  Unknown
Number Reversed on Post-Conviction $10
Percentage Reversed on Post-Conviction $18%
Number Forward to Federal Habeas Corpus Unknown
State Direct Appeal and State Post-Conviction Combined
Overall Rate of Error Found by State Courts $62%
Federal Habeas Corpus
Number Reviewed on Habeas Corpus 7
Number Reversed on Habeas Corpus 1
Percentage Reversed on Habeas Corpus 14%
Overall Rates Including [and Excluding] State Post-Conviction
Overall Error Rate  67% [60%]
Overall Success Rate 33% [40%]
App. A-52
Time
Time From First Death Sentence to First Non-Consensual
Execution
8.00
Average Time from Sentence to Execution 9.40
Average Time from Sentence to Final Federal Relief 8
Sentencing and Execution Rates
Death Sentences per 1000 Homicides 18.20
Death Sentences per 100,000 Population 4.19
Death Sentences per 1000 Prison Population 11.37
Non-Consensual Executions per 1000 Homicides 0.66
Non-Consensual Executions per 100,000 Population 0.15




Average Homicide Rate per 100,000 Population 10.76
Average Prison Admissions 4,113
Average Prison Population 12,142
Percentage Population Non-White 31%
Court Factors
Political Pressure (judicial elections) 4
Party Competition (gubernatorial elections) 1
State Court Criminal Caseload per 1000 Population 38.49
Expenditures per Capita on Courts 22.82




First Death Sentence 1977
First Direct Appeal 1979
First Consensual Execution NONE
First Non-Consensual Execution 2000
Sentences and Executions
Total Number of Death Sentences 141
Total Number of Executions 0
Percentage of Death Sentences Carried Out 0%
Error Rates
State Direct Appeal
Number Reviewed on Direct Appeal 109
Number Reversed on Direct Appeal 32
Percentage Reversed on Direct Appeal 29%
Number Awaiting Direct Appeal 32
Percentage Awaiting Direct Appeal 23%
Number Forward to State Post-Conviction 77
State Post-Conviction
Number Reviewed on Post-Conviction                                   Unknown
Number Reversed on Post-Conviction $13
Percentage Reversed on Post-Conviction $17%
Number Forward to Federal Habeas Corpus Unknown
State Direct Appeal and State Post-Conviction Combined
Overall Rate of Error Found by State Courts $41%
Federal Habeas Corpus
Number Reviewed on Habeas Corpus 1
Number Reversed on Habeas Corpus 1
Percentage Reversed on Habeas Corpus 100%
Overall Rates Including [and Excluding] State Post-Conviction
Overall Error Rate    100% [100%]
Overall Success Rate 0%     [0%]
App. A-54
Time
Time From First Death Sentence to First Non-Consensual
Execution
23
Average Time from Sentence to Execution N/A
Average Time from Sentence to Final Federal Relief 17
Sentencing and Execution Rates
Death Sentences per 1000 Homicides 14.39
Death Sentences per 100,000 Population 2.98
Death Sentences per 1000 Prison Population 16.18
Non-Consensual Executions per 1000 Homicides 0.00
Non-Consensual Executions per 100,000 Population 0.00
Non-Consensual Executions per 1000 Prison Population 0.00
Demographic Information
Average Population                                  4,676,729
Average Homicides 474
Average Homicide Rate per 100,000 Population 10.13
Average Prison Admissions 3,086
Average Prison Population 8,716
Percentage Population Non-White 17%
Court Factors
Political Pressure (judicial elections) 6
Party Competition (gubernatorial elections) 0
State Court Criminal Caseload per 1000 Population 16.51
Expenditures per Capita on Courts 26.92




First Death Sentence 1974
First Direct Appeal 1975
First Consensual Execution 1985
First Non-Consensual Execution 1982
Sentences and Executions
Total Number of Death Sentences 717
Total Number of Executions 104
Percentage of Death Sentences Carried Out 15%
Error Rates
State Direct Appeal
Number Reviewed on Direct Appeal 523
Number Reversed on Direct Appeal 160
Percentage Reversed on Direct Appeal 31%
Number Awaiting Direct Appeal 194
Percentage Awaiting Direct Appeal 27%
Number Forward to State Post-Conviction 363
State Post-Conviction
Number Reviewed on Post-Conviction                                  Unknown
Number Reversed on Post-Conviction $22
Percentage Reversed on Post-Conviction $6%
Number Forward to Federal Habeas Corpus Unknown
State Direct Appeal and State Post-Conviction Combined
Overall Rate of Error Found by State Courts $35%
Federal Habeas Corpus
Number Reviewed on Habeas Corpus 139
Number Reversed on Habeas Corpus 36
Percentage Reversed on Habeas Corpus 26%
Overall Rates Including [and Excluding] State Post-Conviction
Overall Error Rate 52% [49%]
Overall Success Rate 48% [51%]
App. A-56
Time
Time From First Death Sentence to First Non-Consensual
Execution
8.00
Average Time from Sentence to Execution 9.12
Average Time from Sentence to Final Federal Relief 6.50
Sentencing and Execution Rates
Death Sentences per 1000 Homicides 15.16
Death Sentences per 100,000 Population 4.55
Death Sentences per 1000 Prison Population 15.33
Non-Consensual Executions per 1000 Homicides 1.97
Non-Consensual Executions per 100,000 Population 0.59




Average Homicide Rate per 100,000 Population 13.34
Average Prison Admissions 18,229
Average Prison Population 46,774
Percentage Population Non-White 24%
Court Factors
Political Pressure (judicial elections) 7
Party Competition (gubernatorial elections) 0
State Court Criminal Caseload per 1000 Population 33.01
Expenditures per Capita on Courts 33.22




First Death Sentence 1974
First Direct Appeal 1977
First Consensual Execution 1977
First Non-Consensual Execution 1987
Sentences and Executions
Total Number of Death Sentences 25
Total Number of Executions 4
Percentage of Death Sentences Carried Out 16%
Error Rates
State Direct Appeal
Number Reviewed on Direct Appeal 20
Number Reversed on Direct Appeal 7
Percentage Reversed on Direct Appeal 35%
Number Awaiting Direct Appeal 5
Percentage Awaiting Direct Appeal 20%
Number Forward to State Post-Conviction 13
State Post-Conviction
Number Reviewed on Post-Conviction                                   Unknown
Number Reversed on Post-Conviction $3
Percentage Reversed on Post-Conviction $23%
Number Forward to Federal Habeas Corpus Unknown
State Direct Appeal and State Post-Conviction Combined
Overall Rate of Error Found by State Courts $50%
Federal Habeas Corpus
Number Reviewed on Habeas Corpus 3
Number Reversed on Habeas Corpus 1
Percentage Reversed on Habeas Corpus 33%
Overall Rates Including [and Excluding] State Post-Conviction
Overall Error Rate  67% [56%]
Overall Success Rate 33% [44%]
App. A-58
Time
Time From First Death Sentence to First Non-Consensual
Execution
13.00
Average Time from Sentence to Execution 9.25
Average Time from Sentence to Final Federal Relief 10
Sentencing and Execution Rates
Death Sentences per 1000 Homicides 21.89
Death Sentences per 100,000 Population 1.56
Death Sentences per 1000 Prison Population 14.23
Non-Consensual Executions per 1000 Homicides 1.75
Non-Consensual Executions per 100,000 Population 0.13




Average Homicide Rate per 100,000 Population 3.28
Average Prison Admissions 575
Average Prison Population 1,757
Percentage Population Non-White 6%
Court Factors
Political Pressure (judicial elections) 8
Party Competition (gubernatorial elections) 1
State Court Criminal Caseload per 1000 Population 26.28
Expenditures per Capita on Courts 34.65




First Death Sentence 1977
First Direct Appeal 1978
First Consensual Execution/ 1982
First Non-Consensual Execution 1984
Sentences and Executions
Total Number of Death Sentences 105
Total Number of Executions 29
Percentage of Death Sentences Carried Out 28%
Error Rates
State Direct Appeal
Number Reviewed on Direct Appeal 100
Number Reversed on Direct Appeal 10
Percentage Reversed on Direct Appeal 10%
Number Awaiting Direct Appeal 5
Percentage Awaiting Direct Appeal 5%
Number Forward to State Post-Conviction 90
State Post-Conviction
Number Reviewed on Post-Conviction                                   Unknown
Number Reversed on Post-Conviction $3
Percentage Reversed on Post-Conviction $3%
Number Forward to Federal Habeas Corpus Unknown
State Direct Appeal and State Post-Conviction Combined
Overall Rate of Error Found by State Courts $13%
Federal Habeas Corpus
Number Reviewed on Habeas Corpus 31
Number Reversed on Habeas Corpus 2
Percentage Reversed on Habeas Corpus 6%
Overall Rates Including [and Excluding] State Post-Conviction
Overall Error Rate 18% [15%]
Overall Success Rate 82% [85%]
App. A-60
Time
Time From First Death Sentence to First Non-Consensual
Execution
7.00
Average Time from Sentence to Execution 7.50
Average Time from Sentence to Final Federal Relief 5.00
Sentencing and Execution Rates
Death Sentences per 1000 Homicides 9.94
Death Sentences per 100,000 Population 1.82
Death Sentences per 1000 Prison Population 7.62
Non-Consensual Executions per 1000 Homicides 2.46
Non-Consensual Executions per 100,000 Population 0.45




Average Homicide Rate per 100,000 Population 8.49
Average Prison Admissions 5,526
Average Prison Population 13,783
Percentage Population Non-White 22%
Court Factors
Political Pressure (judicial elections) 2
Party Competition (gubernatorial elections) 0
State Court Criminal Caseload per 1000 Population 47.32
Expenditures per Capita on Courts 34.60




First Death Sentence 1977
First Direct Appeal 1979
First Consensual Execution 1993
First Non-Consensual Execution 1994
Sentences and Executions
Total Number of Death Sentences 40
Total Number of Executions 2
Percentage of Death Sentences Carried Out 5%
Error Rates
State Direct Appeal
Number Reviewed on Direct Appeal 22
Number Reversed on Direct Appeal 10
Percentage Reversed on Direct Appeal 45%
Number Awaiting Direct Appeal 18
Percentage Awaiting Direct Appeal 45%
Number Forward to State Post-Conviction 12
State Post-Conviction
Number Reviewed on Post-Conviction                                   Unknown
Number Reversed on Post-Conviction Unknown
Percentage Reversed on Post-Conviction Unknown
Number Forward to Federal Habeas Corpus Unknown
State Direct Appeal and State Post-Conviction Combined
Overall Rate of Error Found by State Courts Unknown
Federal Habeas Corpus
Number Reviewed on Habeas Corpus 3
Number Reversed on Habeas Corpus 1
Percentage Reversed on Habeas Corpus 33%
Overall Rates Including [and Excluding] State Post-Conviction
Overall Error Rate [63%]
Overall Success Rate [37%]
App. A-62
Time
Time From First Death Sentence to First Non-Consensual
Execution
17.00
Average Time from Sentence to Execution 7.50
Average Time from Sentence to Final Federal Relief 9.00
Sentencing and Execution Rates
Death Sentences per 1000 Homicides 8.37
Death Sentences per 100,000 Population 0.90
Death Sentences per 1000 Prison Population 5.90
Non-Consensual Executions per 1000 Homicides 0.21
Non-Consensual Executions per 100,000 Population 0.02




Average Homicide Rate per 100,000 Population 4.94
Average Prison Admissions 2,558
Average Prison Population 6,781
Percentage Population Non-White 10%
Court Factors
Political Pressure (judicial elections) 8
Party Competition (gubernatorial elections) 1
State Court Criminal Caseload per 1000 Population 19.47
Expenditures per Capita on Courts 40.40




First Death Sentence 1974
First Direct Appeal 1977
First Consensual Execution NONE
First Non-Consensual Execution 1992
Sentences and Executions
Total Number of Death Sentences 30
Total Number of Executions 1
Percentage of Death Sentences Carried Out 3%
Error Rates
State Direct Appeal
Number Reviewed on Direct Appeal 9
Number Reversed on Direct Appeal 6
Percentage Reversed on Direct Appeal 67%
Number Awaiting Direct Appeal 21
Percentage Awaiting Direct Appeal 70%
Number Forward to State Post-Conviction 3
State Post-Conviction
Number Reviewed on Post-Conviction                                   Unknown
Number Reversed on Post-Conviction $1
Percentage Reversed on Post-Conviction $33%
Number Forward to Federal Habeas Corpus Unknown
State Direct Appeal and State Post-Conviction Combined
Overall Rate of Error Found by State Courts $78%
Federal Habeas Corpus
Number Reviewed on Habeas Corpus 2
Number Reversed on Habeas Corpus 1
Percentage Reversed on Habeas Corpus 50%
Overall Rates Including [and Excluding] State Post-Conviction
Overall Error Rate  89% [84%]
Overall Success Rate 11% [16%]
App. A-64
Timing
Time From First Death Sentence to First Non-Consensual
Execution
18.00
Average Time from Sentence to Execution 11.50
Average Time from Sentence to Final Federal Relief 6.00
Sentencing and Execution Rates
Death Sentences per 1000 Homicides 58.48
Death Sentences per 100,000 Population 6.44
Death Sentences per 1000 Prison Population 37.57
Non-Consensual Executions per 1000 Homicides 1.95
Non-Consensual Executions per 100,000 Population 0.21




Average Homicide Rate per 100,000 Population 5.11
Average Prison Admissions 319
Average Prison Population 799
Percentage Population Non-White 8%
Court Factors
Political Pressure (judicial elections) 8
Party Competition (gubernatorial elections) 0
State Court Criminal Caseload per 1000 Population 26.67
Expenditures per Capita on Courts 63.57
Sources: DRCen; Death Row U.S.A., Winter 2000; DADB; HCDB; Appendix C; USCen; UCRDB; USCen; PrisCen; PolPres; CtCaLd; CtExpen
1See Report, p.3.
2  On the difference between consensual and non-consensual executions, see Report note 31; pp.
32 & note 140, 41; note 208.
Appendix B: Federal Circuit Court and Regional 
Capital Punishment Report Cards
This Appendix contains report cards for the nine federal judicial circuits that conducted federal habeas
corpus review of state death sentences during the 1973-1995 study period. Most of the information on the report
cards serves merely as a regional composite of information generated by state courts or other state actors in the
subset of particular states (noted in the title of each report) that are grouped in the circuit. Only the three items—all
falling within the “Federal Habeas Corpus” section of each report, and all marked with a number sign (#)—reflect
actions exclusively by the federal courts in the relevant circuit. An additional six rows of information (marked with
a plus sign (+)) report on a mixture of actions by the relevant state courts and the federal courts in the circuit.
The federal circuit court report cards collected here contain seven categories of information: 
1.      Capital-sentencing history.
In the “History” section has information about the years in which four important capital-sentencing events
occurred in the multi-state region following the Supreme Court’s invalidation of all preexisting capital statutes and
sentences in Furman v. Georgia1—the state’s first death sentence, first direct appeal, first consensual execution
and first non-consensual execution.2
2.     Sentences and executions. 
This section reports aggregate information about how many death sentences were imposed in the states in
the region and how many and what proportion of those death sentences were carried out, during the study period.
3.      Error and success rates. 
The third section of the report cards identifies, as a composite for the states within the region, (a)  the rates
3There are three levels of judicial inspection—state direct appeal, state post-conviction and federal
habeas corpus. See Report, Part V, pp.18-22.
4See Report, pp. 4-5 & notes 39, 40.
5See Report, note 31; pp.32 & n.140, 41; note 208.
App. B-2
of serious error discovered at each level of judicial inspection,3 (b) the overall error rate, meaning the proportion
of capital judgments undergoing judicial inspection that were thrown out before reaching the end of the inspection
process,4 and, conversely, (c) the overall success rate, meaning the proportion of capital judgments found after a
full complement of inspections to be free of serious error.
4.     Length of time of review.
This category of the report card aggregates information for the states within the region on (a) the average
number of years it took death sentences to proceed through the three-stage inspection process to execution in the
small proportion of cases in which an execution took place, and (b) the average time from death sentence to federal
habeas corpus reversal in the minority of cases in which reversal occurred at the third (federal habeas corpus)
checkpoint, as opposed to taking place at one of the first two (state court) checkpoints. 
5.     Capital-sentencing and execution rates. 
This part of each regional capital punishment report card answers two questions. First, how often did the
states within the region, in the aggregate, impose death sentences? To answer this question, we consider death
sentences per 1,000 homicides per 100,000 population, and per 1,000 incarcerated inmates in the jurisdiction.
Second, how often (relative to homicides, population and prison population) did the states within the region, in the
aggregate, execute offenders? Because we are interested in success and error rates, we consider here only “non-
consensual” executions, i.e., ones  that were fully reviewed and found free of serious error.5
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6.     Demographic information.
The demographic information reported in the sixth report card category reveals the population pools against
which each region’s number of death sentences and executions are compared to determine the sentencing and
execution rates. This part of the report card also provides bases for distinguishing among regions—and thus,
potentially, for explaining variations among regions—in terms of the capital-sentence error rates detected on direct
appeal and habeas corpus inspection.
“Average population” is the region’s yearly average population from 1973 -1995.  
“Average homicides” are the total number of homicides in each region from 1973-1995 divided by 23, the
number of years in our study . 
Homicides per population establishes a region’s homicide rate. By “average homicides/average population,”
we mean the average number of homicides per year during the study period for every 100,000 persons in the
jurisdiction, averaged over the region’s population during the study period.
“Average prison admissions” means the average number of persons admitted each year to the region’s
prisons during the study period.
“Average prison population” means the region’s average population over study period. 
We also report here the percentage of each region’s population that is nonwhite.
App. B-4
The Third Circuit
(Delaware, Pennsylvania New Jersey Region)
History
First Death Sentence 1978
First Direct Appeal 1981
First Consensual Execution 1992
First Non-Consensual Execution 1993
Sentences and Executions      
Total Number of Death Sentences 343
Total Number of Executions 7
Percentage of Death Sentences Carried Out 2%
Error Rates
          State Direct Appeal 
Number Reviewed on Direct Appeal 261
Number Reversed on Direct Appeal 95
Percentage Reversed on Direct Appeal 36%
Number Awaiting Direct Appeal 82
Percentage Awaiting Direct Appeal 24%
Number Forward to State Post-Conviction 166
          State Post-Conviction
Number Reviewed on Post-Conviction                                  Unknown
Number Reversed on Post-Conviction Unknown
Percentage Reversed on Post-Conviction Unknown
Number Forward to Federal Habeas Corpus Unknown
          Federal Habeas Corpus  
Number Reviewed on Habeas# 7
Number Reversed on Habeas# 2
Percentage Reversed on Habeas# 29%
          Overall Rates [Excluding State Post-Conviction] 
Overall Error  Rate+ [55%]
Overall Success  Rate+ [45%]
App. B-5
Time
Average Time from Sentence to Execution# 8.80
Average Time from Sentence to Final Federal Relief# 9.00
Sentencing and Execution Rates  
Death Sentences per 1000 Homicides 12.64
Death Sentences per 100,000 Population 1.70
Death Sentences per 1000 Prison Population 18.78
NC Executions per 1000 Homicides 0.07
NC Executions per 100,000 Population 0.01




Average Homicides Rate per 100,000  Population 5.86
Percentage Population Non-White 14%
          NOTES: 
    1. Data marked with a # reports the results of actions exclusively of the federal courts within
              the circuit.
    2. Data marked with a + reports the result of actions of both state and federal courts within
              the circuit. 
    3. All other information is aggregate data for the states within the region.
    4. Because no state post-conviction information was collected or available for Delaware and
              New Jersey, information on that stage of the review process is omitted.
    5. No New Jersey cases were reviewed on federal habeas corpus during the study period.
            Sources: DRCen; Death Row U.S.A., Winter 2000; DADB; HCDB; Appendix C; USCen; UCRDB; USCen; PrisCen
App. B-6
The Fourth Circuit
(Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia Region)
History
First Death Sentence 1979
First Direct Appeal 1980
First Consensual Execution 1982
First Non-Consensual Execution 1984
Sentences and Executions      
Total Number of Death Sentences 574
Total Number of Executions 43
Percentage of Death Sentences Carried Out 8%
Error Rates
          State Direct Appeal 
Number Reviewed on Direct Appeal 494
Number Reversed on Direct Appeal 236
Percentage Reversed on Direct Appeal 48%
Number Awaiting Direct Appeal 80
Percentage Awaiting Direct Appeal 14%
Number Forward to State Post-Conviction 258
          State Post-Conviction
Number Reviewed on Post-Conviction                                  Unknown
Number Reversed on Post-Conviction $36
Percentage Reversed on Post-Conviction $14%
Number Forward to Federal Habeas Corpus Unknown
State Direct Appeal and State Post-Conviction Combined
Overall Rate of Error Found by State Courts $55%
          Federal Habeas Corpus  
Number Reviewed on Habeas# 52
Number Reversed on Habeas# 8
Percentage Reversed on Habeas# 15%
          Overall Rates Including [and Excluding] State Post-Conviction
Overall Error Rate+ 62% [56%]
Overall Success  Rate+ 38% [44%]
App. B-7
Time
Average Time from Sentence to Execution+ 7.91
Average Time from Sentence to Final Federal Relief+ 8.04
Sentencing and Execution Rates
Death Sentences per 1000 Homicides 13.10
Death Sentences per 100,000 Population 2.89
Death Sentences per 1000 Prison Population 10.14
NC Executions per 1000 Homicides             0.87
NC Executions per 100,000 Population       0.19
NC Executions per 1000 Prison Population 0.67
    Demographic Information
Average Population 19,832,227
Average Homicides 1,905
Average Homicides Rate per 100,000  Population 9.61
Average Prison Population 56,630
Percentage Population Non-White 25%
    NOTES: 
    1. Data marked with a # reports the results of actions exclusively of the federal courts within the             
circuit.
    2. Data marked with a + reports the result of actions of both state and federal courts within
              the circuit. 
    3. All other information is aggregate data for the states within the region.
       Sources: DRCen; Death Row U.S.A., Winter 2000; DADB; HCDB; Appendix C; USCen; UCRDB; USCen; PrisCen
App. B-8
The Fifth Circuit
(Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas Region)
History
First Death Sentence 1977
First Direct Appeal 1978
First Consensual Execution 1985
First Non-Consensual Execution 1983
Sentences and Executions      
Total Number of Death Sentences 1013
Total Number of Executions 130
Percentage of Death Sentences Carried Out 13%
Error Rates
          State Direct Appeal 
Number Reviewed on Direct Appeal 772
Number Reversed on Direct Appeal 295
Percentage Reversed on Direct Appeal 38%
Number Awaiting Direct Appeal 241
Percentage Awaiting Direct Appeal 24%
Number Forward to State Post-Conviction 477
          State Post-Conviction
Number Reviewed on Post-Conviction Unknown
Number Reversed on Post-Conviction $37
Percentage Reversed on Post-Conviction $8%
Number Forward to Federal Habeas Corpus Unknown
State Direct Appeal and State Post-Conviction Combined
Overall Rate of Error Found by State Courts $43%
          Federal Habeas Corpus
Number Reviewed on Habeas# 200
Number Reversed on Habeas# 63
Percentage Reversed on Habeas# 32%
          Overall Success Rates Including [and Excluding] State Post-Conviction
Overall Error Rate+ 61% [58%]
Overall Success  Rate+  39% [42%]
App. B-9
Time
Average Time from Sentence to Execution+ 8.28
Average Time from Sentence to Final Federal Relief+ 7.05
Sentencing and Execution Rates
Death Sentences per 1000 Homicides 14.64
Death Sentences per 100,000 Population 4.51
Death Sentences per 1000 Prison Population 15.09
NC Executions per 1000 Homicides             1.72
NC Executions per 100,000 Population       0.53
NC Executions per 1000 Prison Population 1.77
          Demographic Information
Average Population 22,473,577
Average Homicides 3,009
Average Homicides Rate per 100,000  Population 13.39
Average Prison Population 67,151
Percentage Population Non-White 27%
NOTES: 
1. Data marked with a # reports the results of actions exclusively of the federal courts within             
the circuit.
2. Data marked with a + reports the result of actions of both state and federal courts within
     the circuit. 
3. All other information is aggregate data for the states within the region.
Sources: DRCen; Death Row U.S.A., Winter 2000; DADB; HCDB; Appendix C; USCen; UCRDB; USCen; PrisCen
App. B-10
The Sixth Circuit
(Kentucky, Ohio, Tennessee Region)
History
First Death Sentence 1978
First Direct Appeal 1980
First Consensual Execution N/A
First Non-Consensual Execution N/A
Sentences and Executions      
Total Number of Death Sentences 391
Total Number of Executions 0
Percentage of Death Sentences Carried Out 0%
Error Rates
          State Direct Appeal 
Number Reviewed on Direct Appeal 284
Number Reversed on Direct Appeal 87
Percentage Reversed on Direct Appeal 31%
Number Awaiting Direct Appeal 107
Percentage Awaiting Direct Appeal 27%
Number Forward to State Post-Conviction 197
          State Post-Conviction
Number Reviewed on Post-Conviction                                  Unknown
Number Reversed on Post-Conviction Unknown
Percentage Reversed on Post-Conviction Unknown
Number Forward to Federal Habeas Corpus Unknown
          Federal Habeas Corpus
Number Reviewed on Habeas# 2
Number Reversed on Habeas# 2
Percentage Reversed on Habeas# 100%
          Overall Rates [Excluding State Post-Conviction]
Overall Error Rate+ [100%]
Overall Success  Rate+ [0%]
App. B-11
Time
Average Time from Sentence to Execution+ N/A
Average Time from Sentence to Final Federal Relief+ 13
Sentencing and Execution Rates
Death Sentences per 1000 Homicides 11.46
Death Sentences per 100,000 Population 2.03
NC Executions per 1000 Homicides             0.00
NC Executions per 100,000 Population       0.00




Average Homicides Rate per 100,000  Population 7.71
Percentage Population Non-White 12%
NOTES: 
1. Data marked with a # reports the results of actions exclusively of the federal courts within
                the circuit.
2. Data marked with a + reports the result of actions of both state and federal courts within
                the circuit. 
3. All other information is aggregate data for the states within the region.
4. Because no state post-conviction information was collected or available for Kentucky and
                Ohio, information on that stage of the review process is omitted.
5. No Ohio cases were review on federal habeas corpus during the study period.





First Death Sentence 1977
First Direct Appeal 1980
First Consensual Execution 1981
First Non-Consensual Execution 1994
Sentences and Executions
Total Number of Death Sentences 352
Total Number of Executions 10
Percentage of Death Sentences Carried Out 3%
Error Rates
          State Direct Appeal 
Number Reviewed on Direct Appeal 297
Number Reversed on Direct Appeal 110
Percentage Reversed on Direct Appeal 37%
Number Awaiting Direct Appeal 55
Percentage Awaiting Direct Appeal 16%
Number Forward to State Post-Conviction 187
          State Post-Conviction
Number Reviewed on Post-Conviction                                  Unknown
Number Reversed on Post-Conviction $22
Percentage Reversed on Post-Conviction $12%
Number Forward to Federal Habeas Corpus Unknown
State Direct Appeal and State Post-Conviction Combined
Overall Rate of Error Found by State Courts $44%
          Federal Habeas Corpus
Number Reviewed on Habeas# 14
Number Reversed on Habeas# 6
Percentage Reversed on Habeas# 43%
          Overall Rates Including [and Excluding] State Post-Conviction
Overall Error  Rate+ 68% [64%]
Overall Success  Rate+ 32% [36%]
App. B-13
Time
Average Time from Sentence to Execution+ 10.90
Average Time from Sentence to Final Federal Relief+ 10.92
Sentencing and Execution Rates
Death Sentences per 1000 Homicides 9.95
Death Sentences per 100,000 Population 2.07
Death Sentences per 1000 Prison Population 11.74
NC Executions per 1000 Homicides             0.20
NC Executions per 100,000 Population       0.04




Average Homicides Rate per 100,000  Population 9.05
Average Prison Population 29,978
Percentage Population Non-White 16%
NOTES: 
1. Data marked with a # reports the results of actions exclusively of the federal courts within             
the circuit.
2. Data marked with a + reports the result of actions of both state and federal courts within
                the circuit. 
3. All other information is aggregate data for the states within the region.
 Sources: DRCen; Death Row U.S.A., Winter 2000; DADB; HCDB; Appendix C; USCen; UCRDB; USCen; PrisCen
App. B-14
The Eighth Circuit
(Arkansas, Missouri, Nebraska Region)
History
First Death Sentence 1974
First Direct Appeal 1975
First Consensual Execution 1990
First Non-Consensual Execution 1990
          Sentences and Executions      
Total Number of Death Sentences 248
Total Number of Executions 29
Percentage of Death Sentences Carried Out 12%
Error Rates
          State Direct Appeal 
Number Reviewed on Direct Appeal 201
Number Reversed on Direct Appeal 56
Percentage Reversed on Direct Appeal 28%
Number Awaiting Direct Appeal 47
Percentage Awaiting Direct Appeal 19%
Number Forward to State Post-Conviction 145
          State Post-Conviction
Number Reviewed on Post-Conviction                                  Unknown
Number Reversed on Post-Conviction $7
Percentage Reversed on Post-Conviction $5%
Number Forward to Federal Habeas Corpus Unknown
State Direct Appeal and State Post-Conviction Combined
Overall Rate of Error Found by State Courts $31%
          Federal Habeas Corpus
Number Reviewed on Habeas# 58
Number Reversed on Habeas# 19
Percentage Reversed on Habeas# 33%
          Overall Rates Including [and Excluding] State Post-Conviction
Overall Error Rate+  54% [52%]
Overall Success Rate+ 46% [48%]
App. B-15
Time
Average Time from Sentence to Execution+ 9.88
Average Time from Sentence to Final Federal Relief+ 9.79
Sentencing and Execution Rates
Death Sentences per 1000 Homicides 14.24
Death Sentences per 100,000 Population 2.57
Death Sentences per 1000 Prison Population 14.10
NC Executions per 1000 Homicides     1.49
NC Executions per 100,000 Population 0.27




Average Homicides Rate per 100,000  Population 7.84
Average Prison Population 17,592
Percentage Population Non-White 12%
NOTES: 
1. Data marked with a # reports the results of actions exclusively of the federal courts within the
                circuit.
2. Data marked with a + reports the result of actions of both state and federal courts within
                the circuit. 
3. All other information is aggregate data for the states within the region.
              Sources: DRCen; Death Row U.S.A., Winter 2000; DADB; HCDB; Appendix C; USCen; UCRDB; USCen; PrisCen
App. B-16
The Ninth Circuit
(Arizona, California, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon,  Washington Region)
History
First Death Sentence 1974
First Direct Appeal 1975
First Consensual Execution 1979
First Non-Consensual Execution 1992
 Sentences and Executions      
Total Number of Death Sentences 1028
Total Number of Executions 15
Percentage of Death Sentences Carried Out 2%
 Error Rates
          State Direct Appeal 
Number Reviewed on Direct Appeal 683
Number Reversed on Direct Appeal 259
Percentage Reversed on Direct Appeal 38%
Number Awaiting Direct Appeal 345
Percentage Awaiting Direct Appeal 34%
Number Forward to State Post-Conviction 298
          State Post-Conviction [Excluding Oregon and Washington]
Number Reviewed on Post-Conviction                                  Unknown
Number Reversed on Post-Conviction $24
Percentage Reversed on Post-Conviction $8%
Number Forward to Federal Habeas Corpus Unknown
State Direct Appeal and State Post-Conviction Combined
Overall Rate of Error Found by State Courts $41%
          Federal Habeas Corpus
Number Reviewed on Habeas# 34
Number Reversed on Habeas# 21
Percentage Reversed on Habeas# 62%
  
          Overall Rates Including [and Excluding] State Post-Conviction
Overall Error Rate+ 78% [76%]
Overall Success  Rate+ 22% [24%]
App. B-17
Time
Average Time from Sentence to Execution+ 9.75
Average Time from Sentence to Final Federal Relief+ 10.05
Sentencing and Execution Rates
Death Sentences per 1000 Homicides 11.86
Death Sentences per 100,000 Population 2.60
NC Executions per 1000 Homicides             0.07
NC Executions per 100,000 Population       0.02




Average Homicides Rate per 100,000  Population 9.52
Percentage Population Non-White 21%
NOTES: 
1. Data marked with a # reports the results of actions exclusively of the federal courts within the
                circuit.
2. Data marked with a + reports the result of actions of both state and federal courts within
                the circuit. 
3. All other information is aggregate data for the states within the region.
4. No state post-conviction information was available or collected for Oregon and Washington.
5. No Oregon cases were reviewed on federal habeas corpus during the study period.
              Sources: DRCen; Death Row U.S.A., Winter 2000; DADB; HCDB; Appendix C; USCen; UCRDB; USCen; PrisCen
App. B-18
The Tenth Circuit
(Colorado, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah, Wyoming Region)
History
First Death Sentence 1975
First Direct Appeal 1980
First Consensual Execution 1977
First Non-Consensual Execution 1990
          Sentences and Executions      
Total Number of Death Sentences 301
Total Number of Executions 11
Percentage of Death Sentences Carried Out 4%
Error Rates
          State Direct Appeal 
Number Reviewed on Direct Appeal 237
Number Reversed on Direct Appeal 115
Percentage Reversed on Direct Appeal 49%
Number Awaiting Direct Appeal 64
Percentage Awaiting Direct Appeal 21%
Number Forward to State Post-Conviction 122
          State Post-Conviction [Excluding Colorado and New Mexico]
Number Reviewed on Post-Conviction Unknown
Number Reversed on Post-Conviction $6
Percentage Reversed on Post-Conviction $5%
Number Forward to Federal Habeas Corpus Unknown
State Direct Appeal and State Post-Conviction Combined
Overall Rate of Error Found by State Courts $51%
          Federal Habeas Corpus
Number Reviewed on Habeas# 17
Number Reversed on Habeas# 8
Percentage Reversed on Habeas# 47%
          Overall Rates Including [and Excluding] State Post-Conviction
Overall Error Rate+  74% [73%]
Overall Success  Rate+ 26% [27%]
App. B-19
Time
Average Time from Sentence to Execution+ 11.54
Average Time from Sentence to Final Federal Relief+ 9.88
Sentencing and Execution Rates
Death Sentences per 1000 Homicides 19.76
Death Sentences per 100,000 Population 3.09
NC Executions per 1000 Homicides             0.53
NC Executions per 100,000 Population       0.08




Average Homicides Rate per 100,000  Population 6.79
Percentage Population Non-White 14%
NOTES: 
1. Data marked with a # reports the results of actions exclusively of the federal courts within
                the circuit.
2. Data marked with a + reports the result of actions of both state and federal courts within
                the circuit. 
3. All other information is aggregate data for the states within the region.
4. No state post-conviction information was collected or available for New Mexico and Colorado
5. No New Mexico or Colorado cases were reviewed on federal habeas corpus during the study
                period.
              Sources: DRCen; Death Row U.S.A., Winter 2000; DADB; HCDB; Appendix C; USCen; UCRDB; USCen; PrisCen
App. B-20
The Eleventh Circuit
(Alabama, Florida, Georgia Region)
History
First Death Sentence 1975
First Direct Appeal 1977
First Consensual Execution 1993
First Non-Consensual Execution 1983
 Sentences and Executions
Total Number of Death Sentences 1503
Total Number of Executions 68
Percentage of Death Sentences Carried Out 5%
Error Rates
          State Direct Appeal 
Number Reviewed on Direct Appeal 1327
Number Reversed on Direct Appeal 627
Percentage Reversed on Direct Appeal 47%
Number Awaiting Direct Appeal 176
Percentage Awaiting Direct Appeal 12%
Number Forward to State Post-Conviction 700
          State Post-Conviction
Number Reviewed on Post-Conviction                                  Unknown
Number Reversed on Post-Conviction $85
Percentage Reversed on Post-Conviction $12%
Number Forward to Federal Habeas Corpus Unknown
State Direct Appeal and State Post-Conviction Combined
Overall Rate of Error Found by State Courts $54%
          Federal Habeas Corpus
Number Reviewed on Habeas# 215
Number Reversed on Habeas# 108
Percentage Reversed on Habeas# 50%
          Overall Rates Including [and Excluding] State Post-Conviction 
Overall Error Rate+ 77% [74%]
Overall Success  Rate+ 23% [26%]
App. B-21
Time
Average Time from Sentence to Execution+ 9.52
Average Time from Sentence to Final Federal Relief+ 8.82
Sentencing and Execution Rates
Death Sentences per 1000 Homicides 26.97
Death Sentences per 100,000 Population 7.09
Death Sentences per 1000 Prison Population 23.88
NC Executions per 1000 Homicides              1.20
NC Executions per 100,000 Population              0.32




Average Homicides Rate per 100,000  Population 11.44
Average Prison Population 62,947
Percentage Population Non-White 23%
            NOTES: 
1. Data marked with a # reports the results of actions exclusively of the federal courts within the        circuit.
2. Data marked with a + reports the result of actions of both state and federal courts within
                the circuit. 
3. All other information is aggregate data for the states within the region.
              Sources: DRCen; Death Row U.S.A., Winter 2000; DADB; HCDB; Appendix C; USCen; UCRDB; USCen; PrisCen
Appendix C: Incomplete List of Capital Judgments Reversed 
on State Post-Conviction and Related Types of Review
Introduction and Key
This Appendix contains an incomplete list of the capital cases in which state post-conviction relief was
granted between 1973 and April 2000. The list is incomplete because many state post-conviction decisions
(whether or not relief was granted) are not published, and information on some of them is not available except by
a search—beyond our capacity—of the records of each of thousands of local, intermediate and statewide courts
throughout the United States with potential jurisdiction over capital state post-conviction cases. 
Because we only collected information about reversals, this list does not permit an accurate count of the
proportion of capital judgments finally reviewed by state post-conviction courts during the study period that
were affirmed or reversed. As we now explain, however, it is possible to use our data to make a different
calculation that can serve as an extremely conservative estimate of the state post-conviction reversal rate. 
From our direct appeal study, we can determine the number of capital judgments that “cleared” state direct
review during the study period and thus were available for state post-conviction review. We also know that nearly
all capital judgments that “clear” direct appeal go on to be reviewed by a state post-conviction court. See Report,
pp. 19-20. Obviously, a sizeable number of capital judgments that “cleared” direct appeal and were subjected to
state post-conviction review during the study period were pending in front of, and had not yet been finally reviewed
by, state post-conviction courts as of the end of the study See Report, at note 132. But because we do not know
how many cases were in that posture, we are forced to compute the number of capital judgments that were
reversed during the study period due to serious error as a percentage of the state post-conviction cases that were
available to be reviewed (whether or not they were actually decided). In this Report, we accordingly use that
calculation—the number of known state post-conviction reversals of capital judgments taken as a proportion of
all capital judgments available for state post-conviction review (available in the sense that they had cleared state
direct appeal)—as a very conservative proxy for (meaning as a number that is reliably equal to or (in most cases)
lower than) the number we actually are interested in, namely, the number of known reversals taken as a
proportion of the capital judgments actually reviewed on state post-conviction.
The data in this Appendix were collected during April 2000. Multiple capital attorneys in each of the 28
states on which this study focuses (states in which at least one capital judgment was reviewed on federal habeas
corpus between 1973 and 1995) were asked to report all known cases within their state in which capital judgments
were overturned during state post-conviction proceedings since 1973, and to provide as much information as was
available about: (1) the name of the capital prisoner granted state post-conviction relief, (2) the citation of, or other
identifying information about, the decision granting relief, (3) the date of the decision, (4) the reason for the reversal,
and (4) the outcome on retrial of the conviction or sentence. We received information from 26 of the 28 states (all
but Delaware and Washington). In all cases, the reporting attorney cautioned that the list was, or may be,
incomplete. Where possible, using the national reporter system and Westlaw, the information provided was verified
and supplemented. Also verified were all unpublished decisions from Nevada (as to which the relevant unpublished
opinions were provided); unpublished decisions from Arizona and Texas, as to which a Westlaw newspaper search
and information available from the state departments of corrections was used; and a few additional unpublished
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cases where secondary sources (which are cited in the list below, see, e.g., the Knapp case in Arizona) were
available. Other unreported information has not been verified, although in most instances, we have identified the
case sufficiently to permits verification using local court records—a task for future research.
Included in this list are all decisions we were able to identify in which capital convictions or death sentences
were set aside during the pendency of state post-conviction proceedings based on legal error with the concurrence
of some state official, including state trial and appellate judges, district attorneys and state attorneys general (e.g.,
in confessing error and agreeing to a new trial or a lesser sentence), and governors (e.g., through commutation
mechanisms that were used for the specific purpose of providing remedies for legal error).
Reported via a citation, a short narrative description, and a variety of notations explained in the “Key”
below, are the case name, date (including whether or not the case fell within the study period), the reason for
reversal, if known, and the outcome of the case on retrial following reversal, if known. Unless otherwise specified,
references to the “trial court” are to the trial-level court with responsibility for deciding state post-conviction
petitions in the first instance. 
Key:
Timing: * = Decided after study period (1996 or after). All other cases were decided during the study period.
Basis for Relief: 
IAC = ineffective assistance of counsel
PSE = prosecutorial suppression of evidence
PM = other prosecutorial or law enforcement misconduct
I = unconstitutional jury instructions
JB = judge or juror bias
O = other basis for relief
UK = unknown basis for relief
Result on Retrial: 
L   = a sentence less than death was imposed, either based on the original conviction of capital murder
or based on a new conviction of capital or some lesser degree of murder
NG = on retrial, the individual was found not guilty of capital or any other degree of murder—by judicial
or jury verdict, dismissal of the charges, the dropping of charges, a formal pardon, or the like
D   =  new death sentence imposed, either based on the original conviction of capital murder or based
on a new conviction of capital murder
RP = retrial pending
DW = died while awaiting a new trial
?    = outcome on retrial unknown 
App. C-3
Summary of National Composite Results
Reversals pre-1996: 248
Reversals 1996 and after: 94 (over 52 months = average of 22/year)
Total reversals (1973- Apr. 2000): 342
Basis for Relief:
Total: 342 (1973 - Apr. 2000)
Total Known: 289
IAC = 107* (37% of known)
PSE = 46* (16% of known)
PM = 10     (3% of known)
PSE/PM = 56 (19% of known)
IAC/PSE/PM =161* (56% of known)
JB = 12   (4% of known) 
I = 57 (20% of known)
O = 59 (21% of known)
UK =53
* Note: in two cases, the basis for relief was both IAC and PSE.
Result on Retrial:
Total: 342 (1973 - Apr. 2000)
Total Known (total minus RP, DW and ?) = 301
L = 225 (75% of known)
NG = 22   (7% of known)
L/NG=247 (82% of known)






Jimmy Wayne Davis v. State (Talladega Cnty. Cir. Ct., Case No. 90-086, Dec. 15, 1995) (during pendency of state
post-conviction petition raising ineffective assistance of counsel claims, among others, and following state supreme
court’s order requiring trial counsel to submit to deposition based on substantial showing of ineffective assistance, see
Ex parte Davis, 628 So.2d 530 (Ala. 1993), state agreed to withdrawal of death sentence and imposition of sentence
of life in prison without parole) [IAC, L]
Ex parte Floyd, 571 So.2d 1234 (Ala. 1990) (conviction overturned because prosecutor intentionally discriminated
against African American jurors by using his first 11 (of 12) peremptory challenges to strike all 11 African-Americans
in the jury venire; resentenced to life) [PM, L]
State v. Freeman, 605 So.2d 1258 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992) (conviction and death sentence overturned by trial court
due to jury foreman’s prejudicially inaccurate and incomplete answers under oath to questions about bias during jury
selection process; resentenced to life) [JB, L]
Johnny Harris v. State (Baldwin Cnty. Cir. Ct., Case No. 6699, July 1, 1981) (conviction and death sentence
reversed on writ of error coram nobis because state failed to disclose evidence impeaching one of its principal
witnesses at Harris' trial and because an exculpatory defense witness was unavailable at the time of Harris' trial;
proceedings are described in a subsequent opinion reviewing a death sentence imposed on retrial, see Harris v. State,
552 So.2d 857 (Al. Crim. App. 1989)) [PSE, D]
Jefferson v. State,  645 So. 2d 313 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994) (conviction and death sentence overturned because state
withheld exculpatory evidence that someone other than the defendant committed the crime and that seriously
impeached the credibility of two key prosecution witnesses; resentenced to life) [PSE, L] 
Frederick Lynn v. State (Barbour Cnty. Cir. Ct., Case No. 83-18, Mar. 12, 1992) (during pendency of state post-
conviction proceeding, state agreed to withdrawal of death sentence and imposition of life sentence; proceedings are
described in subsequent opinion in Lynn v. State, 629 So.2d 89 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993)) [UK, L]
Walter McMillian v. State, 616 So. 2d 933 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (conviction and death sentence overturned
because state suppressed exculpatory evidence impeaching its principal witness (who subsequently recanted) and
failed to disclose evidence creating a reasonable probability that the outcome of the guilt-innocence trial would have
been different had the evidence been disclosed; petitioner was subsequently released from custody for lack of any
evidence of guilt) [PSE, NG]
Philip Musgrove v. State (Madison Cnty. Cir. Ct., Case No.83-1976.60L, Mar. 22, 1989) (conviction and death
sentence overturned by trial court; resentenced to life) [UK, L]
Hamilton v. State, 677 So.2d 1254 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995) (conviction overturned because the prosecutor permitted
the state's principal witness to perjure himself, withheld other exculpatory evidence, and committed other forms of
misconduct and because Hamilton’s lawyer was egregiously ineffective; on retrial, Hamilton was convicted of a lesser
offense and sentenced to a 20-year term ) [PSE, L]
*Judy Haney v. State (Talladega Cnty. Cir. Ct., Case No. 87-559, Oct. 9, 1997) (during pendency of state post-
conviction proceeding, state agreed to withdrawal of death sentence and imposition of life sentence) [UK, L] 
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Darryl Watkins v. State, 659 So.2d 689 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995) (during pendency of state post-conviction appeal,
the prosecutor requested that the sentence of death imposed in the case be set aside and that Watkins be resentenced
to life; the trial court approved the settlement, and the appeal was dismissed as moot) [UK, L]
Ex parte Womack, 541 So. 2d 47 (Ala. 1988) (conviction and death sentence overturned because state (1)
misrepresented that it had no plea bargain or other arrangement with the key witnesses against Womack at the time
of trial, (2) knowingly suppressed a variety of evidence that the state’s own witness may have been guilty of the crime
in question, (3) withheld police reports revealing inconsistencies between key witnesses’ testimony and their
statements to the grand jury, (4) suppressed evidence of witness’s attempt to recant grand jury testimony implicating
Womack in the crime; conviction and sentence overturned, as well, because Womack received ineffective assistance
of counsel when his own attorney took the stand and testified against him; resentenced to life) [PSE (also IAC), L]
Pre-1996: 11
1996 and after: 1
Basis for Relief: IAC = 1; PSE = 5; PM = 1; JB = 1; UK = 4
Result on Retrial: L = 10; NG =1; D = 1
App. C-6
ARIZONA
State v. Britson (Pima Cnty. Super. Ct.) (sometime between 1981 and 1988, as described in subsequent opinion
reviewing subsequent (noncapital) criminal judgment, Britson v. Lewis, 1988 WL 131765 (9th Cir. Nov. 29, 1988),
trial court on third state post-conviction petition overturned death sentence based on ineffective assistance of counsel
at the penalty phase, and a life sentence was imposed) [IAC, L]
State v. Carriger, 645 P.2d 816 (Ariz. 1982) (death sentence overturned due to ineffective assistance of trial counsel
who acted as “neutral observer,” not zealous advocate; Carriger was resentenced to death, although he ultimately was
granted federal habeas relief and was released from custody) [IAC, D] 
State v. Michael Davis (Pima Cnty. Super. Ct. 1994) (conviction overturned due to ineffective assistance of counsel;
resentenced to life; see Ariz. Republic , June 5, 1994, 1994 WL 6392862, and Tucson Citizen, 1994 WL 7831897)
[IAC, L]
State v. Fisher, 859 P.2d 179 (Ariz.1993) & 730 P.2d 825 (Ariz. 1986) (conviction overturned based on ineffective
assistance of counsel and state’s premising plea bargain with principal witness against Fisher upon her giving
testimony specified by the state; Fisher not thereafter returned to death row) [IAC & PSE, L]
State v. Jordan, 672 P.2d 169 (Ariz. 1983) & 697 P.2d 323 (Ariz. 1985) (death sentence overturned due to trial
court’s improper intervention in plea negotiations; life sentence imposed on retrial) [O, L]
*State v. Alvie Kiles (Yuma Cnty. Super. Ct. Nos. C-15444, C-15577, Nov. 7, 1996) (conviction overturned due to
ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel; retrial pending) [IAC, RP]
State v. Knapp (Pima Cnty. Super. Ct. 1987) (conviction and death sentence overturned in 1987 on third state post-
conviction petition due to newly discovered scientific  evidence of innocence and police and prosecutorial misconduct,
as described in Knapp v. Knapp, 823 P.2d 685 (Ariz. 1992); in 1992, Knapp was released as innocent, as  detailed
in Roger Parloff, Triple Jeopardy (1996)) [PSE, NG]
State v. Schad, 691 P.2d 710 (Ariz. 1984) (conviction overturned due to failure to instruct jury on crucial elements
of first-degree murder; resentenced to death) [I, D]
State v. Serna (Maricopa Cnty. Super. Ct. No. 150464, 1994) (conviction overturned due to prosecutor’s obstruction
of defense’s ability to find exculpatory witness; on retrial, state offered and Serna accepted a guilty plea to
manslaughter, after which he was sentenced to time served and was released from prison, see From Death Row to
Halfway House, Phoenix Gazette, Jan. 24, 1995, at B1, 1995 WL 2752207) [PSE, NG]
 
State v. Roger Smith (Maricopa Cnty. Super. Ct. 1992) (during state post-conviction proceedings, state agreed to life
sentence in return for Smith’s dropping his post-conviction challenge to his conviction, see Ariz. Repubic/Phoenix
Gazette, July 8, 1992, at B1, 1992 WL 8259715) [UK, L]
State v. Sylvester Smith (Maricopa Cnty. Super. Ct. No. 101738, 1990) (death sentence replaced with life sentence
upon determination that Smith’s mental condition made him undeserving of a death sentence, see Phoenix Gazette,
Mar. 25, 1991, 1991 WL 5982744) [O, L]
State v. Raymond Tison, 774 P.2d 805 (Ariz. 1989) (death sentence reversed because sentencer previously failed
to determine that defendant had sufficient culpability to justify death penalty under Eighth Amendment; resentenced
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to life, see Tucson Citizen, Jan. 23, 1997, at 1, 1997 WL 5866500)) (on remand from Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137
(1987)) [O, L]
State v. Ricky Tison, 774 P.2d 805 (Ariz. 1989) (death sentence reversed because sentencer previously failed to
determine that defendant had sufficient culpability to justify death penalty under Eighth Amendment; resentenced to
life, see Tucson Citizen, Jan. 23, 1997, at 1, 1997 WL 5866500)) (on remand from Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137
(1987)) [O, L]
State v. White (Yavapai Cnty. Super. Ct. No. 101738, 1990) (death sentence overturned due to ineffective assistance
of counsel, as described in subsequent opinion reviewing the death sentence that was imposed on retrial, see State
v. White, 982 P.2d 819 (Ariz. 1991)) [IAC, D]
*State v. Willoughby (Maricopa Cnty Super. Ct., No. CR 91-10184, Nov. 1999) (conviction overturned due to
ineffective assistance of counsel; retrial pending) [IAC, RP]
Pre-1996: 12
1996 and after: 3
Basis for Relief: IAC = 6; PSE = 2; IAC & PSE = 1; I =1, O = 4, UK = 1 
Result on Retrial: L = 8; NG = 2; D = 3; RP = 2
App. C-8
ARKANSAS
Neal v. State, 623 S.W.2d 191 (Ark. 1981) (death sentence overturned and life sentence imposed by state supreme
court based on ineffective assistance at sentencing phase) [IAC; L]
*Sheridan v. State,  959 S.W.2d 29 (Ark. 1998) (conviction overturned due to representation by attorney with blatant
conflict of interest; resentenced to life) [IAC, L]
Adrian Tisdale (conviction overturned due to ineffective assistance of 90-year-old trial attorney who died immediately
after defendant’s trial; life sentence imposed on retrial, see Tisdale v. State,  843 S.W.2d 803 (Ark. 1993)) [IAC, L]
Pre-1996: 2
1996 and after: 1
Basis for Relief: IAC = 3
Result on Retrial: L = 3
App. C-9
CALIFORNIA
*In re Brown, 17 Cal.4th 873 (1998) (conviction and death sentence overturned due to prosecutorial suppression of
exculpatory evidence; resentenced to death) [IAC, D]
*In re Gay, 19 Cal.4th 771 (1998) (death sentence overturned due to ineffective assistance of counsel; retrial
pending) [IAC, RP]
In re Hitchings, 6 Cal.4th 97 (1993) (conviction and death sentence overturned due to juror misconduct; Hitchings
pled to lesser offense and sentence) [JB, L]
*In re Jones, 13 Cal.4th 552  (1996) (conviction and sentence overturned due to ineffective assistance of counsel;
Jones subsequently was released in lieu of retrial) [IAC, NG]
In re Marquez, 1 Cal.4th 584 (1992)  (death sentence overturned due to ineffective assistance of counsel; Marquez
was not thereafter returned to death row) [IAC, L]
Oscar Morris (after having death sentence overturned on direct appeal in 1988, Morris had his capital conviction
overturned by the L.A. Superior Court in a state post-conviction proceeding; outcome unknown) [UK, ?]
In re Neely, 6 Cal.4th 901 (1993)  (conviction overturned due to ineffective assistance of counsel; on retrial, Neely
received a life sentence) [IAC, L]
In re Sixto, 48 Cal.3d 1247 (1989) (conviction overturned based on ineffective assistance of counsel; lesser sentence
imposed on retrial) [IAC, L]
In re (Laird) Stankewitz, 40 Cal.3d 391  (1985) (conviction overturned due to juror misconduct; lesser sentence
imposed on retrial) [JB, L]
In re Wilson, 3 Cal.4th 945 (1992)  (conviction overturned based on ineffective assistance of counsel; resentenced
to death) [IAC, D]
pre-1996: 7
1996 and after: 3
Basis for Relief: IAC = 7; JB = 2; UK =1
Result on Retrial: L = 5; NG = 1; D = 2; RP =1; ? = 1
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DELAWARE  [No available information]
App. C-11
FLORIDA [all defendants resentenced to sentence less than death unless otherwise indicated]
Arango v. State, 467 So.2d 692 (Fla. 1985) (conviction overturned due to prosecutorial suppression of evidence of
innocence; resentenced to death) [PSE, D]
Arango v. State, 497 So.2d 1161 (Fla. 1986) (second conviction overturned due to prosecutorial suppression of
exculpatory evidence supporting Arango’s defense that someone else committed the offense) [PSE, L]
Barclay v. State, 470 So.2d 691 (Fla. 1985) (new appeal granted due to ineffective assistance of counsel and conflict
of interest on appeal; on new appeal, supreme court reduces death sentence to life) [IAC, L]
Bassett v. State , 541 So.2d 596 (Fla. 1989) (death sentence overturned due to ineffective assistance of counsel in
failing to discover and present mitigating evidence) [IAC, L]
Bates v. Dugger, 604 So.2d 457 (Fla. 1992) (death sentence overturned due to ineffective assistance of counsel;
death sentence imposed on retrial) [IAC, D]
*Mauricio Beltran-Lopez v. State, Dade Cnty. Cir. Ct. (Jan. 12, 1999) (during pendency of state post-conviction
petition for relief in trial court based on evidence of prosecutorial suppression of evidence and ex parte contacts with
trial court on sentencing, state offers and Beltran-Lopez accepts life sentence in return for dropping his claims) [PSE,
L]
Larry Brown v. State, Pinellas Cnty Cir. Ct. (Feb. 18, 1994) (on remand for an evidentiary hearing on ineffective
assistance of counsel as ordered by Brown v. State, 596 So.2d 1026 (Fla. 1992), state agrees to a sentence less than
death) [IAC, L]
Burr v. State, 576 So.2d 278 (Fla. 1990) (death sentence overturned due to sentencer’s reliance on alleged but
unconvicted offenses as aggravating circumstances) [O, L]
*Clark v. State, 690 So.2d 1280 (Fla. 1997) (death sentence overturned due to ineffective assistance of counsel at
the sentencing trial) [IAC, L]
Combs v. State, 525 So.2d 853 (Fla.1988) (death sentence overturned due to improper and prejudicial instruction
barring jury from considering mitigating circumstances) [I, L]
Cooper v. Dugger, 526 So.2d 900 (Fla.1988) (same as Combs; resentenced to death) [I, D]
Copeland v. Dugger, 565 So.2d 1348 (Fl. 1990) (same as Combs) [I, L]
Deaton v. Dugger, 635 So.2d 4 (Fla. 1993) (death sentence overturned due to ineffective assistance of counsel and
improper instruction at sentencing hearing) [IAC, L]
Dougan v. Wainwright, 448 So.2d 1005 (Fla. 1984) (conviction overturned due to ineffective assistance on appeal;
death sentence imposed on retrial) [IAC, D]
Downs v. Dugger, 514 So.2d 1069 (Fla.1987) (same as Combs) [I, D]
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Gregory Engle v. State (Duval Cnty. Cir. Ct. July 27, 1993) (on remand ordered by Engle v. State, 576 So.2d 696
(Fla. 1991) to permit filing of new post-conviction petition following state’s compliance with law requiring disclosure
of potentially exculpatory evidence in state’s file, prosecution agrees to a sentence less than death) [PSE, L]
*Henry Espinosa, Dade Cnty. Cir. Ct. (Jan. 12, 1999) (during pendency of state post-conviction petition for relief
in trial court based on evidence of prosecutorial suppression of evidence and ex parte contacts with trial court on
sentencing, state offers and Espinosa accepts life sentence in return for dropping his claims) [PSE, L]
Foster v. State, 518 So.2d 901 (State 1987) (same as Combs; death sentence imposed on retrial) [I, D]
Garcia v. State, 622 So.2d 1325 (Fla. 1993) (death sentence overturned due to state’s suppression of witness
statement that Garcia was not the shooter and state’s closing argument identifying Garcia as the shooter and due to
ineffective assistance of counsel) [IAC & PSE, L]
Gorham v. State, 597 So.2d 782 (Fla. 1992) (conviction overturned due to prosecutorial suppression of evidence
impeaching its principal witness; reconvicted of lesser offense) [PSE, L]
*State v. Alfonso Green (Hillsborough County, 13th Judicial Circuit, May 2000, No. 86-14233) (on eve of state post-
conviction hearing, state stipulated to an order, entered by the judge, finding ineffective assistance of counsel at
sentencing, overturning the death sentence, and requiring a new sentencing trial; retrial pending) [IAC, RP]
Frank Griffin v. State (Dade Cnty. Cir. Ct. Aug. 14, 1991) (during pendency of state post-conviction petition and
upon trial court’s suggestion that counsel “work out” the case, state agrees to sentence less than death; state stipulated
to relief based on prosecutorial suppression of evidence and incompetent lawyering) [IAC & PSE, L]
Kenneth Griffin v. State (Bradford Cnty. Cir. Ct. Apr. 28, 1993) (following filing of state post-conviction petition
alleging prosecutorial suppression of evidence and other misconduct and newly discovered evidence, state agrees to
sentence less than death) [PSE, L]
*Gunsby v. State, 670 So.2d 920 (Fla. 1996) (new trial required due to cumulative effect of ineffective assistance
of counsel in failing to discover exculpatory evidence that Gunsby was not the perpetrator, and the state’s suppression
of the fact that two of its crucial witnesses testified against Gunsby only after being promised lenient treatment in their
own criminal cases; state did not seek death sentenced on retrial and life sentence was imposed upon reconviction)
[IAC & PSE, L]
Hall v. State, 541 So.2d 1125 (Fla.1989) (same as Combs; resentenced to death) [I, D]
Harvard v. State, 486 So.2d 537 (Fla. 1986) (death sentence overturned due to trial court’s refusal to consider
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances) [O, L]
Tony Hayes v. State (Volusia Cnty. Cir. Ct. June 6, 1995) (death sentence overturned and, in August 1995, state
agreed to a sentence less than death) [UK, L]
Heiney v. State, 620 So.2d 171 (Fla. 1993) (death sentence overturned due to ineffective assistance at sentencing
phase for failure to investigate and discover mitigating evidence) [IAC, L]
Hildwin v. Dugger, 654 So.2d 107 (Fla. 1995) (death sentence overturned due to ineffective assistance of counsel
at sentencing; death sentence imposed on retrial) [IAC, D]
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Hill v. State, 473 So.2d 1253 (Fla. 1985) (conviction overturned due to trial court’s failure to hold hearing on Hill’s
competency to stand trial, despite substantial evidence that defendant, who was retarded and subject to grand mal
seizures, was incompetent to plead guilty) [O, L]
Holmes v. State, 429 So.2d 297 (Fla. 1983)  (death sentence overturned due to ineffective assistance of counsel at
the penalty phase) [IAC, L]
Hudson v. State, 614 So.2d 482 (Fla. 1993) (death sentence overturned due to ineffective assistance of counsel at
the penalty phase; death sentence imposed on retrial) [IAC, D]
Clarence Jackson v. State  (Hillsborough Cnty. Cir. Ct. Sept. 14, 1991) (state stipulated to life sentence on eve of
evidentiary hearing on state post-conviction petition; state stipulated to relief based on ineffective assistance of
counsel, then stipulated to life sentence in return for Jackson’s agreement to drop his claim of prosecutorial
suppression of evidence) [IAC, L]
Nathaniel Jackson v. State  (Pinellas Cnty. Cir. Ct. Oct. 29, 1991) (state stipulated to life sentence three years after
the filing of a state post-conviction petition) [UK, L]
Eligaah Jacobs v. State  (Pasco Cnty. Cir. Ct. July 30, 1986) (death sentence overturned; state stipulated to relief
based on incompetent lawyering at penalty trial) [IAC, L]
James v. State, 615 So.2d 668 (Fla. 1993) (death sentence overturned due to improper instruction on unconstitutionally
vague aggravating circumstance) [I, L]
Daniel Karr Johnson v. State (Clay Cnty. Cir. Ct. Aug. 4, 1988) (state offers and defendant accepts plea to life
sentence after trial overturns conviction; order imposing new sentence gives incompetent lawyering as basis for relief)
[IAC, L]
Paul Johnson v. Wainwright, 490 So.2d 938 (Fla. 1986) (conviction overturned due to ineffective assistance of
counsel on appeal; death sentence imposed on retrial) [IAC, D]
*Jones v. State, 740 S0.2d 520 (Fla. 1999) (c onviction overturned because Jones was incompetent to stand trial;
retrial pending) [O, RP]
Lara v. State, 581 So.2d 1288 (Fla. 1991) (death sentence overturned due to ineffective assistance of counsel at
sentencing hearing; resentenced to death) [IAC, D]
Leduc v. State, (Okaloosa Cnty. Cir. Ct.) (conviction overturned by trial court on remand, which was ordered by
Leduc v. State,  415 So.2d 721 (Fla. 1982), for evidentiary hearing on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and
consequently involuntary guilty plea) [IAC, L]
Lemon v. State (Polk Cnty. Cir. Ct. Sept. 22, 1988) (conviction overturned by trial court following remand for
evidentiary hearing in Lemon v. State,  498 So.2d 923 (Fla. 1986); remand order from Florida Supreme Court states
that sole issue on remand, on which relief was granted, was ineffective assistance of counsel at guilt and sentencing
trials) [IAC, L]
App. C-14
*Carlis Lindsey v. State (Columbia Cnty. Cir. Ct. Apr. 1997) (following Dec. 29, 1995 filing of state post-conviction
petition, state agrees to sentence less than death; relief granted because trial judge had permitted prosecutor, ex parte,
to write the judge’s order sentencing Lindsey to death) [O, L]
*Bobby Lusk v. State (Bradford Cnty. Cir. Ct. Dec. 23, 1996) (on eve of evidentiary hearing on successive state
post-conviction petition, state agrees to sentence less than death; only issue before court on state post-conviction
motion that led to state’s agreement of overturn prior judgment and impose lesser sentence was prosecutorial
suppression of evidence) [PSE, L]
Jose Maqueira v. State (Dade Cnty. Cir. Ct. Feb. 10-11, 1993) (on the day after a state post-conviction petition was
filed, the state agreed to a sentence less than death) [UK, L]
Mason v. State, 597 So.2d 776 (Fla. 1992) (same as Combs) [I, L]
Maxwell v. State, 603 So.2d 490 (Fla. 1992) (same as Combs) [I, L]
State v. Michael, 530 So.2d 929 (Fla. 1987) (death sentence overturned due to penalty-phase lawyer’s ineffective
assistance in failing to investigate and to discover substantial mitigating evidence based on Michael’s mental condition)
[IAC, L]
McCrae v. State, 510 So.2d 874) (Fla. 1987) (same as Combs; resentenced to death) [I, D]
Mikenas v. Dugger, 519 So.2d 601 (Fla.1988) (same as Combs; resentenced to life; see Orval Jackson, Convicted
killer is resentenced to life in prison, Tampa Tribune, Sept. 13, 1991) [I, L]
Mitchell v. State, 595 So.2d 938 (Fla. 1992) (death sentence overturned due to ineffective assistance of counsel at
sentencing hearing) [IAC, L]
Morgan v. State, 515 So.2d 975 (Fla.1987), cert. denied,  486 U.S. 1036 (1988) (same as Combs) [I, L]
O'Callaghan v. State, 542 So. 2d 1324 (Fl. 1989) (same as Combs) [I, L]
Anthony Ray Peek v. State (conviction overturned by trial court because state introduced false forensic  evidence;
reversal noted in opinion reviewing death sentence that was imposed on retrial,  State v. Peek , 488 So.2d 52, 53 (Fla.
1986)) [PSE, D]
Phillips v. State, 608 So.2d 778 (Fla. 1992) (death sentence overturned due to ineffective assistance of counsel at
sentencing; death sentence imposed on retrial) [IAC, D]
*Porter v. State, 723 So.2d 191 (Fla. 1998) (death sentence overturned because the sentencing judge was manifestly
biased against Porter on the issue of sentence; life sentence imposed on retrial on Dec. 2, 1999) [JB, L]
Preston v. State, 564 So.2d 120 (1990) (death sentence overturned because sentencer relied on invalid aggravating
circumstance; death sentence imposed on retrial) [O, D]
State v. Riechmann, 2000 WL 205094 (Fla. 2000) (death sentence overturned based on ineffective assistance of
counsel and on trial court’s having permitted prosecutor, ex parte, to prepare judge’s order sentencing Riechmann to
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die, thus denying the defendant of an independent weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances; retrial
pending) [IAC, RP]
Riley v. Wainwright, 517 So.2d 656 (Fla.1987) (same as Combs) [I, L]
Rivera v. Dugger, 629 So.2d 105 (Fla. 1994) (death sentence overturned because sentencer considered multiple
invalid aggravating circumstances; committed suicide while awaiting retrial) [O, DW]
Roman v. State, 528 So.2d 1169 (Fla. 1988) (conviction overturned due to state’s failure to disclose highly exculpatory
statements by witness who gave highly inculpatory testimony at trial) [PSE, L]
*Rose v. State, 675 So.2d 567 (Fla. 1996) (death sentence overturned due to ineffective assistance of counsel at
sentencing; death sentence imposed on retrial) [IAC, D]
Sawyer v. State (Dade Cnty. Cir. Ct. Aug. 6, 1976) (motion to mitigate sentence granted and sentence reduced to
life) [O, L]
Scott v. Dugger, 604 So.2d 465 (Fla. 1992) (death sentence overturned as disproportionate to life sentence given to
equally or more culpable codefendant; Supreme Court orders imposition of life sentence) [O, L]
Henry Perry Sireci (death sentence overturned by trial court because state relied on incompetent mental evaluations
of defendant’s mental condition at the time of the offense; reversal noted in opinion reviewing death sentence imposed
on retrial, State v. Sireci, 587 So.2d 450, 451 (1991)) [PSE, D]
*Spaziano v. State, 692 So.2d 174 (Fla. 1997) (conviction overturned on fifth successive state post-conviction petition
due to recantation of key witness against defendant) [O, L]
Stevens v. State, 552 So.2d 1082 (Fla. 1989) (death sentence overturned due to ineffective assistance of counsel at
sentencing hearing; resentenced to death) [IAC, D]
*State v. Kenneth Stewart (Hillsborough County, 13th Judicial Circuit, May 2000, No. 85-5667 & 6167) (on state post-
conviction, state stipulated to an order, entered by the judge, finding ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing,
overturning the death sentence, and requiring a new sentencing trial; retrial pending; the basis for relief was that
Stewart was sentenced to death while represented by a crack-addicted lawyer who subsequently was criminally
convicted and disbarred) [IAC, RP]
Suarez v. State, 604 So.2d 488 (Fla. 1992) (following remand for an evidentiary hearing on bias of sentencing judge
as revealed by his pre-sentencing statements to the press, new judge overturned death sentence on Mar. 8, 1992, and
state’s appeal thereafter was dismissed on state’s stipulation) [JB, L]
Thomas v. State, 546 So.2d 716 (Fla. 1989) (death sentence overturned because sentencer prejudicially failed to
consider nonstatutory mitigating circumstances) [O, L]
*Raymond Michael Thompson v. Florida, 731 So.2d 1235 (Fla. 1999) (death sentence overturned due to bias of
original judge who overrode jury recommendation of life; retrial pending) [JB, RP]
William Lee Thompson v. Dugger, 515 So.2d 173 (Fla.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 960 (1988) (same as Combs;
resentenced to death) [O, D]
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Torres-Arboleda v. State, 636 So.2d 1321 (Fla. 1994) (death sentence overturned due to ineffective assistance of
counsel at penalty trial) [IAC, L]
Trawick v. State, 617 So.2d 322 (Fla. 1993) (new trial granted and defendant given life sentence in 1992 following
state’s confession of ineffective assistance of counsel; appeal was thereafter dismissed) [IAC, L]
Charles Vaught v. State (Leon Cnty. Cir. Ct.) (on remand for evidentiary hearing on ineffective assistance of counsel
claims, as ordered by Vaughts v. State, 442 So.2d 217 (Fla. 1985), state agreed to a sentence less than death) [IAC,
L]
Waterhouse v. State, 522 So.2d 341 (Fla. 1988) (same as Combs; resentenced to death) [I, D]
Way v. Dugger, 568 So.2d 1263 (Fla. 1990) (same as Combs; resentenced to death) [I, D]
Richard Williams v. State (Bradford Cnty. Cir. Ct. May 23, 1985) (upon suggestion of Florida Supreme Court in
denying direct appeal in State v. Williams, 438 So.2d 781 (Fla. 1983) that post-conviction relief might be appropriate
in regard to claim of ineffective assistance of counsel due to trial court’s denial of continuance, Williams files petition
for post-conviction relief and state immediately agreed to a sentence less than death) [IAC, L]
Wilson v. Wainwright, 474 So.2d 1162 (Fla. 1985) (conviction overturned due to egregious ineffective assistance of
Wilson’s appellate attorney; on reappeal, the Florida Supreme Court determined that the evidence did not support a
death sentence, and ordered that a life sentence be imposed) [IAC, L]
*Young v. State, 739 So.2d 553 (Fla. 1999) (death sentence overturned due to state’s suppression of eyewitness
statements to police supporting Young’s defense that he fired his weapon in self-defense only after the victim had
first fired a shot at Young; resentenced to life) [PSE, L]
Zeigler v. Dugger, 524 So.2d 419 (Fla.1988) (same as Combs; resentenced to death) [I, D]
Pre-1996: 67*
1996 and after: 14
Basis for Relief: IAC = 30; IAC & PSE = 3; PSE = 13; I =17; JB = 3; O = 12; UK = 3
Result on Retrial: L = 53; D = 22; RP = 5; DW = 1
Note:
Although we report Hudson v. State, 614 So.2d 482 (Fla. 1993), as having led to a death sentence on retrial after
state post-conviction relief, it is interesting to note that the state supreme court subsequently overturned Hudson’s
death sentence a second time, on direct review of the new death sentence (see Hudson v. State, 708 So.2d 256 (Fla.
1998)), after which Hudson was resentenced to life on Nov. 9, 1998.  Likewise, we report Stevens v. State, 552 So.2d
1082 (Fla. 1989), as having led to a death sentence on retrial after state post-conviction relief.  But on direct appeal
of the new death sentence, the state supreme court ruled that the state trial court should have imposed a life sentence
at the retrial, which the state supreme court did (see Stevens v. State, 613 So.2d 402 (Fla. 1992)).  Also, we report
McCrae v. State, 510 So.2d 874 (Fla. 1987) as having led to a death sentence on retrial after state-post-conviction
relief.  But on direct appeal of the new death sentence, the state supreme court ruled, in this case as well, that the
state trial court should have imposed a life sentence at the retrial, which the supreme court did (see McCrae v. State,
582 So.2d 613 (Fla. 1991)). Thus, three cases that we report as a “D” (death sentence imposed on retrial) involve
individuals who in fact are no longer on death row, as a result of a court reversal followed by the imposition of a lesser
sentence following retrial.
1This list excludes 21 cases that the Georgia Supreme Court remanded between Jan. 4, 1990 and May
19, 1995, for hearings to determine whether the prisoner was mentally retarded and thus ineligible for the
death penalty under Georgia constitutional law (Finney, Fleming, Foster, G. Davis, Frazier, Holiday, Holiday,
Peek, Cohen, Collins, Wilson, Jarrells, Walker, S. Allen, Childs, Morrison, Pruitt, Miller, Rogers).  Also
excluded are 4 cases in which the Board of Pardons and Paroles found death sentences “disproportionate”
and reduced them to life sentences (Charles Harris Hill, Freddie Davis, William Neal Moore, G. Williams).
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GEORGIA1
State v. Anderson (Cook Cnty Super. Ct. No. 9854, Apr. 1, 1975) (trial court overturns death sentence and imposes
lesser sentence due to absence of aggravating circumstances) [O,L]
Banks v. State , 268 S.E.2d 230 (Ga. 1980) (ordering new trial based on counsel’s failure to discover evidence of
innocence; on remand, petitioner was released for lack of any evidence of guilt, Henry Cnty. Super. Ct. No. 10032)
[IAC, NG] 
Eli Beck v. Zant (Bleckley Cnty. Super. Ct. No. 8563) (after state supreme court remanded Beck’s successive state
post-conviction petition to trial court for hearing to determine whether Beck was retarded, hence ineligible for the
death penalty under the state constitution, see Zant v. Beck , 386 S.E.2d 349 (Ga. 1989), and during pendency of that
proceeding, state Board of Pardons and Parole ruled that Beck was retarded and imposed a life sentence on May 2,
1994) [O, L]
Birt v. Hopper, 265 S.E.2d 276 (Ga. 1980) (affirming reversal of death sentence because jury instructions suggested
to jury that it must impose death sentence if it found one statutory aggravating circumstance, regardless of the
mitigating circumstances; resentenced to death) [I, D]
State v. John Brown (Chatham Cnty. Super. Ct. No. 23499, Dec. 4, 1978) (trial court granted Brown’s extraordinary
motion for new trial and sentenced Brown to life) [UK, L]
State v. Earl Charles (Chatham Cnty. Super. Ct. No. 23392-95, July 5, 1978) (trial court granted Charles’s
extraordinary motion for new trial; charges against Charles were dropped for lack of any evidence of guilt) [UK, NG]
*Turpin v. Christenson, 497 S.E.2d 216 (Ga. 1998) (death sentence overturned due to ineffective assistance of
counsel; retrial pending) [IAC, RP]
Curry v. Zant, 371 S.E.2d 647 (Ga. 1988) (conviction overturned due to counsel’s ineffective failure to secure expert
evaluation of Curry’s mental status at the time of the offense which would have provided substantial evidence that
Curry was not sane at the time of the offense, nor capable of intelligently and voluntarily waiving his right to counsel
when he confessed; on retrial, Curry pled to life (Washington Cnty. Super. Ct. No. 7)) [IAC, L]
Kenny Dampier v. Zant (Butts Cnty. Super. Ct. No. 5617, Aug. 31, 1982) (death sentence overturned because jury
instructions suggested to jury that it must impose death sentence if it found one statutory aggravating circumstance,
regardless of the mitigating circumstances; life sentence imposed on retrial (Chatham Cnty. Super. Ct. No. 26638))
[I, L]
Stynchcombe v. Floyd, 311 S.E.2d 828 (Ga. 1984) (death sentence overturned because trial court’s instructions
suggested to jury that it had to impose death sentence if it found one aggravating circumstance, notwithstanding the
mitigating evidence; life sentence imposed on retrial, Fulton Cnty. Super. Ct. No. A-19628) [I, L]
App. C-18
Bobby Gene Gaddis v. Hopper (Tattnall Cnty. Super. Ct. Nos. 36985 & 37095, Sept. 20, 1980) (death sentence
overturned because jury instructions suggested to jury that it must impose death sentence if it found one statutory
aggravating circumstance, regardless of the mitigating circumstances; life sentence imposed on retrial; direct appeal
at Gaddis v. State, 236 S.E.2d 594 (Ga. 1977)) [I, L]
*D. Hall v.  Zant  (Butts Cnty. Super. Ct. No. 95-V-651, July 10, 1998) (conviction and death sentence overturned
and, on July 10, 1998, a life sentence was imposed) [UK, L]
Zant v. Hamilton, 307 S.E.2d 667 (Ga. 1983) (death sentence overturned due to ineffective assistance of trial counsel;
on remand, trial court imposed a life sentence, Chatham Cnty. Super. Ct. No.27-002) [IAC, L]
Harris v. Hopper, 253 S.E.2d 707 (Ga. 1979) (death sentence overturned because jury instructions suggested to jury
that it must impose death sentence if it found one statutory aggravating circumstance, regardless of the mitigating
circumstances; resentenced to life, DeKalb Cnty. Super. Ct. No. 17784) [I, L]
Harrison v. Zant, 402 S.E.2d 518 (Ga. 1991) (conviction overturned due to ineffective assistance of attorneys who
presented fractured and contradictory defenses; on retrial, Harrison pled to life sentence, Hall Cnty. Super. Ct. No.
K84-48,139) [IAC, L]
Zant v. Hill, 289 S.E.2d 765 (Ga. 1982) (death sentence overturned due to ineffective assistance of counsel at penalty
phase; on retrial, life sentence imposed, as discussed in Hill v. Zant, 638 F. Supp. 969, 970 (M.D. Ga. 1986)) [IAC,
L]
Jarrell v. Zant, 284 S.E.2d 17 (Ga. 1981) (death sentence overturned because jury instructions suggested to jury that
it must impose death sentence if it found one statutory aggravating circumstance, regardless of the mitigating
circumstances; life sentence imposed on retrial) [I, L]
Krier v. Jarvis (Butts Cnty. Super. Ct. No. 83-2501-4) (state trial judge granted state habeas corpus relief on
ineffective assistance of counsel, and D.A. simultaneously accepted a plea to a life sentence) [IAC, L]
Jessie Lee v. Zant (Butts Cnty. Super. Ct. No. 90-V-2616) (on remand to consider whether Lee was retarded, hence
constitutionally ineligible for the death penalty, trial court imposed life sentence on Dec. 19, 1990, Walton Cnty. Super.
Ct. No. 87-CR-229E) [O, L]
*Turpin v. Lipham, 510 S.E.2d 32 (Ga. 1998) (death sentence overturned due to ineffective assistance of counsel
in presenting jury with 2500 pages of Lipham’s psychiatric  records, without presenting an expert or taking any other
steps to help the jury to sift through the materials and discover how mitigating the information was; retrial pending)
[I, RP]
Nelson v. Zant, 405 S.E.2d 250 (Ga. 1991) (state suppressed FBI analyses establishing that the limb hair the state’s
expert had used to connect defendant to the crime lacked sufficient characteristics for microscopic  analysis). Nelson
was thereupon released from prison and not retried because, as the district attorney admitted, there was no valid
evidence implicating him in the offense, see Jingle Davis & Mark Curriden, Man Condemned for Murder of Girl
Is Freed, Atlanta Const., Nov. 7, 1991, at O6) [PSE, NG]
State v. Keith Eugene Pattillo (Bibb Cnty. Super. Ct. No. 27738) (after state supreme court remanded Pattillo’s
successive state post-conviction petition to trial court for hearing to determine whether Pattillo was retarded, hence
ineligible for the death penalty under the state constitution, see State v. Pattillo, 417 S.E.2d 139 (Ga. 1992), and during
pendency of that proceeding, state Board of Pardons and Parole ruled that Beck was retarded and imposed a life
sentence in 1993) [O, L]
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Zant v. Pitts, 436 S.E.2d 4 (Ga. 1993) (death sentence overturned due to ineffective assistance of counsel in failing
to inform jury that petitioner was retarded, even though that created a bar to the death penalty under Georgia law;
on retrial, judge imposed life sentence, Floyd Cnty. Super. Ct. No. S93A-1151, Aug. 22, 1996)) [IAC, L]
Leonard Pryor v. Hopper (Tattnall Cnty. Super. Ct. No. 3826, Mar. 29, 1979) (death sentence overturned because
prosecutor argued that, state supreme court, not jury, bore ultimate responsibility for any sentence the jury imposed;
on retrial, Pryor pled to life sentence, Irwin Cnty. Super. Ct. No. 5075) [PM, L]
Jessie Lewis Pulliam v. Hopper (Tattnall Cnty. Super. Ct. No. 77-358, June 20, 1979) (death sentence overturned
because jury instructions suggested to jury that it must impose death sentence if it found one statutory aggravating
circumstance, regardless of the mitigating circumstances; pled to life sentence on retrial, Troup Cnty. Super. Ct. No.
715/143; direct appeal at Pulliam v. State, 224 S.E.2d 8 (Ga. 1976)) [I, L]
Ross v. Kemp, 393 S.E.2d 244 (Ga. 1990) (conviction overturned due to ineffective assistance of counsel and co-
counsel who presented contradictory defenses, severely prejudicing Ross; on retrial, state and court accepted a plea
to a life sentence, DeKalb Cnty. Super. Ct. No. 83-CR-2635) [IAC, L]
State v. J.L. Smith (DeKalb Cnty. Super. Ct. No. 81CR-3545, May. 10, 1983) (death sentence overturned due to
ineffective assistance of counsel; resentenced to life) [IAC, L]
*State v. Spencer (Butts Cnty. Super. Ct. 91-V-4040) (after state supreme court remanded Spencer’s state post-
conviction petition to trial court for hearing to determine whether Spencer was retarded, hence ineligible for the death
penalty under the state constitution, trial judge imposed life sentence on July 1, 1996) [O, L]
*Turpin v. Todd, 519 S.E.2d 678 (Ga. 1999) (death sentence overturned due to prejudicial communications between
bailiff and jury during sentencing deliberations; retrial pending) [PM, RP]
Pre-1996: 24
1996 and after: 5
Basis for Relief: IAC = 10; PSE = 1; PM = 2; I = 8; O = 5; UK = 3
Result on Retrial: L = 22; NG =3, D = 1; RP = 3
App. C-20
IDAHO
Aurelio Barajas, aka Miguel Ybarra v. State (Payette Cnty. Dist. Ct., 3rd Jud. Dist., No. SP-OT-0044,  1995) (trial
judge, G. Weston, J., overturned capital judgment on state postconviction petition; Barajas was not returned to death
row) [UK, L]
*Timothy Alan Dunlap v. State (Caribou Cnty. Dist. Ct., 6th Jud. Dist., No. SP-94-863A, Apr. 11, 2000) (on remand
for a hearing ordered by Dunlap v. State, 961 P.2d 1179 (Idaho 1998), state’s attorney conceded sentencing error
requiring reversal of death sentence; guilt phase claims are pending) [UK, RP]
*Donald Paradis (in May 1996, Idaho governor commuted death sentence on the ground of probable innocence,
ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial suppression of evidence (see Paradis v. Arave, 130 F.3d 385, 388
(9th Cir. 1997)) [IAC & PSE, L]
*Shawn Eric Smith v. State (Booneville Cnty. Dist. Ct., 7th Jud. Dist., Dec. 17, 1999) (death sentence overturned
due to ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to prepare and present a case in mitigation; retrial pending)
[IAC, RP]
pre-1996: 1
1996 and after: 3
Basis for Relief: IAC = 2; UK = 2
Result on Retrial: L = 2; RP = 2
App. C-21
ILLINOIS
*People v. Burrows, 665 N.E.2d 1319 (1996) (conviction overturned based on admission by key witness against
petitioner that she perjured herself at Burrows’ trial, that she alone committed the killing, and that Burrows was
elsewhere at the time; Burrows was released) [PSE, NG]
*People v. Caballero, 688 N.E.2d 658 (Ill. 1997) (remanding for hearing on claim in second state post-conviction
petition that Caballero’s death sentence was disproportionate to lesser sentence imposed on codefendant; resentenced
to life) [O, L]
*People v. Ondrea Edgeston (state agrees to life sentence in return for Edgeston’s agreement to drop his state post-
conviction petition challenging his conviction and death sentence) [UK, L]
*People v. Fields, 690 N.E.2d 999 (Ill. 1998) (conviction overturned because trial judge who imposed it (1) was under
investigation, eventually substantiated, for taking bribes to “throw” criminal cases, (2) initially solicited a bribe in this
case, but then (3) came to realize that his behavior in the case was under FBI scrutiny and changed his behavior) [JB,
?]
*People v. Hawkins, 690 N.E.2d 999 (Ill. 1998) (same as Fields, supra) [JB, ?]
People v. Jimerson, 652 N.E.2d 278 (Ill. 1995) (conviction overturned due to prosecutorial suppression of exculpatory
evidence and countenancing of perjury by crucial witness against Jimerson who denied being offered, but in fact had
accepted, a deal in return for her testimony; during preparation for retrial, Jimerson was cleared of all charges and
subsequently pardoned by the governor)  [PSE, NG]
/
*People v. Jones, 1997 WL 11360 (Ill. July 30, 1997) (conviction overturned due to prosecutorial misconduct; charges
subsequently were dropped, and Jones was released as innocent and was pardoned by the governor) [PM, NG]
People v. Lego, 660 N.E.2d 971 (Ill. 1995) (conviction overturned due to Lego’s manifest incompetence, due to
organic  brain damage, to waive counsel and represent himself at his capital trial; resentenced to sentence less than
death) [O, L]
*People v. Mack, 658 N.E.2d 437 (Ill. 1997) (sentence reversed based on ineffective assistance of counsel and
insufficient finding of aggravating circumstance; retrial pending) [IAC; RP]
*People v. Morgan, 719 N.E.2d 681 (Ill. 1999) (death sentence overturned because incompetent trial attorney failed
to investigate Morgan’s mental status and thus to find easily accessible psychological and neurological tests results
documenting Morgan’s organic brain damage, history of child abuse and other mitigating evidence; retrial pending)
[IAC, RP]
*People v. Nitz, 670 N.E.2d 672 (Ill. 1996) (conviction overturned upon discovery the state suppressed evidence that
it was secretly administering psychotropic medications to petitioner throughout his capital trial; on retrial, state dropped
request for death penalty) [PSE, L]
People v. Orange, 659 N.E.2d 935 (Ill. 1995) (death sentence overturned by trial court due to ineffective assistance
of counsel at penalty trial; proceedings challenging conviction are pending) [IAC, RP]
People v. Owens, 564 N.E.2d 1184 (Ill. 1990) (remanding to Will County Circuit Court to determine whether Owens
was mentally competent to pursue additional proceedings and thus, depending on the outcome of those proceedings,
to be executed;  on remand, trial court declared Owens unfit) [O, L]
App. C-22
People v. Palmer (Mason Cnty. Cir. Ct. 1996) (same as Nitz, supra; prosecutor confessed error and Palmer received
a negotiated sentence of 65 years) [PSE, L]
 
People v. Perez, 592 N.E.2d 984 (Ill. 1992) (sentence overturned due to ineffective assistance of counsel, who failed
to investigate and discover substantial bases for mitigation of sentence; resentenced to 50-year term) [IAC, L]
*People v. Anthony Porter (Apr. 1999) (during pendency before trial court of Porter’s successive state post-
conviction petition challenging his competence to be executed, Porter was released from prison as innocent based on
another man’s confession to the crime) [UK, NG]
*People v. Ruiz, 686 N.E.2d 574 (Ill. 1997) (sentence overturned due to ineffective assistance of counsel, who failed
to investigate and discover substantial bases for mitigation of sentence; on retrial, trial judge determined that death
sentence would be disproportionate to the life sentence given to Ruiz’s co-offender) [IAC, L]
People v. Salazar, 643 N.E.2d 698 (Ill. 1994) (conviction overturned due to instruction shifting burden of proof of
guilt to Salazar and ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal; on retrial, Salazar was convicted of a lesser charge,
sentenced to time served, and released) [IAC, NG] 
*People v. Steidl, 685 N.E.2d 1335 (Ill. 1997) (remanding for hearing on ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilt
phase and newly discovered evidence (based on recantation of inculpatory testimony by important witness against
Steidl; on remand, trial court overturned the death sentence based on ineffective assistance of counsel at the
sentencing phase but denied relief from the conviction, and the state agreed to a life sentence in return for Steidl’s
agreement not to appeal) [IAC, L]
*People v. Christopher Thomas (Lake Cnty. Cir. Ct. late 1998 or 1999) (death sentence vacated by trial court based
on petition alleging multiple grounds for relief; Thomas was resentenced to a term of years) [UK, L]
*People v. Clarence Towns (St. Clair Cnty. Cir. Ct. 1998 or 1999) (on remand for hearing on ineffective assistance
of counsel at penalty trial based on counsel’s manifestly prejudicial failure to discover Towns’ “pervasive history of
child abuse and maltreatment, coupled with . . . mental illness,” see People v. Towns, 696 N.E.2d 1128 (Ill. 1998),
trial court vacates sentence and orders a new sentencing hearing, which is pending) [IAC, RP]
People v. Titone, 600 N.E.2d 1160 (Ill. 1992) (noting trial court’s unappealed decision, premised on unspecified
grounds, overturning Titone’s death sentence; Titone was not returned to death row) [UK, L]
People v. Jimmie Tye (Cook Cnty. Cir. Ct. 1994) (death sentence overturned by trial court based on ineffective
assistance of counsel; Tye was resentenced to life) [IAC, L]
*People v. West, 719 N.E.2d 664 (Ill. 1999) (death sentence overturned due to insufficiency of the evidence that the
offense was death-eligible and due to ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal; Illinois Supreme Court orders
imposition of lesser sentence) [O, L]
People v. William Young (Will Cnty. Cir. Ct. Feb. 1993) (death sentence overturned when state confesses error
based on incompetent representation at trial; Young was resentenced to life) [IAC, L]
Pre-1996: 10
1996 and after: 15
Basis for Relief: IAC = 10; PSE = 4; PM =  1; JB = 2; O = 4; UK = 4
Result on Retrial: L = 14; NG = 5; RP = 4; ? =2
App. C-23
INDIANA
Averhart v. State, 614 N.,E.2d 924 (Ind. 1993) (death sentence overturned based on ineffective assistance of counsel;
resentenced to death) [IAC, D]
William Benirschke (Benirschke was permitted to plead to 140-year sentence in early 1990s during pendency of state
post-conviction proceeding) [UK, L]
Russell Boyd (Boyd was permitted to plead to term of years in late 1980s during pendency of state post-conviction
proceeding) [UK, L]
Burris v. State, 558 N.E.2d 1067 (Ind. 1990) (death sentence overturned based on ineffective assistance of counsel;
resentenced to death) [IAC, D]
Frank Davis (death sentence vacated on November 10, 1993 by state trial court on joint motion by state and Davis
premised on jury’s failure to hear and consider important mitigating evidence; these proceedings are described in a
subsequent opinion reviewing the death sentence imposed on retrial, see Davis v. State,  675 N.E.2d 1097 (Ind. 1996))
[O, D]
*Games v. State, 684 N.E.2d 466, on reh’g., 690 N.E.2d 211 (Ind. 1997) (sentence overturned because jury was
permitted to rely on improper conviction as aggravating circumstance; resentenced to death) [O, D]
James Harris (Harris was permitted to plead to 120-year term in late 1980s during pendency of state post-conviction
proceeding) [UK, L] 
State v. Huffman, 643 N.E.2d 899 (Ind. 1994) (conviction overturned because jury was instructed that defendant,
not state, bore the burden of proof on crucial defensive issue; on retrial, Huffman pled guilty and was sentenced to
60 years (see State v. Huffman, 717 N.E.2d 571 (Ind. 1999)) [I, L]
Phillip McCollum (during pendency of state post-conviction proceedings in early 1990s, state offered and McCollum
accepted a plea to a term of years after evidence he presented in the post-conviction hearing showed that his trial
attorney failed to investigate and inform the jury of his mental retardation) [IAC, L]
*State v. Moore, 678 N.E.2d 1258 (Ind. 1997) (conviction and death sentence overturned by state trial court; on
appeal, supreme court reinstates conviction but leaves reversal of death sentence intact; resentenced to death) [UK,
D]
Larry Potts (Potts was permitted to plead to 210-year sentence in early 1990s during pendency of state post-
conviction proceeding) [UK, L]
*Schiro v. State, 669 N.E.2d 1357 (Ind. 1996) (death sentence overturned and 60-year sentence imposed on
successive state post-conviction petition, because trial judge improperly rejected jury’s recommendation of life
sentence) [O, L]
Smith v. State, 547 N.E.2d 817 (Ind. 1990) (conviction overturned due to egregious ineffective assistance of counsel;
on retrial, Smith was acquitted of all charges) [IAC, NG]
Spranger v. State, 650 N.E.2d 1117 (Ind. 1995) (death sentence overturned based on ineffective assistance of
counsel; on retrial, Spranger was sentenced to 60-year term) [IAC, L]
App. C-24
Johnny Townsend (during pendency of state post-conviction proceedings in early 1990s, state permitted Townsend
to plead out to 120-year term after he established Sixth Amendment error in the use against him of his codefendant’s
confession despite Townsend’s inability to cross-examine the codefendant) [O, L]
Herbert Underwood (on April 21, 1995, trial court overturned capital conviction for unspecified reasons; on retrial,
defendant was acquitted of capital murder but convicted of lesser (nonhomicide) offenses, see 722 N.E.2d 828, 830-31
(Ind. 2000)) [UK, NG]
*VanCleave v. State, 674 N.E.2d 1293 (Ind. 1996) (death sentence overturned based on ineffective assistance of
counsel; on retrial, VanCleave was sentenced to 60-year term) [IAC, L]
pre-1996: 13
1996 and after: 4
Basis for Relief: IAC = 6; I = 1; O = 4; UK = 6





State v. Brooks, 661 So.2d 1333 (La. 1995) (death sentence overturned based on ineffective assistance of counsel
at penalty phase; retrial pending) [IAC, RP]
State ex rel. Busby v. Butler, 538 So.2d 164 (La. 1987) (death sentence overturned based on ineffective assistance
of counsel at penalty phase; resentenced to life) [IAC, L]
*State v. Cage, 667 So.2d 529 (La. 1996)  (conviction and death sentence overturned based on misinstruction
concerning requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt; resentenced to life) [I, L]
*State v. Michael Graham (Union Parish, 3rd Jud. Dist. Ct., Div. A, No. 28734B,  Mar. 2000) (after pending for 12
years in state trial court on extraordinary motion for new trial, conviction was overturned due to prosecutorial
suppression of evidence; retrial pending) [PSE, RP]
State v. Keith Messiah (trial court in New Orleans overturned death sentence in 1994 due to ineffective assistance
at the penalty phase; resentenced to life, see Killer Off Death Row in '83 Case:  He'll Spend Life in Prison, New
Orleans Times-Picayune, Mar. 11, 1998, at B1, 1998 WL 6260994) [IAC, L]
State v. Lane Nelson (state conviction overturned; on retrial, lesser conviction and sentence were imposed by trial
judge in mid-1980s) [UK, L]
pre-1996: 4
1996 and after: 2 
Basis for Relief: IAC = 3; PSE = 1; I = 1;UK = 1
Result on Retrial: L = 5; RP = 1
App. C-27
MARYLAND
Bowers v. State, 578 A.2d 734 (Md. 1990) (conviction overturned based on variety of errors committed by Bower’s
incompetent trial attorney—including in failing to show that forensic  evidence found on the victim did not match
Bowers, leaving a “substantial possibility” that the result of the trial would have been different had counsel done his
job; lesser sentence imposed on retrial) [IAC, L]
State v. Kirk Bruce (Prince George’s Cnty. Cir. Ct. No. CT88-2226X, Apr. 1995) (conviction and death sentence
overturned due to prosecutorial suppression of exculpatory evidence of innocence; on Jan. 22, 1996, state and Bruce
stipulated to, and the trial court imposed, a life sentence) [PSE, L]
State v. James Arthur Calhoun (Montgomery Cnty. Cir. Ct. 1989) (death sentence overturned, due to instruction
forbidding jurors to rely on mitigating factors that one or more of them believed warranted a sentence less than death
unless all 12 jurors could agree that each such factor existed and was sufficiently mitigating; a properly instructed jury
imposed a lesser sentence on retrial; proceedings described in The Report of the [Maryland] Governor’s
Commission on the Death Penalty 94-96 (Nov. 1993)) [I, L]
State v. Colvin, 548 A.2d 506 (Md. 1988) (death sentence overturned due to sentencer’s reliance in sentencing Colvin
to death on juvenile infractions that do not qualify as criminal convictions under Maryland, hence cannot qualify as
aggravating circumstances and because the trial improperly forbade individual jurors to rely on bases for mitigating
sentence unless each such basis was agreed to by all 12 jurors; resentenced to death) [O, D]
State v. Vernon Lee Evans (Worcester Cnty. Cir. Ct. Mar. 29, 1991) (death sentence overturned on same basis as
in Calhoun; proceedings are described in a subsequent opinion reviewing the death sentence imposed on retrial, see
Evans v. State, 637 A.2d 117 (Md. 1994)) [I, D]
State v. Anthony Grandison (Somerset Cnty. Cir. Ct. July 31 1992) (same as Calhoun; proceedings  described in
subsequent opinion reviewing death sentence imposed on retrial, in Grandison v. State, 670 A.2d 398, 407 (Md.
1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1027 (1996)) [I, D]
State v. Ian Henry (Prince George’s Cnty. Cir. Ct. Oct. 24, 1994) (conviction overturned due to prosecutorial
suppression of evidence of innocence; on Apr. 19, 1996, Henry pled guilty to a lesser offense; on May 31, 1996, Henry
was resentenced to time served and released from custody) [PSE, L]
State v. James H. Huffington (Apr. 28 1992) (same as Calhoun; on retrial, state unilaterally withdrew its death
notice (indicating its intention to seek the death penalty), and the trial judge imposed a life sentence; proceedings
described in The Report of the [Maryland] Governor’s Commission on the Death Penalty 94-96 (Nov. 1993))
[I, L]
State v. Lawrence Johnson (Harford Cnty. Cir. Ct. Nov. 4, 1988) (same as Calhoun; resentenced to life;
proceedings described in The Report of the [Maryland] Governor’s Commission on the Death Penalty 94-96
(Nov. 1993)) [I, L]
*Perry v. State, 741 A.2d 1162 Md. (Md. 1999) (conviction overturned due to counsel’s ineffective assistance in
failing to make timely objection to patently inadmissible evidence that provided the crucial link between Perry and the
offense; retrial pending) [IAC, RP]
State v. Willie Reid (Baltimore City Cir. Ct. 1988) (same as Calhoun); resentenced to life; proceedings described
in The Report of the [Maryland] Governor’s Commission on the Death Penalty 94-96 (Nov. 1993)) [I, L]
App. C-28
Trimble v. State, 582 A.2d 794 (Md. 1990) (death sentence overturned because the judge who imposed it upon
Trimble’s waiver of a jury trial did not properly advise Trimble of the adverse consequences of waiving a jury trial;
resentenced to life life) [O, L]
State v. Derrick Quentin White (Baltimore Cnty. Cir. Ct. 1988) (death sentence overturned by trial court, as
described in subsequent opinion overturning the death sentence imposed on resentencing, State v. White, 589 A.2d
969 (Md. 1991)) [UK, D]
State v. Derrick Quentin White (Baltimore Cnty. Cir. Ct. 1992) (after death sentence had been imposed and
overturned twice, White’s third death sentence was overturned time upon the state’s admission of error in the
sentencing instructions; a life sentence was imposed by a properly instructed jury on June 9, 1992, see The Report
of the [Maryland] Governor’s Commission on the Death Penalty 94-96 (Nov. 1993)) [I, L]
State v. Willie Reid (Baltimore City Cir. Ct. 1988) (same as Calhoun); resentenced to life sentence imposed on
retrial; proceedings described in The Report of the [Maryland] Governor’s Commission on the Death Penalty
94-96 (Nov. 1993)) [I, L]
pre-1996: 14
1996 and after: 1
Basis for Relief: IAC = 2; PSE = 2; I = 8; O = 2;UK = 1
Result on Retrial: L = 11; D = 3; RP = 1 
App. C-29
MISSISSIPPI [petitioner was not returned to death row after retrial, unless otherwise noted]
*Booker v. State, 699 So.2d 132 (Miss. 1997) (death sentence overturned because jury considered two improper
aggravating circumstances) [O, L]
Davis v. State, 655 So.2d 864 (Miss. 1994) (death sentence overturned because jury relied on improperly defined
aggravating circumstance) [I, L]
Gilliard v. State, 614 So.2d 370 (Miss. 1993) (same as Davis) [I, L]
Hill v. State, 659 So.2d 547 (Miss. 1994) (same as Davis) [I, L]
Irving v. State, 618 So.2d 58 (Miss.1992) (death sentence overturned on second state post-conviction petition because
jury relied on improperly defined aggravating circumstance) [I, L]
Johnson v. State, 547 So.2d 59 (Miss. 1989) (death sentence overturned because jury based it on invalid prior
conviction; on remand from Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578 (1988); life sentence imposed on remand) [O, L]
Leatherwood v. State, 539 So.2d 1378 (Miss. 1989) (conviction overturned due to egregious ineffective assistance
of counsel) [IAC, L]
Smith v. State, 648 So.2d 63 (Miss. 1994) (same as Davis) [I, L]
Stringer v. State, 638 So.2d 1285 (Miss. 1994) (same as Davis) [I, L]
Tokman v. State, 564 So.2d 1339 (Miss. 1990) (death sentence overturned because of ineffective assistance of
counsel at sentencing phase) [IAC, L]
West v. State, 666 So.2d 767 (Miss. 1995) (same as Davis) [I, L]
Woodward v. State, 635 So.2d 805 (Miss. 1993) (same as Davis) [I, L]
pre-1996: 11
1996 and after: 1
Basis for Relief: IAC = 2; I = 8; O = 2
Result on Retrial: L = 11; D = 1
App. C-30
MISSOURI
*State v. Butler, 951 S.W.2d 600 (Mo. 1997) (conviction and death sentence overturned based on ineffective
assistance of counsel in failing to investigate and discover evidence that the victim was murdered by her nephew
rather than by Butler and in failing to bring out substantial weaknesses in the prosecution's case, either of which could
have raised a reasonable doubt in the jurors’ minds; on retrial, Butler was convicted of a lesser (nonmurder) degree
of homicide and given a 20-year term) [IAC, NG]
*State v. Dexter, 954 S.W.2d 332 (Mo. 1997) (conviction overturned due to prosecutor’s repeated use against Dexter
of his invocation of his right to silence; on retrial, the state dismissed the charges against Dexter and released him for
lack of any evidence of guilt) [PM, NG]
State v. Roderick Nunley (Mo.  S. Ct.) (sometime between Oct. 28, 1991 and Mar. 31, 1994, as described in a
subsequent opinion in State v. Nunley, 923 S.W.2d 911, 916 (Mo. 1996), death sentence was vacated by state
supreme court based on evidence that the trial judge who imposed it was intoxicated at the time; resentenced to death)
[JB, D]
*State v. Phillips, 940 S.W.2d 512 (Mo. 1997) (death sentence overturned based on exclusion of evidence shifting
blame for part of offense to someone other than the defendant; resentenced to life) [O, L] 
*State v. Ed Reuscher, (Mo. 1995 or after) (unpublished opinion granting relief apparently based upon ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel; resentenced to life) [IAC, L]
*State v. Rhodes, 988 S.W.2d 521 (Mo. 1999) (death sentence overturned because of prosecutorial misconduct in
closing argument at sentencing phase; retrial pending) [PM, RP]
State v. Michael Taylor (Mo. June 1993) (death sentence was vacated because of evidence that the trial judge who
imposed it was intoxicated at the time, as described in subsequent opinion reviewing death sentence that was imposed
on retrial, State v. Taylor, 929 S.W.2d 209, 215 (1996)) [JB, D]
*State v. Thompson, 985 S.W.2d 779 (Mo. 1999) (death sentence overturned because state prejudicially relied on
surprise aggravating evidence, denying Thompson a fair chance to rebut it; retrial pending) [O, RP]
State v. Wells, 804 S.W.2d 746 (Mo. 1991) (conviction overturned based on ineffective assistance of trial counsel in
failing to uncover and present evidence that another man committed the offense; convicted of a lesser offense on
retrial and sentenced to a term of years) [IAC, L]
pre-1996: 3
1996 and after: 6
Basis for Relief: IAC = 3; PM = 2; JB = 2; O = 2
Result on Retrial: L = 3; NG = 2; D = 3; RP = 2
App. C-31
MONTANA
Lester Kills on Top v. State, 901 P.2d 1368 (Mont. 1995) (death sentence overturned due to state’s suppression of
material evidence impeaching its key witness at sentencing; defendant was not returned to death row) [PSE, L]
*Vernon Kills on Top v. State, 928 P.2d 182 (Mont. 1997) (death sentence overturned as disproportionate to
defendant’s minor participation in the killing; life sentence imposed) [O, L]
pre-1996: 1
1996 and after: 1
Basis for Relief: PSE =1; O = 1
Result on Retrial: L = 2
App. C-32
NEBRASKA
Reeves v. Nebraska, 498 U.S. 964 (1990) (on certiorari review of denial of state post-conviction petition, Court
vacates death sentence that state supreme court had improperly affirmed despite having invalidated an aggravating
circumstance on which the sentence was based; remanding for resentencing; see State v. Reeves, 604 N.W.2d 152,
161 (2000); resentenced to death) [O, D]
*State v. Reeves, 604 N.W.2d 152 (2000) (overturning death sentence that was reimposed following U.S. Supreme
Court’s vacation of it, concluding that the reimposition of death violated Reeves’ right to a sentencing trial;
proceedings pending) [O, RP]
Simants v. State, 277 N.W.2d 217 (Neb. 1979) (conviction overturned based on sheriff’s repeated course of ex parte
contacts with jurors during course of trial; on retrial, petitioner was found not guilty by reason of insanity, see State
v. Simants, 537 N.W.2d 346, 348 (1995)) [PM, NG]
pre-1996: 2
1996 and after: 1
Basis for Relief: PM = 1; O = 2
Result on Retrial: NG = 1; D= 1; RP = 1
App. C-33
NEVADA
*State v. Jason Browne (Nev. S. Ct., No. 33769, Apr. 27, 2000) (death sentence overturned due to ineffective
assistance at the penalty phase in failing to discovery and document petitioner’s mental disorder; retrial pending) [IAC,
RP]
State v. Vincent Pasquale (Carson City Dist. Ct., No. 88-01304C-II, Jan. 19, 1993) (upon state’s confession to
having committed “a nonspecified error . . . during the sentencing phase of the trial,” trial court vacates death
sentence and imposes life sentence) [UK, L]
Richard Lee Hardison v. State (Nev. S. Ct., No. 24195, May 24, 1994 & July 22, 1994) (death sentence overturned
due to ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to do any investigation in mitigation, thus leaving the jury unaware
that the victim had previously stabbed, beaten and otherwise provoked Hardison and that Hardison was brain damaged
and retarded; on retrial, Hardison was removed from death row) [IAC, L]
*Jimenez v. State, 918 P.2d 687 (Nev. 1996) (conviction overturned due to state’s suppression of evidence implicating
other suspects and impeaching key informant witness against Jiminez; on retrial, Jimenez pled to noncapital murder
and was released from prison the next year) [PSE, L]
*Mazzan v. Warden, 993 P.2d 25 (Nev. 2000) (conviction overturned on third state post-conviction petition due to
prosecutorial suppression of police reports “provid[ing] support for Mazzan's defense that someone else murdered
[the victim] . .. [and] provid[ing] a basis to impeach the thoroughness of the state's investigation of the crime”; Mazzan
was released, see Brendan Riley, Emotional Mazzan Released, Las Vegas Rev.-J., May 7, 2000, at 1) [PSE, NG]
Roberto Hernandez Miranda v. Warden, (Nev. S. Ct., No. 17497, Apr. 28, 1988) (judgment overturned due to
egregious ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure to interview 10 witnesses named by his client
who were able to exonerate Miranda and identify the actual killer; on retrial, Miranda was released as innocent) [IAC,
NG]
Olausen v. State, 771 P.2d 583 (Nev. 1989) (death sentence overturned due to counsel's negligent failure to present
a large body of available mitigating evidence and his own damaging remarks to the sentencing panel; Olausen was
not returned to death row) [PSE, L]
*State v. Danny Alfred Padilla (Clark Cnty. Dist. Ct.,  No. C70597-IV-C, July 12, 1996) (state confesses that error
occurred at Padilla’s trial and permits him to plead guilty to second-degree murder) [UK, L]
Dewayne Derek Stevens v. State (Nev. S. Ct., No. 24138, July 8, 1994) (conviction overturned due to trial court’s
failure to advise Stevens properly about the pitfalls of self-representation at a capital trial and failure to determine
whether self-representation was permitted under the circumstances; on remand, Stevens pled to a lesser sentence)
[IAC, L]
pre-1996: 5
1996 and after: 4
Basis for Relief: IAC = 4; PSE = 3; UK = 2
Result on Retrial: L = 6; NG = 2; RP = 1
App. C-34
NORTH CAROLINA
*State v. Bishop, No. 93 CRS 20410-20423 (Guilford Cnty., Jan. 10, 2000) (death sentence overturned because
prosecution concealed material, exculpatory evidence and its discovery of a witness who placed Bishop elsewhere
at the time of the crime; retrial pending) [PSE, RP]
*State v. Thomas Jack Brown, No. 65A85-2 (Robeson Cnty., June 30, 1997) (conviction overturned by trial court
due to ineffective assistance of counsel; state offered and Brown accepted a plea to second-degree murder and was
sentenced to life) [IAC, L]
State v. Gladden, No. 82 CRS 18706 (Onslow Cnty., Dec. 7, 1988) (death sentence overturned by trial court due
to ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase; Gladden was resentenced to life) [IAC, L]
State v. Alton Green, No. 85 CRS 11245 (Wake Cnty., Oct. 29, 1993) (death sentence overturned by trial court
because jury was misinstructed on proper consideration of mitigating evidence; Green was resentenced to life) [I, L]
State v. Holden, No. 85 CRS 1559 (Duplin Cnty., Dec. 7, 1990) (death sentence overturned by trial court because
jury was misinstructed on proper consideration of mitigating evidence) [I, D]
State v. McNeil, No. 83 CRS 25605 (Wake Cnty., Aug. 26, 1993) (conviction overturned by trial court due to
ineffective assistance of counsel and Harbison error; resentenced to death) [IAC, D]
*State v. Munsey, No. 93 CRS 4078 (Wilkes Cnty., May 14, 1999) (conviction overturned because prosecution
concealed material, exculpatory evidence, another man confessed to the offense, and a key witness against Munsey
recanted and admitted giving false testimony; Munsey died while awaiting retrial) [PSE, DW]
State v. Oliver, No. 78 CRS 25575 (Robeson Cnty., Apr. 4, 1994) (death sentence overturned by trial court because
prosecution suppressed exculpatory evidence; Oliver was not returned to death row) [PSE, L]
State v. Robbins, No. 82 CRS 13883 (Durham Cnty., Feb. 1, 1993) (conviction overturned by trial court due to
ineffective assistance of counsel; Robbins was not returned to death row) [IAC, L]
State v. Roper, No. 87 CRS 4488 (Burke Cnty., August 29, 1995) (death sentence overturned by trial court due to
ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase; resentenced to death) [IAC, D]
State v. Spruill, No. 84 CRS 1423 (Northampton Cnty., Feb. 21, 1992) (conviction overturned by trial court due to
ineffective assistance of counsel and Harbison error; resentenced to death) [IAC, D]
*State v. Womble, No. 93 CRS 1992-1993 (Columbus Cnty., July 22, 1998) (conviction overturned by trial court
because prosecution concealed material, exculpatory evidence; on retrial, Womble pled to second-degree murder and
received a life sentence) [PSE, L]
State v. Zuniga, 444 S.E.2d 443 (No. Car. 1994) (death sentence overturned by state supreme court because jury
was misinstructed on proper consideration of mitigating evidence; resentenced to death) [I, D]
pre-1996: 9
1996 and after: 4
Basis for Relief: IAC = 6; PSE = 4; I = 3
Result on Retrial: L = 6; D = 5; RP = 1; DW = 1
App. C-35
OKLAHOMA
Green v. State, 881 P.2d 751 (Okl. Cr. App. 1994) (death sentence overturned because jury instructions invited jury
to rely upon improperly vague aggravating circumstance; resentenced to life) [I, L]
State v. Munson, 886 P.2d 999 (Okl. Cr. App. 1994) (conviction overturned because prosecution deliberately withheld
165 photographs and more than 300 pages of reports, most of it suggesting that Munson was innocent; on retrial,
Munson was acquitted, see Randall Coyne, Abe Munson’s Near-Death Experience, Okla. Observer, Apr. 25, 1995,
at  9) [PSE, NG]
pre-1996: 2
Basis for Relief: PSE = 1; I = 1
Result on Retrial: L = 1; NG = 1
App. C-36
PENNSYLVANIA
*Commonwealth v. Anthony Bryant (Allegheny Cnty. Com. Pl.  No. CC8407686A, May 15, 1998) (death sentence
overturned; proceedings challenging conviction are pending) [UK; RP]
*Commonwealth v. George Edwards  (Lackawanna Cnty. Com. Pl.  Nos. 84-CR 529 & CR 996, June 21, 1999)
(death sentence overturned on state’s stipulation to life sentence) [UK, L]
Commonwealth v. DeHart, 650 A.2d 38 (Pa. 1994) (death sentence overturned due to ineffective assistance of
counsel; life sentence imposed on retrial) [IAC; L]
*Commonwealth v. Morales, 701 A.2d 516 (Pa. 1997) (death sentence overturned on successive state post-
conviction petition due to improper argument by the prosecutor; life sentence imposed on retrial) [PM, L]
*Commonwealth v. Willard Moran  (Phila. Cnty. Com. Pl. Nos. 3091 & 3092, 1999) (death overturned and Moran
reportedly was offered and accepted life sentence in return for ending proceedings) [UK, L]]
*Commonwealth v. Florencio Rolan (Philadelphia Cnty. Com. Pl.  Nos. 2893-2896, Mar. 5, 1997) (death sentence
overturned; proceedings challenging conviction are pending) [UK, RP]
*Commonwealth v. Benjamin Terry (Montgomery Cnty. Com. Pl. No. 1563-79, Oct. 22, 1996) (death sentence
overturned on successive state post-conviction review following unsuccessful federal habeas review; life sentence
imposed on retrial) [UK, L]
*Commonwealth v. Harold C. Wilson (Philadelphia Cnty. Com. Pl. Nos. 3267-73, Aug. 19, 1999) (death sentence
overturned; proceedings challenging conviction are pending upon Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s remand for a hearing
in April 2000) [UK, RP]
pre-1996: 1
post-1996: 7
Basis for Relief: IAC = 1; PM = 1; UK = 6
Result on Retrial: L = 5; RP = 3
App. C-37
SOUTH CAROLINA 
Butler v. State, 397 S.E.2d 87 (S.C. 1990) (convictions and death sentence vacated on state habeas within the original
jurisdiction of the South Carolina Supreme Court because the trial court coerced Butler, who was mentally retarded,
into testifying at trial against his will and in violation of his privilege against self-incrimination; resentenced to life) [O,
L]
James Russell Cain v. Evatt (S.C. 4th Cir. Common Pleas No. 90-CP-13-382, May 4, 1995), cert. dismissed as
improvidently granted, 477 S.E.2d 98 (S.C. 1996) (convictions and death sentence vacated; resentenced to life) [UK,
L] 
*Robert Conyers v. Moore (S.C. 3rd Cir. Common Pleas No. 97-CP-14-506, Feb. 10, 2000) (death sentence
vacated; state’s appeal pending) [UK, RP]
Chaffee v. State, 362 S.E.2d 875 (S.C. 1987) (death sentence vacated due to unconstitutional exclusion of mitigating
evidence at trial; resentenced to life) [O, L]
Ferrell v. State, 362 S.E.2d 875 (S.C. 1987) (death sentence vacated due to unconstitutional exclusion of mitigating
evidence at trial; resentenced to life) [O, L]
*Ellis Franklin v. Moore (S.C. 3rd  Cir. Common Pleas No. 96-CP-45-117, Oct. 2, 1998) (murder conviction and
death sentence vacated; retrial pending) [UK, RP]
*Bobby Lee Holmes v. Moore (S.C. 16th Cir. Common Pleas  No. 96-CP-46-966, Jan. 15, 1998) (murder conviction
and death sentence vacated; retrial pending) [UK, RP]
*Joseph Hudgins v. Moore, 1999 WL 1114701 (S.C. Dec. 6, 1999) (conviction and death sentence vacated due to
ineffective assistance of counsel in permitting prosecutor to pursue patently inadmissible and prejudicial line of inquiry
while cross-examining Hudgins; retrial pending) [IAC, RP]
Alvin Owens (murder conviction and death sentence vacated in unpublished order in 1991 or before, which is
discussed in subsequent opinion (reviewing life sentence imposed follow resentencing), in Owens v. State, 503 S.E.2d
462 (S.C. 1998)) [UK, L]
*Raymond Patterson v. State (S.C. 11th Cir. Common Pleas No. 98-CP-32-97, Sep. 23, 1999) (death sentence
vacated; resentencing pending) [UK, RP]
Andy Lavern Smith (death sentence vacated due to unconstitutional exclusion of mitigating evidence at trial, as
discussed in subsequent opinion (reviewing death sentence imposed following resentencing) in State v. Smith, 381
S.E.2d 724 (S.C. 1989)) [O, L]
State v. Singleton, 437 S.E.2d 53 (S.C. 1993) (execution of death sentence forbidden due to finding that petitioner
was incompetent to be executed) [O, L]
*Robert “Bo” Southerland v. State, 1999 WL 1140298 (S.C. Dec. 13, 1999) (death sentence vacated due to
ineffective assistance on appeal; resentencing pending) [IAC, RP]
App. C-38
*State v. Spann, 513 S.E.2d 98 (S.C. 1999) (after direct appeal and first state post-conviction proceeding and in midst
of federal habeas corpus proceeding, conviction overturned on extraordinary motion for new trial based on discovery
of evidence appearing to exonerate petitioner of offense; retrial pending) [O, RP]
Thompson v. Aiken, 315 S.E.2d 110 (S.C. 1984) (death sentence vacated due to prosecutorial misconduct during
closing argument; resentenced to life) [PM, L]
Truesdale v. Aiken, 480 U.S. 527 (1987) (death sentence overturned because defendant was prevented from making
argument in mitigation to jury based on his good record in prison; resentenced to death, see State v. Truesdale, 393
S.E.2d 198 (S.C. 1990)) [O, D]
*James Whipple v. Moore (S.C. 15th Cir. Common Pleas No. 97-CP-26-295, Dec. 18, 1998) (death sentence
vacated; state’s appeal pending) [UK, L]
Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391 (1991) (conviction overturned because trial court prejudicially instructed jury in manner
that shifted burden of proof to the defendant; Yates was not returned to death row) [I, L]
pre-1996: 10
1996 and after: 8
Basis for Relief: IAC = 2; PM = 1; I = 1; O = 7; UK = 7
Result on Retrial: L = 10; D = 1; RP = 7
App. C-39
TENNESSEE (incomplete, especially prior to 1985, when decisions were not published or made available on
Westlaw)
Adkins v. State, 911 S.W.2d 334 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (death sentence overturned due to counsel’s failure to
investigate or to use information regarding Adkin’s psychiatric  and psychological condition and abuse as a child, thus
leaving jury with little choice but to impose a death sentence; resentenced to life) [IAC, L]
Bell v. State, 1995 WL 113420 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 1995) (death sentence overturned due to ineffective
assistance of counsel at the penalty phase; resentenced to life) [IAC, L] 
Bobo v. State (Shelby Cnty. Crim. Ct.) (trial court overturned death sentence due to ineffective assistance of counsel
in failing to investigate and present presenting evidence of Bobo’s mental disturbance; resentenced to life) [UK, L]
*Brimmer v. State, 1998 WL 612888 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 15, 1998) (death sentence overturned due to egregious
ineffective assistance of counsel by intoxicated and drug-abusing defense lawyer at the penalty phase; resentenced
to life) [IAC; L)
Campbell v. State, 1993 WL 122057 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 21, 1993) (death sentence overturned because trial
judge instructed sentencing jury to rely in support of aggravating-circumstance findings on a variety of inadmissible
evidence; Campbell was not returned to death row) [I, L]
*Caughron v. State, 1999 WL 49906 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 5, 1999) (death sentence overturned due to ineffective
assistance of counsel at the penalty phase; retrial pending) [IAC, RP]
*Rocky Lee Coker v. State (Hamilton Cnty. Cir. Ct. April 1996) (death sentence overturned due to “fatally flawed”
representation at sentencing phase; life sentence imposed on retrial; proceedings described in subsequent opinion in
Coker v. State, 1999 WL 228789 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 21, 1999)) [IAC, L]
Cooper v. State, 847 S.W.2d 521 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992) (death sentence overturned due to defense counsel's
materially prejudicial failure to interview mental health experts who had evaluated defendant prior to trial and who
were aware of substantial mitigating evidence; Cooper was not returned to death row) [IAC, L]
*Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363 (Tenn. 1996) (death sentence overturned due to trial lawyers’ prejudicially deficient
failure to investigate and present evidence demonstrating Goad’s affliction with post-traumatic stress syndrome; retrial
pending) [IAC, RP]
Hartman v. State, 896 S.W.2d 94 (Tenn. 1995) (death sentence overturned due to sentencing jury’s prejudicial
reliance on unconstitutional aggravating circumstance; resentenced to death) [O, D]
*Randy Hurley v. State (Cocke Cnty. Crim. Ct.) (death sentence overturned by trial court in mid- to late 1990s;
resentenced to life) [UK, L] 
*Erskine Leroy Johnson v. State, 1999 WL 608861 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) (death sentence overturned due to
state’s suppression of evidence that Johnson did not commit offense that jury relied on as aggravating circumstance
in imposing death sentence, and because of state’s and jury’s reliance on second, aggravating circumstance which
state conceded was invalid; review pending) [O, RP]
Walter Keith Johnson v. State, 1992 WL 210576 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 2, 1992) (death sentence overturned as
grossly disproportionate to the offense; life sentence ordered) [O, L] 
App. C-40
Thomas G. Laney v. State (Sullivan Cnty. Crim. Ct. 1994) (death sentence overturned by trial court on successive
state post-conviction petition due to sentencing jury’s reliance on unconstitutional aggravating circumstance; life
sentence imposed on retrial on November 15, 1995, as described in Laney v. Campbell, 1997 WL 401829 (Tenn. App.
July 18, 1997)) [O, L]
Michael Matson v. State (Hamilton Cnty. Crim. Ct.) (death sentence overturned by trial court in early 1990s on
successive state post-conviction petition due to sentencing jury’s reliance on unconstitutional aggravating
circumstance; resentenced to life) [O, L]
*McCormick v. State, 1999 WL 394935 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 17, 1999) (conviction and death sentence overturned
due to egregiously ineffective assistance of counsel; retrial pending) [IAC, RP]
*David Poe v. State (Montgomery Cnty. Crim. Ct.) (death sentence overturned by trial court in late 1990s; retrial
pending) [UK, RP]
Richard W. Simon v. State (Montgomery Cnty. Crim. Ct.) (death sentence overturned by trial court in early 1990s
on successive state post-conviction petition due to sentencing jury’s reliance on unconstitutional aggravating
circumstance; resentenced to life) [O, L]
*Ricky G. Smith v. State (Shelby Cnty. Crim. Ct.) (death sentence overturned by trial court on successive state post-
conviction petition sometime after January 1994 due to sentencing jury’s reliance on unconstitutional aggravating
circumstance; resentenced to life; proceedings described in subsequent decision in Smith v. State, 1997 WL 206769
(Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 28, 1997)) [O, L]
*Sylvester Smith v. State, 1999 WL 899362 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 28, 1998) (conviction and death sentence
overturned due to “the plethora and gravity of counsel's deficiencies,” which were “glaring . . . throughout all phases
of this trial” and “rendered the entire proceeding fundamentally unfair”; resentenced to life) [IAC, L]
Sparks v. State, 1993 WL 151324 (Tenn. May 10, 1993) (death sentence overturned because sentencer relied upon
invalid aggravating factor and on evidence obtained in violation of Sparks’ post-arraignment right to consult with
assigned counsel before being questioned by another inmate who was secretly acting as a government agent;
resentenced to life) [PM, L]
  
*State v. Taylor, 1999 WL 512149 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 21, 1999) (conviction and death sentence overturned due
to egregiously ineffective assistance of counsel; retrial pending) [IAC, RP]
Teague v. State, 772 S.W.2d 915 (Tenn. 1989) (death sentence overturned due to sentencer’s reliance  on
unconstitutional conviction as an aggravating circumstance; resentenced to life) [O, L]
Homer Teel v. State (Marion Cnty. Crim. Ct.) (trial court granted relief in early 1990s; direct appeal decision is in
State v. Teel, 793 S.W.2d 236 (Tenn. 1990); Teel was not returned  to death row). [UK, L]
*Wilcoxson v. State, 1999 WL 826035 (Tenn. Oct. 18, 1999) (death overturned based on state’s admission that
Wilcoxson’s trial representation was so prejudicially below par as to require resentencing; retrial pending) [IAC, RP]
pre-1996: 13
1996 and after: 12
Basis for Relief: IAC = 12; PM = 1; I = 1; O = 7; UK = 4
Result on Retrial: L = 18; D = 1; RP = 6
App. C-41
TEXAS
Ex Parte Randall Dale Adams, 768 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (conviction overturned and prisoner released
as innocent due to prosecution’s (1) intentional failure to disclose crime witness’ prior inconsistent statement, which
was diametrically opposed to her material trial testimony; (2) failure to correct witness’s perjurious testimony that she
had identified defendant in a lineup; and (3) failure to disclose misidentification and improper coaching of witness by
police) [PSE, NG]
Ex Parte Banda (Tex. Crim. App. Writ No. 21,327-02, Oct. 21, 1992) (overturning conviction and sentence due to
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; resentenced to death) [IAC, D]
Ex Parte Bell  (Tex. Crim. App. No. 70,946, Nov. 6, 1991) (death sentence overturned due to improper instruction
forbidding jury to consider defendant’s mental retardation as a mitigating circumstance; unpublished opinion reported
as appendix to dissenting opinion in Ex Parte Tennard, 960 S.W.2d 57 (1997); resentenced to death) [I, D]
Ex Parte Brandley, 781 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (conviction overturned because that prosecution
suppressed evidence placing other suspects at scene of crime near time the crime was perpetrated, its suggestive
conduct of investigation so as to create false testimony, and it failure to resolve conflicts in physical evidence;
Brandley was released in lieu of retrial) [PSE, NG]
Ex Parte Bravo, 702 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (death sentence overturned because the trial court excluded
impartial jurors due to their doubts about the death penalty; 99-year sentenced imposed on retrial see
<www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/permanentout.htm>) [JB, L]
Ex Parte Chambers, 688 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (death sentence overturned because state psychiatrist
interviewed petitioner without informing him that his statements could be used as a basis for sentencing him to die;
resentenced to death) [O, D]
Ex Parte Demouchette, 633 S.W.2d 879 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (same) [O, D]
Ex Parte Duffy, 607 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (conviction and death sentence overturned due to
ineffective assistance of counsel; resentenced to life, see <www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/permanentout.htm>) (IAC, L]
Ex Parte Edwin ("Edward") Eldon Corley (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 1992) (as described in Austin
American-Statesman, Nov. 15, 1993, 1993 WL 6810836, “Corley's [death] sentence was reversed in December 1992,
after the Court of Criminal Appeals found that two state psychiatrists failed to warn Corley before they examined him
that they could testify against him”; resentenced to life) [O, L]
Ex Parte Goodman, 816 S.W.2d 383 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (death sentence overturned due to improper instruction
forbidding jury to consider defendant’s mental retardation as a mitigating circumstance; resentenced to life) [I, L]
Ex Parte Hughes, 728 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (death sentence overturned because trial court excluded
impartial jurors due to their doubts about the death penalty; resentenced to death) [JB, D]
Ex Parte Jordan, 758 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (death sentence overturned because Jordan was
incompetent to be executed) [O, L]
Ex Parte McCormick, 645 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (conviction overturned due to capital attorney’s
conflict of interest in representing two criminal defendant’s with conflicting defenses; McCormick was resentenced
to life and has since been paroled) [IAC, L]
App. C-42
Ex Parte McGee, 817 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (death sentence overturned due to improper instruction
forbidding jury to consider defendant’s mental retardation as a mitigating circumstance; resentenced to life [I, L ]
Ex Parte McKay, 819 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (death sentence overturned due to trial court's improper
limitation of counsel’s ability to question prospective jurors on whether they would feel compelled to condemn the
defendant in the event that they convicted him; resentenced to life) [JB, L]
Ex Parte McMahon, 645 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (conviction overturned due to capital attorney’s conflict
of interest in representing two criminal defendant’s with conflicting defenses; McMahon was resentenced to life and
has been released on parole) [IAC, L]
Ex Parte Mitchell, 853 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (conviction overturned due to prosecutorial suppression of
exculpatory evidence showing that victim was alive after last time when Mitchell could have killed him; lengthy but
inconclusive proceedings on remand described in Ex parte Mitchell, 977 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)) [PSE;
?]
Ex Parte Modden (Tex. Crim. App. Case No. 71,312, Feb. 12, 1992) (death sentence overturned due to improper
jury instructions forbidding jury to consider Modden’s mental retardation as a mitigating circumstance; resentenced
to death) [I, D]
Ex Parte Purtell (Tex. Crim. App. Case No. 71,515, Oct. 12, 1994) (death sentence overturned because state
psychiatrist interviewed petitioner without informing him that his statements could be used as a basis for sentencing
him to die; resentenced to life) [O, L]
Ex parte Terry Nash Sterling (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 29, 1992) (death sentence overturned due to improper
instruction forbidding jury to consider defendant’s mental retardation and brain damage as a mitigating circumstance,
as reported in Austin American-Statesman, Apr. 30, 1992, at B12, 1992 WL 4716376; resentenced to life) [I, L]
Ex Parte Philip Tompkins (230th Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas Cause No. 329,004A)  (on July 7,
1990, the Texas governor commuted Tomkins’ death sentence at the request of the D.A., after Tompkins’ volunteer
state post-conviction lawyers developed evidence that the prosecution's star witness at the penalty phase—purportedly
a clinical psychologist who had “examined” and “treated” Phil during a prior stint in prison—was not a psychologist
at all but an imposter whose only post-high-school educational credential was a degree in fine arts) [PSE, L]
Ex Parte Williams, 833 S.W.2d 150 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (death sentence overturned due to improper instruction
forbidding jury to consider defendant’s mental retardation as a mitigating circumstance; resentenced to life) [I, L]
*Ex Parte Bobby Joe Wills (Tex. Crim. App. Writ No. 72,915, May 13, 1998) (death sentence overturned due to
improper instruction forbidding jury to consider defendant’s mental retardation as a mitigating circumstance, as
reported in Austin American-Statesman, May 18, 1998, at A6, 1998 WL 3610947; resentenced to life) [I, L]
pre-1996: 22
1996 and after: 1
Basis for Relief: IAC = 4; PSE = 4; I = 7; JB = 3, O = 5
Result on Retrial: L = 15; NG = 2, D = 6 
App. C-43
UTAH
Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1103 (Utah 1983) (in opinion denying habeas corpus relief from capital
conviction, court notes trial court’s 1980 grant of habeas corpus relief from capital sentence for Codianna and his two
codefendants, Craig Marvell and Irvin Dunsdon, based on prosecutorial suppression of mitigating evidence; all three
were resentenced to life in prison) [PSE, L]
Irvin Dunsdon v. Morris (see Codianna, supra) [PSE, L]
Craig Marvell v. Morris (see Codianna, supra) [PSE, L]
pre-1996: 3
Basis for Relief: PSE = 3
Result on Retrial: L = 3
App. C-44
VIRGINIA
Wilbert Evans (death sentence overturned by trial court after state “confessed error” based on its reliance to secure
a death sentence on “‘seriously misleading’” or “‘otherwise defective’” prior convictions (reversal noted in decision
reviewing death sentence imposed on retrial Evans v. Commonwealth, 323 S.E.2d 114 (Va. 1984))) [O, D]
Joseph Giarratano (in 1991, Virginia governor accepted prisoner’s request that he impose a quasi-judicial judgment
by way of “conditional pardon” (setting aside the conviction on condition that the prisoner waive double jeopardy and
submit to reprosecution) to enable the prisoner to secure a new trial that several judicial doctrines of issue-preclusion
had barred him from getting in either the Virginia state courts or the federal courts; on retrial, Giarratano was
sentenced to life; see Greg Schneider, 2 Years After Escaping Execution, Giarratano’s Stature Still Grows,  The
Virginian-Pilot & Ledger Star, Sept. 5, 1993, at B1) [UK, L]
*Chauncey Jackson v. Warden, 2000 WL 462516 (Va. April 21, 2000) (conviction overturned because court that
convicted defendant did not have jurisdiction over him; retrial pending) [O, RP]
Earl Washington (in 1992, Virginia governor commuted capital conviction and death sentence to life imprisonment
based on DNA evidence showing that Washington, who was retarded, had been compelled to confessed to a rape-
murder that he did not commit; see Robert Perske, Unequal Justice? 54-56 (1991); Joe Jackson & June Arney,
Sentenced To Die Without Fair Trials, Virginian-Pilot & Ledger Star, June 26, 1994, at A1) [PSE, L]
pre-1996: 3
1996 and after: 1
Basis for Relief: PSE =1; O = 2; UK = 1
Result on Retrial: L = 2; D = 1; RP = 1
App. C-45
WASHINGTON [No available information]
App. C-46
WYOMING
Engberg v. Meyer, 820 P.2d 70 (Wyo. 1991) (death sentence reversed due to improper bootstrapping of
accompanying felony that was used to elevate offense from second- to first-degree murder as aggravating
circumstance sufficient to elevate first-degree murder to capital offense; life sentence imposed on retrial, see
Engberg v. State, 874 P.2d 890 (Wyo. 1994)) [O, L]
pre-1996: 1
Basis for Relief: O = 1
Result on Retrial: L = 1
1For many other examples of “serious error” requiring judicial reversal of capital judgments, see cases
collected in Appendix C, supra ; Report, at notes 36, 44, 97-106, 140; Liebman & Hertz, supra Report, note
33, § 11.2c.
Appendix D: Examples of  Serious Error 
Warranting Federal Habeas Corpus Relief1
1. Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214 (1988) (Georgia) (prosecutor unconstitutionally instructed jury commissioner
to under-represent African-Americans on the jury venire).
2. Banks v. Reynolds, 54 F.3d 1508 (10th Cir. 1995) (Oklahoma) (prosecution suppressed evidence that at
least three other men were previously arrested for the crime with which petitioner was charged, that two of
them had been positively identified by eyewitnesses, and that the cell-mate of one of the previously arrested
suspects claimed that THE suspect had confessed to the crime).
3. Beam v. Paskett, 3 F.3d 1301 (9th Cir. 1993), cert denied, 511 U.S. 1060 (1994) (Idaho) (death sentence
premised in part on trial judge's distaste for petitioner's prior history of nonviolent “abnormal sexual relation-
ships,” including homosexuality and relationships with women substantially younger and older than petitioner).
4. Bowen v. Maynard, 799 F.2d 593 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 479 U.S. 962 (1986) (Oklahoma) (prosecutors
suppressed a sheaf of investigative reports that a suspect other than the capitally sentenced petitioner had
murdered the victim and that an investigating officer with a grudge against the petitioner had maliciously
framed him; Bowen was subsequently released from prison for lack of any evidence of his guilt).
5. Brown v. Wainwright, 785 F.2d 1457 (11th Cir. 1986) (Florida) (state deliberately withheld fact that chief
witness against Brown lied on the stand about not having been granted leniency in return for testifying against
Brown; on retrial, Brown was released from prison after the charges against him were dropped).
6. Buttrum v. Black, 908 F.2d 965 (11th Cir. 1990) and  721 F. Supp. 1261 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (Georgia)
(prosecutor unconstitutionally secured death sentence based on a plethora of errors, including (1) insisting on
going to trial before a jury saturated with prejudicial pretrial publicity; (2) employing a private psychiatrist to
testify against Buttrum but insisting that she be limited to the services of a psychiatrist employed by and
beholden to the state, rather than the independent expert the Constitution requires; (3) blatantly and
unconstitutionally inviting the jurors to use against Buttrum the fact that she had exercised her right not to
testify; (4) urging the jury, whatever its qualms about a death sentence might be, to impose that punishment
because the decision would later be reviewed by appellate courts that would bear the real responsibility for
Buttrum’s fate; (5) urging the jury to ignore factors warranting mercy, notwithstanding that the Constitution
makes those very factors the crux of the sentencing decision; (6) relying on a vague and overbroad
aggravating circumstance as a basis for a death sentence)
7. Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1827 (1998) (Arizona)
(prosecutor failed to disclose information in state’s files showing that prosecution’s central witness—who later
confessed to the murder he theretofore had successfully pinned on petitioner at trial—had a “long history”
of prior crimes and assaultive acts and “of lying to the police and blaming others to cover up his own guilt”;
Carriger subsequently pled guilty to a lesser offense in return for the state’s agreement that he be immediately
released, see generally Samuel R. Gross, Lost Lives: Miscarriages of Justice in Capital Cases, 61 L. &
CONTEMP. PROB. 125, 139-40 (1998)(providing additional details on Carriger case)).
App. D-2
8. Cervi v. Kemp, 855 F.2d 702 (11th Cir.  1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033 (1989) (Georgia) (after Cervi
informed the judge at an initial hearing that he wanted a lawyer, thus giving him a constitutional right to the
assistance of counsel before and while being questioned by police—and during the very period when Cervi’s
lawyer was in the police station repeatedly demanding to see his client, but was denied the opportunity—police
interrogated Cervi until he confessed; Cervi was resentenced to life).
9. Chambers v. Armontrout, 907 F.2d 825 (8th Cir.) ,  cert. denied, 498 U.S. 950 (1990) (Missouri) (counsel
incompetently failed to interview and call witness who would have supported petitioner's claim that he did not
deserve the death penalty because he acted in self-defense).
10. Clemons v. Bowersox, 124 F.3d 944 (8th Cir.  1997) (Missouri) (on rehearing after relief initially had been
denied, conviction and death sentence were overturned due to the state’s suppression of an eye-witness
report identifying as the actual killer another man whom Clemons had all along claimed was the culprit; on
retrial in February 2000, Clemons was acquitted) 
11. Christy v. Horn, 28 F. Supp. 2d 307 (W.D. Pa. 1998) (Pennsylvania) (prosecutor violated due process by
disparaging petitioner's mental illness defense despite the prosecutor's awareness of inadmissible evidence
substantiating the defense and by implicitly encouraging the jury to believe, erroneously, that petitioner might
be eligible for parole if sentenced to life imprisonment; in addition, the trial court unconstitutionally denied a
defense request for an independent psychiatrist at guilt and penalty stages and instead limited the accused to
a court-appointed psychiatrists who was not competent to marshal the necessary facts; in addition, Christy’s
attorneys provided prejudicially incompetent representation at the penalty phase by “fail[ing] to investigate
the mountain of mitigating evidence readily available to them,” failing to seek psychiatric testimony, failing
to object to the prosecutor’s improper closing argument, and incorrectly advising the jury about Pennsylvania
law in a manner that was highly prejudicial to Christy). 
12. United States ex rel. Collins v. Wellborn and United States ex rel. Bracy v. Gramley, 79 F. Supp. 898
(N.D. Ill. 1999) (Illinois) (death sentences overturned based on proof that trial judge, who repeatedly took
bribes to acquit in other cases, exhibited compensatory pro-prosecution bias against Collins and Bracy and
other defendants who did not bribe him).
13. Crivens v. Roth, 172 F.3d 991 (7th Cir. 1999) (Illinois) (prosecutor failed to disclose that its key eyewitness
had a criminal history and had used an alias in past, thereby “demonstrat[ing] a propensity to lie to police
officers, prosecutors, and even judges”).
14. Davis v. Zant, 36 F.3d 1538 (11th Cir. 1994) (Georgia) (conviction and death sentence overturned due to
blatant prosecutorial misrepresentations to the jury in the course of objections and closing argument: having
successfully objected to Davis’ effort to inform the jury that another person had confessed to the killing for
which Davis was convicted and sentenced to die, and having known that Davis for months before trial had
hinged his defense on his claim that the other person was the killer, the prosecutor repeatedly vouched to the
jury that there was no evidence that the other person had committed the crime and that Davis had
“fabricated” the defense at the last minute, during the course of the trial).
15. Felder v. McCotter, 765 F.2d 1245 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1077 (1986) (Texas) (after Felder
was appointed counsel, giving him a constitutional right to have his lawyer present when the police questioned
him, and after the appointed lawyer told the police he wanted to be present at any interrogation, the police
proceeded to interrogate Felder (a man of low intelligence) outside the presence of counsel, using a variety
of strategems designed to make Felder believe the police knew he was guilty, until Felder confessed).
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16. Ford v. Norris, 67 F.3d 162 (8th Cir. 1995) (Arkansas) (conviction and death sentence overturned because
of “overwhelming record evidence . . . that the prosecutor routinely attempted to pervert the peremptory
challenge system by using it to exclude black venirepersons for reasons wholly unrelated to the trial” and did
so at Ford’s trial, striking every potential black juror, and giving an explanation in each case that was blatantly
pretextual because it was either a false statement of the facts regarding the prospective juror or, if true, would
have required the prosecutor to strike white jurors whom he left on the jury; district judge also found
ineffective assistance of trial counsel at the sentencing phase).
17. Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985) (Georgia) (trial judge instructed jury to “presume” that defendant
was guilty of murder unless defendant proved otherwise).
18. Groseclose v. Bell, 130 F.3d 1161 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1826 (1998) (Tennessee)
(counsel failed to develop defense theory and “to conduct any meaningful adversarial challenge, as shown
by his failure to cross-examine more than half of the prosecutions’ witnesses, to object to any evidence, to
put on any defense witnesses, to make a closing argument, and, at sentencing, to put only any meaningful
mitigation evidence”; instead, counsel abdicated client’s case to counsel for codefendant who presented a
defense that was antagonistic to Groseclose).
19. Guerra v. Johnson, 916 F. Supp. 620 (S.D. Tex. 1995), aff’d, 90 F.3d 1075 (5th Cir. 1996) (Texas) (police
and prosecutors, among other things, “intimidated” numerous eyewitnesses, who initially said that petitioner’s
companion fired the fatal shots, into corroborating the prosecution’s theory that Guerra had fired the shots—in
the process coercing witnesses into giving testimony and into signing affidavits that the police and witnesses
knew were false; police told one witness that her common-law husband was at risk of parole revocation if
she did not cooperate and told another witness that her infant daughter could be taken from her if she refused
to cooperate; district judge concluded that the defendant would surely have been acquitted if he had received
a fair trial; on retrial, the D.A. demanded that the state trial judge reconsider all of the federal courts’ findings
about prosecutorial misconduct, which the trial judge did, concluding that the findings were accurate in all
respects; in April 1997, the D.A. dropped all charges against Guerra, and he was released). 
20. Harris v. Wood, 64 F.3d 1432 (9th Cir. 1995) (Washington)  (counsel incompetently failed to interview a
majority of the witnesses, advised the defendant to confess to the prosecutor without receiving any promise
of reduced charges in return, and failed to file potentially meritorious suppression motions, to propose or object
to improper jury instructions, and to raise and preserve meritorious issues for appeal).
21. Houston v. Dutton, 50 F.3d 381 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 905 (1995) (Tennessee) (capital
conviction overturned because—in a trial at which the single, decisive issue was whether the defendant
deliberately killed the victim or whether the killing was an accident, and at which the state’s evidence on that
decisive issue was so weak that it raised a substantial question whether it was even barely sufficient to avoid
a directed verdict in favor of the defense—the trial judge instructed the jury that it was required to “presume”
that the killing was intentional).
22. Jones v. Thigpen, 788 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1087 (1987) (Mississippi) (counsel
conducted no investigation in mitigation of death penalty and did not realize, nor inform jury, that his client had
an I.Q. below 41).
23. Jurek v. Estelle, 623 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (1981) (Texas)
(habeas decision overturning a capital conviction after police obtained two very different confessions from
the mentally deficient petitioner during a 42-hour period of interrogation without counsel; the exculpatory
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version of the confession, not admitted at trial, appeared to be in the defendant’s words; the inculpatory
version, used at trial, had prose beyond defendant’s ken).
24. Kordenbrock v. Scroggy, 919 F.2d 1091 (6th Cir. 1990) (en banc), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 970 (1991)
(Kentucky) (police obtained confession after (1) ignoring petitioner’s statements that he wanted the
interrogation to stop, (2) threatening to arrest petitioner’s girlfriend (against whom they had no evidence) and
(3) threatening to send petitioner to Ohio, where, police said, he could be held incommunicado and put through
“an ordeal [he] may not forget for a long time,” then (4) suppressed the tape-recorded version of the
confession and pieced together a written statement giving a far more inculpatory account than the actual
confession).
25. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (Louisiana) (in investigating robbery-murder of supermarket customer
in store’s parking lot, New Orleans police (1) accepted the word of a long-time criminal and police informant
Beanie, whom police found in possession of the victim’s car, that Curtis Kyles had sold him the car, while
suppressing a variety of statements by Beanie that (a) were inculpatory, self-contradictory and inconsistent
with Beanie’s trial testimony, (b) suggested that Beanie (in his own words) had “‘set up’” Kyles,  and (c)
revealed a course of dealings between Beanie and the police that strongly impugned the investigation, then
(2) manipulated eyewitnesses into identifying Kyles at tr ial, inconsistently with their initial but thereafter
suppressed descriptions that much more closely matched Beanie; a majority of jurors in three successive
retrials voted to acquit Kyles, whom prosecutors finally released from custody).
26. Martinez-Macias v. Collins, 810 F. Supp. 782 (W.D. Tex. 1991), aff’d, 979 F.2d 1067 (5th Cir. 1992)
(Texas) (conviction and death sentence overturned due to egregious, comprehensive, prejudicial
incompetence by trial lawyer who (1) failed to call disinterested alibi witness who was available at time of
trial and whose testimony would have established that Macias could not have committed the offense; (2)
failed to impeach a crucial prosecution witness with her contradictory statements before trial to a private
investigator and by calling witnesses who were with the witness at the critical time and did not see what she
saw; (3) failed to investigate and present evidence from defendant's family members regarding Macias’s good
character traits, failed to prepare defendant's wife for testimony, and failed to utilize records from a California
rehabilitation center to demonstrate the defendant's good behavior and attempts to rehabilitate while in
custody; (4) failed to utilize an expert witness to introduce important mitigating information—all of which,
taken together, left the federal court of appeals “with the firm conviction that Macias was denied his
constitutional right to adequate counsel in a capital case in which actual innocence was a close question” and
that the “state [having] paid defense counsel $11.84 per hour[,] [u]nfortunately . . . got only what it paid for”;
on remand, Macias was released after a grand jury determined that there was not even enough evidence of
guilt to justify indicting him).
27. United States ex rel. Maxwell v. Gilmore, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1078 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (Illinois) (granting
evidentiary hearing to capitally sentenced habeas petitioner and denying presumption of correctness to state
court’s voluntary-confession finding because the state suppression-hearing judge “did not have access to the
voluminous [subsequently disclosed] information about the systematic . . . [physical] abuse [of suspects by
the police unit that interrogated and secured a confession from Maxwell], . . . and Maxwell’s attorney never
had the opportunity to use that information to cross-examine the officers who testified at the suppression
hearing”). In regard to the police unit that took the confession in Maxwell’s case, see Sasha Abramsky, Trial
by Torture, Mother Jones, March 3, 2000 (“Dozens of other prisoners [including 10 death row inmates] have
come forward saying they were tortured into confessing by police officers from . . . Area Two” and
presenting “hair-raising and remarkably consistent [claims] . . . of alligator clips attached to their ears, noses,
mouths, penises, and testicles; of electric shocks to the genitals; of being burned atop radiators” and of “mock
executions” and “bags put over their heads for minutes at a time, a technique known as the ‘Dry
Submarino’”).
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28. McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033 (1989) (North Carolina)
(police withheld the fact that before petitioner’s arrest for the offense, the chief prosecution witness—who
at trial identified petitioner, a dark-skinned African American man sentenced to die for the offense, as the
assailant—had told police that the assailant was white).
29. Miller and Jent v. Wainwright, Nos. 86-98-Vic.-T-13 and 85-1910-Civ.-T-13 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 13, 1987)
(Florida) (prosecutor exhibited “callous and deliberate disregard for ... truth” by suppressing police reports
identifying numerous witnesses who were fishing at the location where the victim’s body was found at the
only time the two capitally sentenced petitioners (who otherwise had an airtight alibi defense) could have
deposited the victim’s body and who saw nothing amiss; Jent and Miller pled to a lesser offense and were
immediately released on time served).
30. Monroe v. Blackburn, 748 F.2d 958 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1145 (1985) (Louisiana) (state
failed to disclose that police obtained information after trial that someone other than petitioner may have
committed the murder).
31. Orndorff v. Lockhart, 998 F.2d 1426 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1063 (1994) (Arkansas)
(prosecutor failed to inform defense that key witness in favor of death penalty was hypnotized prior to trial,
preventing fair cross-examination concerning discrepancies between witness's prehypnotic  and posthypnotic
statements to police).
32. Parker v. Bowersox, 188 F.3d 923 (8th Cir. 1999) (Missouri) (defense counsel failed to respond to state’s
argument in aggravation—that defendant killed his girlfriend to eliminate her as a witness against him in a
criminal proceeding—by presenting accessible evidence proving that petitioner knew for certain prior to the
murder that the victim could and would not testify against him).
33. Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308 (1991) (Florida) and Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40, 48 (1992) (Arizona)
and Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222 (1992) (Mississippi) (state appellate court struck down an aggravating
circumstance on which a death sentence was based without determining whether a death sentence remained
appropriate absent the faulty aggravating circumstance).
34. Paxton v. Ward, 199 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 1999) (Oklahoma) (overturning judgment because D.A.  “clearly
and deliberately made two critical misrepresentations to the jury” as an “an integral part of the deprivation
of Mr. Paxton’s constitutional rights to present mitigating evidence, to rebut evidence and argument used
against him, and to confront and cross-examine the state’s witnesses”)
35. Rickman v. Bell, 131 F.3d 1150 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied , 118 S. Ct. 1827 (1998) (Tennessee)
(counsel’s “total failure to actively advocate his client’s cause” and “repeated expressions of contempt for
his client for his alleged actions” had the effect of “provid[ing] [petitioner] not with a defense counsel, but
with a second prosecutor”).
36. Shillinger v. Haworth, 70 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 1995) (Wyoming) (deputy sheriff’s listening in on and
reporting to prosecutor substance of defense counsel’s jailhouse conversations with client violated Sixth
Amendment right to counsel).
37. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) (Texas) (state-employed psychiatrist was permitted to testify at death
penalty phase based on petitioner's pretrial statements that were not freely and voluntarily given and that were
made without counsel or waiver of counsel).
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38. Smith v. McCormick, 914 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1990) (Montana) (state unconstitutionally secured a death
sentence against an indigent defendant with mental disorders when the trial judge (1) forced the defense to
rely on the psychiatric  evaluation of a doctor acting under the direction of the judge (who had previously
sentenced Smith to die), rather than appointing the independent psychiatrist required by law in a case in which
doing so would have generated substantial mitigating evidence; (2) refused to consider most of the mitigating
circumstances that Smith did manage to present; and, (3) as to the limited set of mitigating factors the judge
did take into consideration, he refused to assess their overall effect in mitigation, instead insisting that each
individual factor be sufficient in itself to warrant a life sentence).
39. Stockton v. Virginia, 852 F.2d 740 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1071 (1989) (Virginia) (in lunch
break during jury's death sentencing deliberations, courtroom deputies allowed owner of restaurant in which
jurors were eating to tell jurors “they ought to fry the son of a bitch”).
40. Strickland v. Francis, 738 F.2d 1542 (11th Cir. 1984) (Georgia) (state court violated Strickland’s due
process rights by forcing him to trial despite mental disorders so severe and unequivocal that he had no idea
what the proceedings were about and could not assist his attorney).
41. Troedel v. Dugger, 828 F.2d 670 (11th Cir. 1987), aff'g 667 F. Supp. 1426 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (Florida)
(prosecutor suborned testimony of expert witness at separate trials of two codefendants that each
codefendant had to have been sole triggerman in single killing with which both were charged and for which
Troedel was sentenced to death).
42. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986) (Virginia) (trial court forbade capital defendant charged with
interracial crime to question prospective jurors in order to discover possible racial biases)
43. Wade v. Calderon, 29 F.3d 1312 (9th Cir. 1994) (California) (sentence of death based on unconstitutionally
vague special circumstance of torture-murder and based on prejudicially ineffective representation at penalty
phase due to counsel’s failure to present any significant evidence of defendant's child abuse and his argument
to the jury that executing defendant would benefit him by freeing him of his mental illness).
44. Wallace v. Kemp, 757 F.2d 1102 (11th Cir. 1985) (Georgia) (capitally sentenced petitioner found to have
been incompetent to assist attorney at trial; on retrial, after being restored to sanity, Wallace was acquitted).
45. Wheat v. Thigpen, 793 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 930 (1987) (Mississippi)
(prosecutor encouraged jurors to exercise less than full responsibility for death sentence by telling jurors that
any mistake they made in sentencing the defendant to die would be corrected by an appellate court).
46. Wilkins v. Bowersox, 145 F.3d 1006 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied 119 S. Ct. 852 (1999) (Missouri)
(conviction and death sentence overturned because the trial court permitted the 16-year old defendant—who
“from infancy through his teenage years [had] suffered severe physical and emotional abuse at the hands of
his mother and other adults in his life,” who “began abusing drugs as a kindergartner on his way to school,”
who was diagnosed at age 10 “as a severely depressed boy with homicidal and suicidal tendencies,” who
“was transferred in and out of mental health facilities” between ages 10 and 16, and who court-appointed
psychiatrists at trial, on direct appeal and during state post-conviction proceedings had unanimously and
consistently concluded could not make voluntary, knowing and intelligent decisions about important matters
in his case, and who was never advised by the court or counsel about “his possible defenses to the charges
against him . . . or the full range of punishments that he might receive”— to fire his lawyer, represent himself
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at trial (as a 16-year-old), waive all his rights and plead guilty, and then waive his right to present any evidence
in mitigation of the death penalty).
47. Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000) (Virginia) (death sentence overturned due to incompetence of
Williams’ trial attorneys who “did not begin to prepare for [the penalty trial] until a week before” it took place,
“failed to conduct an investigation that would have uncovered extensive records graphically describing
Williams’ nightmarish childhood, not because of any strategic calculation but because they incorrectly thought
that state law barred access to such records,” thereby kept “the jury [from] learn[ing] that Williams’ parents
had been imprisoned for the criminal neglect of Williams and his siblings, that Williams had been severely and
repeatedly beaten by his father, that he had been committed to the custody of the social services bureau for
two years during his parents’ incarceration (including one stint in an abusive foster home), and then, after his
parents were released from prison, had been returned to his parents’ custody”; concluding that “there existed
‘a reasonable probability that the result of the sentencing phase would have been different’ if the jury had
heard that evidence”).
48. Williamson v. Ward, 904 F. Supp. 1529 (E.D. Okla. 1995) (Oklahoma) (overturning capital conviction based
on faulty hair analysis which was so “scientifically unreliable” that it should not have been be permitted as
evidence of guilt and based on claims that hairs found at the crime scene “matched” the defendant’s, although
hair analysis can never support that categorical a claim), aff’d, 110 F.3d 1508 (10th Cir. 1997) (affirming
reversal of capital conviction on habeas because appointed counsel, who received no funding for expert or
investigative services and was paid the statutory maximum of $3200, failed to investigate a videotaped
statement by another person confessing to the crime and extensive evidence of petitioner’s mental illness and
likely incompetence to stand trial) ( DNA testing subsequently established that Williamson was innocent, and
he was released from prison, see Bill Dedman, DNA Evidence Frees Two in Murder Case, Milwaukee J.
Sentinel, Apr. 25, 1999, at 20; Barry Scheck, Peter Neufeld & Jim Dwyer, Actual Innocence: Five Days to
Execution, and Other Dispatches from the Wrongly Convicted 126-27, 130-57, 251-54 (2000)).
*In some cases, this information comes from the published decision in the listed case.
Although we have tried to update the information about lawyers’ phone numbers and locations,
some of it is outdated.
Examples of  Serious Error 
Warranting State Post-Conviction or




Innocence cases: Carriger/Arizona; Knapp/Arizona; Brown/Florida; Miller &
Jent/Florida; Nelson/Georgia; Jimerson/Illinois; Bowen/Oklahoma;
Munson/Oklahoma; Williamson/Oklahoma; Brandley/Texas, Martinez-
Macias/Texas
Cases with multiple serious error: Gunsby/Florida; Buttrum/Georgia;
Smith/Montana;
 Christy/Pennsylvania
Very recent cases: Young/Florida; Collins and Bracy/Illinois; Crivens/Illinois;
Parker/Missouri; Wilkins/Missouri; Mazzan/Nevada; Munsey/North
Carolina; Hudgins/South Carolina; Spann/South Carolina;
Brimmer/Tennessee; Sylvester Smith/Tennessee; Williams v.
Taylor/Virginia
Pattern of wrongful convictions (often due to prosecutorial suppression of
evidence): See Arizona cases; Oklahoma cases
Chronic incompetent lawyering: See Missouri cases; Tennessee cases
(many more cases can be supplied)
Chronic prosecutorial suppression of evidence of innocence and other
prosecutorial misconduct: See Florida cases; North Carolina cases;
Oklahoma cases; also Alabama and Arizona cases
States with error running the gamut and large numbers of serious errors
found: See Florida cases; Georgia cases; Illinois cases; Texas cases
Racial discrimination in selecting jurors: Floyd/Alabama; Ford/Arkansas,
Amadeo/Georgia
Lawyers with multiple cases on the list: 
John H. Blume, Esq., Columbia, SC, 803-765-1044: Butler/South
Carolina; Spann/South Carolina
Professor John C. Boger, U. No. Car. L. School, 919-962-843-9288:
McDowell/
North Carolina; Jurek/Texas; Estelle v. Smith/Texas
Stephen B. Bright, Esq., Atlanta, GA, 404-688-1202: Amadeo/Georgia; 
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Wheat/Mississippi
Prof. Randall T.E. Coyne, Univ. of Oklahoma Law School, 405-325-4646:
Munson/Oklahoma; Martinez-Macias/Texas
Laura Wightman FitzSimmons, Esq., Las Vegas, NV, 702-733-8877:
 Jimenez/Nevada; Miranda/Nevada
Professor Eric Freedman, Hofstra Law School, NY, NY, 212-665-2713:
Monroe/Louisiana; McCormick/Texas; Earl Washington/Virginia
George Kendall, Esq., NY, NY, 212-965-2267: Buttrum/Georgia;
Cervi/Georgia; Curry/Georgia; Ross/Georgia
Professor James S. Liebman, NY, NY, 212-854-3423: Kyles/Louisiana;
Houston/Tennessee
Mark Olive, Esq., Tallahassee, FL, 850-224-0004: Michael/Florida;
Roman/Florida; Troedel/Florida; Wilson/Florida
Bryan Stevenson, Esq., Montgomery, AL, 334-269-1803: Jefferson/AL
McMillian/AL
Denise Young, Esq., Tucson, AZ, 520-322-5344: Carriger/AZ; Serna/AZ
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ALABAMA
Ex parte Floyd, 571 So.2d 1234 (Ala. 1990) (conviction overturned because prosecutor
intentionally discriminated against African American jurors by using his first 11 (of 12)
peremptory challenges to strike all 11 African-Americans in the jury venire; resentenced
to life) 
CONTACT: Christopher Knight, Esq., Mobile, AL
Charles Hollifield, Esq., Montgomery, AL
Jefferson v. State,  645 So. 2d 313 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994) (conviction and death
sentence overturned because state withheld exculpatory evidence that someone other
than the defendant committed the crime and that seriously impeached the credibility of
two key prosecution witnesses; resentenced to life) 
CONTACT: Bryan A. Stevenson, Esq., Montgomery, AL, 334-269-1803
Ruth E. Friedman, Esq., Washington, D.C. 202-393-8070
Walter McMillian v. State, 616 So. 2d 933 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (conviction and death
sentence overturned because state (1) suppressed exculpatory evidence impeaching
its principal witness (who subsequently recanted) and (2) failed to disclose evidence
creating a reasonable probability that the outcome of the guilt-innocence trial would
have been different had the evidence been disclosed; petitioner subsequently released
from custody as innocent) 
CONTACT: Bryan A. Stevenson, Esq., 334-269-1803
ARIZONA
Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
1827 (1998) (prosecutor failed to disclose information in state’s files showing that
prosecution’s central witness—who later confessed to the murder he successfully
pinned on Carriger at trial—had a “long history” of prior crimes and assaultive acts and
“of lying to the police and blaming others to cover up his own guilt”; on retrial, Carriger
was released from prison)
CONTACT: Jay Pultz, Esq., Center for Capital Assistance, San Francisco, CA
415-621-8860
Denise Young, Esq., Tucson, AZ, 520-322-5344
Prof. Samuel Gross, U. Mich. Law School, 734-764-1519
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State v. Knapp (conviction and death sentence overturned in 1987 on third state post-
conviction petition due to newly discovered scientific evidence of innocence and police
and prosecutorial misconduct, as described in Knapp v. Knapp, 823 P.2d 625 (Ariz.
1992); Knapp was subsequently released as innocent, as  detailed in Roger Parloff,
Triple Jeopardy (1996)) 
CONTACT: Larry Hammond, Esq., LAHammond@omlaw.com, 602-640-0000
Roger Parloff, NY, NY, 212-313-9050
State v. Serna (Maricopa Cnty. Super. Ct. No. 150464, 1994) (conviction overturned
due to prosecutor’s obstruction of defense’s ability to find an exculpatory witness; on
retrial, state offered and Serna accepted a guilty plea to manslaughter, who was then
sentenced to time served and was released from prison, see From Death Row to
Halfway House, Phoenix Gazette, Jan. 24, 1995, at B1, 1995 WL 2752207) 
CONTACT: Denise Young, Esq., Tucson, AZ, 520-322-5344
ARKANSAS
Ford v. Norris, 67 F.3d 162 (8th Cir. 1995) (conviction and death sentence overturned
because of “overwhelming record evidence . . . that the prosecutor routinely attempted
to pervert the peremptory challenge system by using it to exclude black venirepersons
for reasons wholly unrelated to the trial” and did so at Ford’s trial, striking every
potential black juror, and giving an explanation in each case that was blatantly
pretextual because it was either a false statement of the facts regarding the prospective
juror or, if true, would have required the prosecutor to strike white jurors whom he left
on the jury; district judge also found ineffective assistance of trial counsel at the
sentencing phase)
CONTACT: Timothy O. Dudley, Little Rock, Arkansas, 501-372-0080
Orndorff v. Lockhart, 998 F.2d 1426 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1063 (1994)
(prosecutor failed to inform defense that key witness in favor of death penalty was
hypnotized prior to trial, preventing fair cross-examination concerning discrepancies
between witness's prehypnotic and posthypnotic statements to police)
CONTACT: Kenneth Breckenridge, Hot Springs, AR,  
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Sheridan v. State,  959 S.W.2d 29 (Ark. 1998) (conviction overturned due to
representation by attorney with blatant conflict of interest; resentenced to life) 
CONTACT: Deborah Sallings, Esq., 501-340-6120
CALIFORNIA
In re Jones, 13 Cal.4th 552  (1996) (conviction and sentence overturned due to
ineffective assistance of counsel; Jones subsequently was released in lieu of retrial) 
CONTACT: Charles M. Bonneau, Sacramento, CA, 916-444-8828
In re Neely, 6 Cal.4th 901 (1993)  (conviction overturned to ineffective assistance of
counsel; on retrial, Neely was given a life sentence) 
CONTACT: Karen S. Sorensen, Kentfield, CA
Wade v. Calderon, 29 F.3d 1312 (9th Cir. 1994) (sentence of death based on
unconstitutionally vague special circumstance of torture-murder and based on
prejudicially ineffective representation at penalty phase due to counsel’s failure to
present any significant evidence of defendant's child abuse and his argument to the
jury that executing defendant would benefit him by freeing him of his mental illness)
CONTACT: Barry P. Helft, Donald J. Ayoob, Deputy State Public Defenders,
San Francisco, CA, 415-553-9650
Michael R. Levine, Asst. Federal Public Defender, Portland, OR
 
FLORIDA
Arango v. State, 497 So.2d 1161 (Fla. 1986) (conviction overturned due to
prosecutorial suppression of exculpatory evidence supporting Arango’s defense that
someone else committed the offense) 
CONTACT: Sharon Jacobs, Esq., Miami, FL
Brown v. Wainwright, 785 F.2d 1457 (11th Cir. 1986) (state deliberately withheld fact
that chief witness against Brown lied on the stand about not having been granted
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leniency in return for testifying against Brown, who was released from prison after the
charges against him were dropped)
CONTACT: Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General of the State of Connecticut,
Hartford, CT
David Golub, Stanford, CT, 203-325-4491
Also contact Brown himself, now Shebaka Waglini, at 202-789-
2126
Miller and Jent v. Wainwright, Nos. 86-98-Vic.-T-13 and 85-1910-Civ.-T-13 (M.D. Fla.
Nov. 13, 1987) (prosecutor exhibited “callous and deliberate disregard for ... truth” by
suppressing police reports identifying numerous witnesses who were fishing at the
location where the victim’s body was found at the only time the two capitally sentenced
petitioners (who otherwise had an airtight alibi defense) could have deposited the
victim’s body and who saw nothing amiss); pled to lesser offense in order that they
could be released on time served).
CONTACT: Sharlette Holdman, San Francisco, CA, 415-621-8860
Gunsby v. State, 670 So.2d 920 (Fla. 1996) (new trial required due to cumulative effect
of ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to discovery exculpatory evidence that
Gunsby was not the perpetrator, and the state’s suppression of the fact that two of its
crucial witnesses testified against Gunsby in return for lenient treatment in their own
criminal cases; state did not seek death sentenced on retrial and life sentence was
imposed upon reconviction) 
CONTACT: Hon. Bruce Peterson, Minneapolis, MN, 612-596-7126
John M. Baker, Esq., Greene, Espel, Minneapolis, MN, 612-373-
8344
James C. Lohman, Tallahassee, 850-878-8260
State v. John Michael, 530 So.2d 929 (Fla. 1987) (death sentence overturned due to
penalty-phase lawyer’s ineffective assistance in failing to investigate and secure expert
support for defendant’s mental condition as basis for mitigation) 
CONTACT: Mark E. Olive, Esq., Tallahassee, FL, 850-224-0004
Porter v. State, 723 So.2d 191 (Fla. 1998) (death sentence overturned because
sentencing judge was manifestly and admittedly biased against Porter on the issue of
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sentence; life sentence imposed on retrial on Dec. 2, 1999)
CONTACT: Martin J. McClain, Esq., NY, NY, 212-577-3429 
Todd Scher, Esq., Ft. Lauderdale, FL 954-713-1284
Roman v. State, 528 So.2d 1169 (Fla. 1988) (conviction overturned due to state’s
failure to disclose highly exculpatory statements by witness who gave highly inculpatory
testimony at trial)
CONTACT: Mark Olive, Esq., Tallahassee, FL., 850-224-0004
Troedel v. Dugger, 828 F.2d 670 (11th Cir. 1987), aff'g 667 F. Supp. 1426 (S.D. Fla.
1986) (prosecutor suborned testimony of expert witness at separate trials of two
codefendants that each codefendant had to have been sole triggerman in single
killing with which both were charged and for which Troedel was sentenced to
death)
CONTACT: Mark Olive, Esq., Tallahassee, FL., 850-224-0004
Wilson v. Wainwright, 474 So.2d 1162 (Fla. 1985) (conviction overturned due to
egregious
ineffective assistance of Wilson appellate attorney; on reappeal, the Florida
Supreme Court determined that the evidence did not support a death sentence,
and order that a life sentence be imposed) 
CONTACT: Mark Olive, Esq., Tallahassee, FL., 850-224-0004
Young v. State, 739 So.2d 553 (Fla. 1999) (death sentence overturned due to state’s
suppression
of eyewitness statements to police supporting Young’s defense that he fired his
weapon in self-defense after the victim had first fired a shot at Young;
resentenced to life) 
CONTACT: Martin J. McClain, Esq., NY, NY, 212-577-3429 
Todd Scher, Esq., Ft. Lauderdale, FL, 954-713-1284
GEORGIA
Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214 (1988) (prosecutor unconstitutionally instructed jury
commissioner to under-represent African-Americans on the jury venire).
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CONTACT: Stephen B. Bright, Esq., Atlanta, GA, 404-688-1202
Buttrum v. Black, 908 F.2d 965 (11th Cir. 1990) and  721 F. Supp. 1261 (N.D. Ga.
1989) (prosecutor unconstitutionally secured death sentence based on a plethora of
errors, including (1) insisting on going to trial before a jury saturated with prejudicial
pretrial publicity; (2) employing a private psychiatrist to testify against Buttrum but
insisting that she be limited to the services of a psychiatrist employed by and beholden
to the state, in lieu of the independent expert the Constitution requires; (3) blatantly and
unconstitutionally inviting the jurors to use hold Buttrum the fact that she had exercised
her right not to testify; (4) urging the jury, whatever its qualms about a death sentence,
to impose that punishment because the decision would later be reviewed by appellate
judges who would bear the real responsibility for Buttrum’s fate; (5) urging the jury to
ignore factors warranting mercy, notwithstanding that the Constitution makes those
very factors the crux of the sentencing decision; (6) relying on a vague and overbroad
aggravating circumstance as a basis for a death sentence; resentenced to life)
CONTACT: George H. Kendall, Esq., NY, NY, 212-965-2267
Cervi v. Kemp, 855 F.2d 702 (11th Cir.  1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033 (1989) (after
Cervi informed the judge at an initial hearing that he wanted a lawyer, thus giving him a
constitutional right to the assistance of counsel before and while being questioned by
police—and during the very period when Cervi’s lawyer was in the police station
repeatedly demanding to see his client, but was denied the opportunity—police
interrogated Cervi until he confessed; resentenced to life)
CONTACT: George H. Kendall, Esq., NY, NY, 212-965-2267
Curry v. Zant, 371 S.E.2d 647 (Ga. 1988) (conviction overturned due to counsel’s
ineffective failure to secure expert evaluation of Curry’s mental status at the time of the
offense which would have provided substantial evidence that Curry was not sane at the
time of the offense and was not capable of intelligently and voluntarily waiving his right
to counsel when he confessed; on retrial, Curry was permitted to plead to life
(Washington Cnty. Super. Ct. No. 7)) 
CONTACT: David Lane, Esq., Denver, CO, 303-534-6400
George H. Kendall, Esq., 212-965-2267
Davis v. Zant, 36 F.3d 1538 (11th Cir. 1994) (conviction and death sentence overturned
due to blatant prosecutorial misrepresentations to the jury in the course of objections
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and closing argument: having successfully objected to Davis’ effort to inform the jury
that another person had confessed to the killing with which Davis was charged, and
having known that Davis, for months before trial, had hinged his defense on his claim
that the other person was the killer, the prosecutor repeatedly stated to the jury that
there was no evidence that the other person had committed the crime and that Davis
had “fabricated” the defense at the last minute, during the course of the trial)
CONTACT: Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Jenner & Block, Washington D.C., 202-639-
6000
Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985) (trial judge instructed jury to “presume” that
defendant was guilty of murder unless defendant proved otherwise)
CONTACT: Ronald J. Tabak, Esq. NY, NY, Skadden, Arps, State, Meagher &
Flom, 212-735-2226
Harrison v. Zant, 402 S.E.2d 518 (Ga. 1991) (conviction overturned due to ineffective
assistance of attorneys who presented fractured and inconsistent defenses; on retrial,
Harrison pled to life sentence, Hall Cnty. Super. Ct. No. K84-48,139) 
CONTACT: Ogden N. Lewis, Esq., Davis, Polk & Wardlaw, NY, NY, 212-450-
4000
Turpin v. Lipham, 510 S.E.2d 32 (Ga. 1998) (death sentence overturned due to
ineffective assistance of counsel in simply presenting jury with 2500 pages of Lipham’s
psychiatric records without presenting an expert or taking any other steps to assist the
jury in understanding how mitigating the information was; retrial pending) 
CONTACT: Greg Alexander Alexion, Esq., Brooklyn, NY
John Youngblood, NY, NY
Nelson v. Zant, 405 S.E.2d 250 (Ga. 1991) (state suppressed FBI analyses
establishing that the limb hair the state’s expert had used to connect defendant to the
crime lacked sufficient characteristics for microscopic analysis). Nelson was thereupon
released from prison and not retried because, as the district attorney admitted, there
was no valid evidence implicating him in the offense. See Jingle Davis & Mark
Curriden, Man Condemned for Murder of Girl Is Freed, Atlanta Const., Nov. 7, 1991, at
O6) 
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CONTACT: Emmett J. Bondurant II, Bondurant, Mixon & Elmore, Atlanta, GA,
404-881-4100
Zant v. Pitts, 436 S.E.2d 4 (Ga. 1993) (death sentence overturned due to ineffective
assistance of counsel in failing to inform jury that petitioner was retarded, even though
that created a bar to the death penalty under Georgia law; on retrial, state agreed to life
sentence, Floyd Cnty. Super. Ct. No. S93A-1151, Aug. 22, 1996)) 
CONTACT: Mitchell D. Raup, Esq., Mayer, Brown & Platt, Washington, DC,
202-263-3257
Ross v. Kemp, 393 S.E.2d 244 (Ga. 1990) (conviction overturned due to ineffective
assistance of counsel and co-counsel who presented inconsistent defenses, severely
prejudicing Ross; on retrial, petitioner permitted to plead to life sentence, DeKalb Cnty.
Super. Ct. No. 83-CR-2635) 
CONTACT: George H. Kendall, Esq., NY, NY, 212-965-2267
Strickland v. Francis, 738 F.2d 1542 (11th Cir. 1984) (state court violated Strickland’s
due process rights by forcing him to trial despite mental disorders so severe and
unequivocal that he had no idea what the proceedings were about and could not assist
his attorney)
CONTACT: Millard Farmer, Esq., Atlanta, Georgia, 404-688-8116
Wallace v. Kemp, 757 F.2d 1102 (11th Cir. 1985) (Georgia) (capitally sentenced
petitioner found to have been incompetent to assist attorney at trial). On retrial after
being restored to sanity, Wallace was acquitted)
CONTACT: Elyse Aussenberg, Hyatt Legal Svcs., Atlanta, Ga., Risa L.
Lieberwitz, N.Y. State School of Industrial & Labor Relations,
Ithaca, N.Y., Frank L. Derrickson, Atlanta, Ga.
IDAHO
Beam v. Paskett, 3 F.3d 1301 (9th Cir. 1993), cert denied, 511 U.S. 1060 (1994) (death
sentence premised in part on trial judge's distaste for petitioner's prior history of
nonviolent “abnormal sexual relationships,” including homosexuality and relationships
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with women substantially younger and older than petitioner).
CONTACT: David Skeen, Port Townsend, WA and Gar Hackney, Lynn, Scott,
Hackney & Jackson, Boise, ID  
ILLINOIS
United States ex rel. Collins v. Wellborn and United States ex rel. Bracy v. Gramley, 79
F. Supp. 898 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (death sentences overturned based on proof that trial
judge, who repeatedly took bribes to acquit in other cases, exhibited compensatory
pro-prosecution bias against Collins and Bracy and other defendants who did not bribe
him)
CONTACT: Robert Hugh Farley, Naperville, IL, Stephen E. Eberhardt, Tinley Park, IL,
for Roger Collins;  John Ladell Stainthorp, Chicago, IL and Gilbert H.
Levy, Seattle, WA for Bracy; and , Daniel R. Collins, Ramsell &
Armamentos, Wheaton, IL, for both
Crivens v. Roth, 172 F.3d 991 (7th Cir. 1999) (prosecutor failed to disclose that its key
eyewitness had a criminal history and had used an alias in past, thereby
“demonstrat[ing] a propensity to lie to police officers, prosecutors, and even judges”).
CONTACT: Brian D. Roche, J. Samuel Tenenbaum, Lisa J. Krasberg, Henry
Pietrkowski, Sachnoff & Weaver, Chicago, IL  
United States ex rel. Maxwell v. Gilmore, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1078 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (granting
evidentiary hearing to capitally sentenced habeas petitioner and denying presumption
of correctness to state court’s voluntary-confession finding because the state
suppression-hearing judge “did not have access to the voluminous [subsequently
disclosed] information about the systematic . . . [physical] abuse [of suspects by the
police unit that interrogated and secured a confession from Maxwell], . . . and Maxwell’s
attorney never had the opportunity to use that information to cross-examine the officers
who testified at the suppression hearing”). In regard to the police unit that took the
confession in Maxwell’s case, see Sasha Abramsky, Trial by Torture, Mother Jones,
March 3, 2000 (“Dozens of other prisoners [including 10 death row inmates] have come
forward saying they were tortured into confessing by police officers from . . . Area Two”
and presenting “hair-raising and remarkably consistent [claims] . . . of alligator clips
attached to their ears, noses, mouths, penises, and testicles; of electric shocks to the
genitals; of being burned atop radiators” and of “mock executions” and “bags put over
their heads for minutes at a time, a technique known as the ‘Dry Submarino’”)
CONTACT: Gary Ravitz, Eric Palles, Chicago, IL  
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People v. Jimerson, 652 N.E.2d 278 (1995) (conviction overturned due to prosecutorial
suppression of exculpatory evidence and countenancing of perjury by crucial witness
against Jimerson who denied being offered a deal in return for her testimony; trial court
dismissed the charges and defendant was released due to the absence of any
evidence of guilt and due to DNA evidence implicating 4 other men, 3 of whom
eventually confessed to the crime (the 4th had died) and one of whom had killed
another of his rape victims in the meantime)
CONTACT: Mark R. Ter Molen, Esq., Mayer, Brown & Platt, 312-782-0600
Fredrick S. Levin, Esq., 213-229-5124
Professor Andrea D. Lyon, U. Mich. Law. School, 734-647-4091
Jesse A. Witten, Esq., Nussbaum & Wald, Washington, DC, 202-
879-5451
People v. Lego, 660 N.E.2d 971 (Ill. 1995) (conviction overturned due to Lego’s
manifest incompetence to stand trial, due to organic brain damage, to waive counsel
and represent himself at his capital trial; resentenced to sentence less than death)
CONTACT: Charles Schiedel, 217-782-1989
Charles Hoffman, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Chicago, 
IL, 312-814-5100
People v. Ruiz, 686 N.E.2d 574 (Ill. 1997) (sentence overturned due to ineffective
assistance of counsel, who failed to investigate and discover substantial bases for
mitigation of sentence; on retrial, judge determined that death sentence would be
disproportionate to life sentence given co-offender; state’s appeal is pending) 
CONTACT: Richard H. McLeese, Thomas D. Decker & Associates, Chicago,
312-922-4180
INDIANA
Smith v. State, 547 N.E.2d 817 (Ind. 1990) (conviction overturned due to egregious
ineffective assistance of counsel; on retrial, Smith was acquitted of all charges) 
CONTACT: Teresa D. Harper, 812-333-5355
Rhonda R. Long-Sharp, 317-630-0137
13
KENTUCKY
Kordenbrock v. Scroggy, 919 F.2d 1091 (6th Cir. 1990) (en banc), cert. denied, 499
U.S. 970 (1991) (police obtained confession after (1) ignoring petitioner’s statements
that he wanted the interrogation to stop, (2) threatening to arrest petitioner’s girlfriend
(against whom they had no evidence) and (3) threatening to send petitioner to Ohio,
where, police said, he could be held incommunicado and put through “an ordeal [he]
may not forget for a long time,” then (4) suppressed the tape-recorded version of the
confession and pieced together a written statement giving a far more inculpatory
account than the actual confession)
CONTACT: Edward C. Monahan, 502-564-8006, Ext. 236
LOUISIANA
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (in investigating robbery-murder of supermarket
customer in store’s parking lot, New Orleans police (1) accepted the word of a long-time
criminal and police informant Beanie, whom police found in possession of the victim’s car, that
Curtis Kyles had sold him the car, while suppressing a variety of statements by Beanie that (a)
were inculpatory, self-contradictory and inconsistent with Beanie’s trial testimony, (b)
suggested that Beanie (in his own words) had “‘set up’” Kyles,  and (c) revealed a course of
dealings between Beanie and the police that strongly impugned the investigation, then (2)
manipulated eyewitnesses into identifying Kyles at trial, inconsistently with their initial but
thereafter suppressed descriptions that much more closely matched Beanie; a majority of
jurors in three successive retrials voted to acquit Kyles, whom prosecutors finally released from
custody)
CONTACT: Prof. James S. Liebman, Columbia Law School, NY, NY, 212-854-
3423
Monroe v. Blackburn, 748 F.2d 958 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1145 (1985)
(Louisiana) (state failed to disclose that police obtained information after trial that
someone other than petitioner may have committed the murder)
CONTACT: Prof. Eric Freedman, Hofstra Law School, NY, NY, 212-665-2713
Douglas G. Morris, Esq., Brooklyn, NY, 718-330-1209
MARYLAND
Bowers v. State, 578 A.2d 734 (Md. 1990) (conviction overturned based on variety of
incompetent errors that trial counsel committed—including in failing to show that
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forensic evidence found on the victim did not match Bowers, but for which there was a
“substantial possibility” that the result of the trial would have been different; lesser
sentence imposed on retrial) 
CONTACT: Judith R. Catterton, Esq., Catterton, Kemp & Mason, Rockville,
MD, 301-294-0460
MISSISSIPPI
Jones v. Thigpen, 788 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1087 (1987)
(counsel conducted no investigation in mitigation of death penalty and did not realize,
or inform jury, that his client had an I.Q. below 41)
CONTACT: T.H. Freeland, III, Freeland & Gafford, T.H. Freeland, IV, Oxford,
Miss., 
Mary Carolyn Ellis, University, Miss.
Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222 (1992) (state appellate court struck down an
aggravating circumstance on which a death sentence was based without determining
whether a death sentence remained appropriate absent the faulty aggravating
circumstance)
CONTACT: Kenneth Rose, Esq., Durham, NC, 919-956-9545
Wheat v. Thigpen, 793 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 930 (1987)
(prosecutor encouraged jurors to exercise less than full responsibility for death
sentence by telling jurors that any mistake they made in sentencing the defendant to
die would be corrected by an appellate court)
CONTACT: Stephen B. Bright, Esq., Atlanta, GA, 404-688-1202
MISSOURI
State v. Butler, 951 S.W.2d 600 (Mo. 1997) (conviction and death sentence overturned
based on ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to investigate and discover
evidence that the victim was murdered by her nephew rather than by Butler and in
failing to bring out substantial weaknesses in the prosecution's case, either of which
could have raised a reasonable doubt in the jurors’ minds; on retrial, Butler was
convicted of a lesser degree of homicide and given a 20-year term) 
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CONTACT: Melinda K. Pendergraph, Asst. Public Defender, Columbia, MO,
573-882-9855
Pat Berrigan, Esq., Kansas City, MO, 816-474-3350 , ext. 113.
State v. Dexter, 954 S.W.2d 332 (Mo. 1997) (conviction overturned due to prosecutor’s
repeated use against Dexter of his invocation of his right to silence; on retrial, Dexter
was released after the state dismissed the charges against him for lack of evidence of
guilt) 
CONTACT: Cyndi Short, Esq., Kansas City, MO, 816-889-7699
Clemons v. Bowersox, 124 F.3d 944 (8th Cir.  1997) (on rehearing after relief initially
had been denied, conviction and death sentence were overturned due to the state’s
suppression of an eye-witness report identifying as the actual killer another man whom
Clemons had all along claimed was the culprit; on retrial in February 2000, Clemons
was acquitted) 
CONTACT: Charles Rogers and Cheryl Pilate, Esqs., Kansas City, MO,
816-221-0080
Parker v. Bowersox, 188 F.3d 923 (8th Cir. 1999) (defense counsel failed to respond to
state’s argument in aggravation—that defendant killed his girlfriend to eliminate her as
a witness against him in a criminal proceeding—by presenting accessible evidence
proving that petitioner knew for certain prior to the murder that the victim could and
would not testify against him)
CONTACT: Gregg F. Lombardi, Esq., Kansas City, Missouri, 816-531-6565,
ext. 103
Wilkins v. Bowersox, 145 F.3d 1006 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied 119 S. Ct. 852 (1999)
(conviction and death sentence overturned because the trial court permitted the 16-
year old defendant—who “from infancy through his teenage years [had] suffered severe
physical and emotional abuse at the hands of his mother and other adults in his life,”
who “began abusing drugs as a kindergartner on his way to school,” who was
diagnosed at age 10 “as a severely depressed boy with homicidal and suicidal
tendencies,” who “was transferred in and out of mental health facilities” between ages
10 and 16, and who court-appointed psychiatrists at trial, on direct appeal and during
state post-conviction proceedings had unanimously and consistently concluded could
not make voluntary, knowing and intelligent decisions about important matters in his
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case, and who was never advised by the court or counsel about “his possible defenses
to the charges against him . . . or the full range of punishments that he might receive”—
to fire his lawyer, represent himself at trial (as a 16-year-old), waive all his rights and
plead guilty, and then waive his right to present any evidence in mitigation of the death
penalty)
CONTACT: Sean O’Brien, Esq., Kansas City, Mo., 816-363-2795
MONTANA
Smith v. McCormick, 914 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1990) (state unconstitutionally secured a
death sentence against an indigent defendant with mental disorders when the trial
judge (1) forced the defense to rely on the psychiatric evaluation of a doctor acting
under the direction of the judge (who had previously sentenced Smith to die), rather
than appointing the independent psychiatrist required by law in a case in which doing
so would have generated substantial mitigating evidence; (2) refused to consider most
of the mitigating circumstances that Smith did manage to present; and, (3) as to the
limited set of mitigating factors the judge did take into consideration, he refused to
assess their overall effect in mitigation, instead insisting that each individual factor be
sufficient in itself to warrant a life sentence)
CONTACT: Cliff Gardner, Esq., San Francisco, CA, 415, 922-9404
NEVADA
Jimenez v. State, 918 P.2d 687 (Nev. 1996) (conviction overturned due to state’s
suppression of evidence implicating other suspects and impeaching key informant
witness against Jiminez; on retrial, Jimenez pled guilty to lesser charge and was
released from prison the next year)
CONTACT: Laura Wightman FitzSimmons, Esq., Las Vegas, NV, 702-733-
8877
Mazzan v. Warden, 993 P.2d 25 (Nev. 2000) (conviction overturned on third state post-
conviction petition due to prosecutorial suppression of police reports “provid[ing]
support for Mazzan's defense that someone else murdered [the victim] . .. [and]
provid[ing] a basis to impeach the thoroughness of the state's investigation of the
crime”; Mazzan was released from prison, see Brendan Riley, Emotional Mazzan
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Released, Las Vegas Rev.-J., May 7, 2000, at 1) 
CONTACT: JoNell Thomas, Esq., Las Vegas, NV, 702-471-6535
Roberto Hernandez Miranda v. Warden, (Nev. S. Ct., No. 17497, Apr. 28, 1988)
(judgment overturned due to egregious ineffective assistance of counsel based on
counsel’s failure to interview 10 witnesses named by his client who were able to
exonerate Miranda and identify the actual killer; on remand for retrial, Miranda was
released as innocent) [IAC, NG]
CONTACT: Laura Wightman FitzSimmons, Esq., Las Vegas, NV, 702-733-
8877
NORTH CAROLINA
State v. Bishop, No. 93 CRS 20410-20423 (Guilford Cnty., Jan. 10, 2000) (death
sentence overturned because prosecution concealed material, exculpatory evidence
and discovery of witness who placed Bishop elsewhere at the time of the crime; retrial
pending) 
CONTACT: Stephen Dear, 919-933-7567
McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033 (1989)
(police withheld the fact that before petitioner’s arrest for the offense, the chief
prosecution witness—who at trial identified petitioner, a dark-skinned African American
man sentenced to die for the offense, as the assailant—had told police that the
assailant was white)
CONTACT: Professor John C. Boger, U. No. Car. L. School, 919-962-843-9288
State v. Munsey, No. 93 CRS 4078 (Wilkes Cnty., May 14, 1999) (conviction
overturned because prosecution concealed material, exculpatory evidence, another
man confessed to the offense, and key witness against Munsey recanted and admitted
to giving false testimony; Munsey died while awaiting retrial) 
CONTACT: Stephen Dear, 919-933-7567
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OKLAHOMA
Banks v. Reynolds, 54 F.3d 1508 (10th Cir. 1995) (prosecution suppressed evidence
that at least three other men were previously arrested for the crime with which
petitioner was charged, that two of them had been positively identified by
eyewitnesses, and that the cell-mate of one of the previously arrested suspects claimed
that suspect had confessed to the crime)
CONTACT: James T. Priest, McKinney, Stringer & Webster, P.C., Oklahoma
City, OK, 405-239-6444
Bowen v. Maynard, 799 F.2d 593 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 479 U.S. 962 (1986)
(prosecutors suppressed a sheaf of investigative reports that a suspect other than the
capitally sentenced petitioner had murdered the victim and that an investigating officer
with a grudge against the petitioner had maliciously framed him). Bowen was
subsequently released from prison for lack of any evidence of his guilt) 
CONTACT: Jack B. Zimmermann and Jim E. Lavine of Zimmermann & Lavine,
P.C., Houston, TX
Patrick A. Williams, Williams, Donovan & Savage, Tulsa, OK
State v. Munson, 886 P.2d 999 (Okl. Cr. App. 1994) (conviction overturned because
prosecution deliberately withheld 165 photographs and more than 300 pages of
reports, most of it suggesting that Munson was innocent; on retrial, Munson was
acquitted, see Randall Coyne, Abe Munson’s Near-Death Experience, Okla. Observer,
Apr. 25, 1995, at  9)  
CONTACT:  Prof. Randall T.E. Coyne, Univ. of Oklahoma Law School, 405-
325-4646
Paxton v. Ward, 199 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 1999) (Oklahoma) (overturning judgment
because D.A. “clearly and deliberately made two critical misrepresentations to the jury”
as an “an integral part of the deprivation of Mr. Paxton’s constitutional rights to present
mitigating evidence, to rebut evidence and argument used against him, and to confront
and cross-examine the state’s witnesses”)
CONTACT: Robert A. Nance, Riggs, Abney, Neal, Turpen, Orbison & Lewis,
Oklahoma City, OK
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Williamson v. Ward, 904 F. Supp. 1529 (E.D. Okla. 1995) (overturning capital
conviction based on faulty hair analysis which was so “scientifically unreliable” that it
should not have been be permitted as evidence of guilt and based on claims that hairs
found at the crime scene “matched” the defendant’s, although hair analysis can never
support that categorical a claim), aff’d, 110 F.3d 1508 (10th Cir. 1997) (affirming
reversal of capital conviction on habeas because appointed counsel, who received no
funding for expert or investigative services and was paid the statutory maximum of
$3200, failed to investigate a videotaped statement by another person confessing to
the crime and extensive evidence of petitioner’s mental illness and likely incompetence
to stand trial). DNA testing subsequently established that Williamson was innocent, and
he was released from prison. See Bill Dedman, DNA Evidence Frees Two in Murder
Case, Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, Apr. 25, 1999, at 20; Barry Scheck, Peter Neufeld &
Jim Dwyer, Actual Innocence: Five Days to Execution, and Other Dispatches from the
Wrongly Convicted 126-27, 130-57, 251-54 (2000) 
CONTACT:  Prof. Barry Scheck, Cardozo Law School, NY, NY, 212-790-0377
PENNSYLVANIA
Christy v. Horn, 28 F. Supp. 2d 307 (W.D. Pa. 1998) (prosecutor violated due process
by disparaging petitioner's mental illness defense despite the prosecutor's awareness
of inadmissible evidence substantiating the defense and by implicitly encouraging the
jury to believe, erroneously, that petitioner might be eligible for parole if sentenced to
life imprisonment; in addition, the trial court unconstitutionally denied a defense request
for an independent psychiatrist at guilt and penalty stages and instead limited the
accused to a court-appointed psychiatrists who was not competent to marshal the
necessary facts; in addition, Christy’s attorneys provided prejudicially incompetent
representation at the penalty phase by “fail[ing] to investigate the mountain of
mitigating evidence readily available to them,” failing to seek psychiatric testimony,
failing to object to the prosecutor’s improper closing argument, and incorrectly advising
the jury about Pennsylvania law in a manner that was highly prejudicial to Christy) 
CONTACT: W. Thomas McGough, Jr., Pittsburgh, PA, 412-288-3088
John C. Unkovic, Pamina Ewing, Eric Chaffin, Pittsburgh, PA
SOUTH CAROLINA
Butler v. State, 397 S.E.2d 87 (S.C. 1990) (convictions and death sentence vacated via
state habeas within the original jurisdiction of the South Carolina Supreme Court
because trial court coerced Butler, who was mentally retarded, into testifying at trial
against his will and in violation of his privilege against self-incrimination; resentenced
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to life)  
CONTACT: John H. Blume, Esq., Columbia, SC, 803-765-1044
Joseph Hudgins v. Moore, 1999 WL 1114701 (S.C. Dec. 6, 1999) (conviction and death
sentence vacated due to ineffective assistance of counsel in permitting prosecutor to
pursue patently inadmissible and prejudicial line of inquiry while cross-examining
Hudgins; retrial pending) 
CONTACT: David I.  Bruck, Esq., Columbia, SC, 803-765-1044
State v. Spann, 513 S.E.2d 98 (S.C. 1999) (after direct appeal and first state post-
conviction proceeding and in midst of federal habeas corpus proceeding, conviction
overturned on extraordinary motion for new trial based on discovery of evidence
appearing to exonerate petitioner of offense; retrial pending)   
CONTACT: John H. Blume, Esq., Columbia, SC, 803-765-1044
TENNESSEE
Brimmer v. State, 1998 WL 612888 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 15, 1998) (death sentence
overturned due to egregious ineffective assistance of counsel by intoxicated and drug-
abusing defense lawyer at the penalty phase; resentenced to life) 
CONTACT: W. Thomas Dillard, Esq., Ritchie, Fels & Dillard, P.C., Knoxville,
TN, 865-637-0661
Cooper v. State, 847 S.W.2d 521 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992) (death sentence overturned
due to defense counsel's materially prejudicial failure to interview mental health experts
who had evaluated defendant prior to trial and who were aware of substantial mitigating
evidence; Cooper was not returned to death row) 
CONTACT: William B. Mitchell Carter, Karen Broadway Petosa, Esqs.,
Chattanooga, TN  
Groseclose v. Bell, 130 F.3d 1161 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1826 (1998)
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(counsel failed to develop defense theory and “to conduct any meaningful adversarial
challenge, as shown by his failure to cross-examine more than half of the prosecutions’
witnesses, to object to any evidence, to put on any defense witnesses, to make a
closing argument, and, at sentencing, to put only any meaningful mitigation evidence”;
instead, counsel abdicated client’s case to counsel for codefendant who presented a
defense that was antagonistic to Groseclose)
CONTACT: Larry D. Woods, Esq., Woods & Woods, Nashville, TN, 615-259-
4366
Rickman v. Bell, 131 F.3d 1150 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied , 118 S. Ct. 1827 (1998)
(counsel’s “total failure to actively advocate his client’s cause” and “repeated
expressions of contempt for his client for his alleged actions” had the effect of
“provid[ing] [petitioner] not with a defense counsel, but with a second prosecutor”)
CONTACT: Henry Martin, Paul Bottei, Esqs., Nashville, TN, 615-736-5047
Sylvester Smith v. State, 1999 WL 899362 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 28, 1998)
(conviction and death sentence overturned due to “the plethora and gravity of counsel's
deficiencies,” which were “glaring . . . throughout all phases of this trial” and “rendered
the entire proceeding fundamentally unfair”; resentenced to life) 
CONTACT: William P. Redick, Jr., Esq., Whites Creek, TN, 615-742-9865
TEXAS
Ex Parte Brandley, 781 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (conviction overturned
because that prosecution suppressed evidence placing other suspects at scene of
crime near time the crime was perpetrated, its suggestive conduct of investigation so as
to create false testimony, and it failure to resolve conflicts in physical evidence;
released in lieu of retrial) 
CONTACT: Mike DeGeurin, Paul Nugent, Esqs., Houston, TX, 713-655-9000
Martinez-Macias v. Collins, 810 F. Supp. 782 (W.D. Tex. 1991), aff’d, 979 F.2d 1067
(5th Cir. 1992) (conviction and death sentence overturned due to egregious,
comprehensive, prejudicial incompetence by trial lawyer who (1) failed to call
disinterested alibi witness who was available at time of trial and whose testimony would
have established that Macias could not have committed the offense; (2) failed to
22
impeach a crucial prosecution witness with her contradictory statements before trial to
a private investigator and by calling witnesses who were with the witness at the critical
time and did not see what she saw; (3) failed to investigate and present evidence from
defendant's family members regarding Macias’s good character traits, failed to prepare
defendant's wife for testimony, and failed to utilize records from a California
rehabilitation center to demonstrate the defendant's good behavior and attempts to
rehabilitate while in custody; (4) failed to utilize an expert witness to introduce
important mitigating information—all of which, taken together, left the federal court of
appeals “with the firm conviction that Macias was denied his constitutional right to
adequate counsel in a capital case in which actual innocence was a close question”
and that the “state [having] paid defense counsel $11.84 per hour[,] [u]nfortunately . . .
got only what it paid for”; on remand, Macias was released after a grand jury
determined that there was not even enough evidence of guilt to justify indicting him)
CONTACT: Douglas G. Robinson, Esq., Skadden, Arps, State, Meagher &
Flom, Washington, D.C., 202-371-7000
Prof. Randall T.E. Coyne, Univ. of Oklahoma Law School, 405-
325-
4646
Guerra v. Johnson, 916 F. Supp. 620 (S.D. Tex. 1995), aff’d, 90 F.3d 1075 (5th Cir.
1996) (police and prosecutors, among other things, “intimidated” numerous
eyewitnesses, who initially said that petitioner’s companion fired the fatal shots, into
corroborating the prosecution’s theory that Guerra had fired the shots—in the process
coercing witnesses into giving testimony and into signing affidavits that the police and
witnesses knew were false; police told one witness that her common-law husband was
at risk of parole revocation if she did not cooperate and told another witness that her
infant daughter could be taken from her if she refused to cooperate; district judge
concluded that the defendant would surely have been acquitted if he had received a
fair trial; on retrial, the D.A. demanded that the state trial judge reconsider all of the
federal courts’ findings about prosecutorial misconduct, which the trial judge did,
concluding that the findings were accurate in all respects; in April 1997, the D.A.
dropped all charges against Guerra, and he was released; Guerra died in an
automobile accident four months later)
CONTACT: Scott J. Atlas, Vinson & Elkins, Houston, TX, 713-758-2024
Stanley Schneider, Schneider & McKinney, Houston, TX,
713-951-9555
Jurek v. Estelle, 623 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001
(1981) (habeas decision overturning a capital conviction after police obtained two very
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different confessions from the mentally deficient petitioner during a 42-hour period of
interrogation without counsel; the exculpatory version of the confession, not admitted at
trial, appeared to be in the defendant’s words; the inculpatory version, used at trial, had
prose beyond defendant’s ken)
CONTACT: John Charles Boger, U. No. Car. L. School, 919-843-9288
Jay Topkis, Esq., Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, NY,
NY, 212-373-3000
Ex Parte McCormick and Ex Parte McMahon, 645 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983)
(convictions overturned due to capital attorney’s irreconcilable conflict of interest in
representing two criminal defendant’s with conflicting defenses; both were resentenced
to life and have since been released on parole) 
CONTACT: Prof. Eric Freedman, Hofstra Law School, NY, NY, 212-665-2713
(for McCormick)
Marc Fleisher, Esq., NY, NY, 212-595-0595 (for McCormick)
Frederick T. Davis, Esq, Shearman & Sterling,
NY, NY, 212-848-4675 (for McMahon)
Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) (state-employed psychiatrist permitted to testify at
death penalty phase based on petitioner's pretrial statements that were not freely and
voluntarily given and that were made without counsel or waiver of counsel)
CONTACT: John Charles Boger, U. No. Car. L. School, 919-962-843-9288
 
VIRGINIA
Stockton v. Virginia, 852 F.2d 740 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1071 (1989)
(in lunch break during jury's death sentencing deliberations, courtroom deputies
allowed owner of restaurant in which jurors were eating to tell jurors “they ought to fry
the son of a bitch”)
CONTACT: Louis Martin Bograd, Donald G. Frankel, Kevin S. Marks, Joseph
G. Poluka, Pamela K. Chen, Arnold & Porter, Washington, D.C.,
202-942-5000
Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000) (death sentence overturned due to
incompetence of Williams’ trial attorneys who “did not begin to prepare for [the penalty
24
trial] until a week before” it took place, “failed to conduct an investigation that would
have uncovered extensive records graphically describing Williams’ nightmarish
childhood, not because of any strategic calculation but because they incorrectly
thought that state law barred access to such records,” thereby kept “the jury [from]
learn[ing] that Williams’ parents had been imprisoned for the criminal neglect of
Williams and his siblings, that Williams had been severely and repeatedly beaten by
his father, that he had been committed to the custody of the social services bureau for
two years during his parents’ incarceration (including one stint in an abusive foster
home), and then, after his parents were released from prison, had been returned to his
parents’ custody”; concluding that “there existed ‘a reasonable probability that the
result of the sentencing phase would have been different’ if the jury had heard that
evidence”)
CONTACT: Brian A. Powers, Esq., O’Donoghue & O’Donoghue, 202-362-0041
Earl Washington (in 1992, Virginia governor commuted capital conviction and death
sentence to life imprisonment based on DNA evidence showing that Washington, who
was retarded, had been compelled to confessed to a rape-murder that he did not
commit; see Robert Perske, Unequal Justice? 54-56 (1991); Joe Jackson & June
Arney, Sentenced To Die Without Fair Trials, Virginian-Pilot & Ledger Star, June 26,
1994, at A1; David Swanson, Retarded Man Awaits DNA Decision, Culpeper News,
May 25, 2000, at 1) 
CONTACT: Eric M. Freedman, Hofstra Law School, NY, NY, 212-665-2713
Gerald T. Zerkin, Richmond, VA, 804-788-4412 
WASHINGTON
Harris v. Wood, 64 F.3d 1432 (9th Cir. 1995) (counsel’s incompetently failed to
interview a majority of the witnesses, advice to the defendant to confess to the
prosecutor without receiving any promise of reduced charges in return, and failure to
file potentially meritorious suppression motions, to propose or object to improper jury
instructions, and to raise and preserve meritorious issues for appeal)
CONTACT: Allen M. Ressler, Esq., Browne & Ressler, Seattle, WA, 206-624-
7364 
Kany M. Levine, 360-779-6038
WYOMING
Shillinger v. Haworth, 70 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 1995) (deputy sheriff’s listened in on and
25
reported to prosecutor the substance of defense counsel’s jailhouse conversations with
the client, in blatant violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel)
CONTACT: Professor Emeritus Gerald Gallivan, University of Wyoming
College of Law, 307-766-6416 (dean’s office at U. of WY)
Appendix E: Tables and Figures
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Table 1: Overall Error Rates and Percent Death Sentences Carried Out,
by State, 1973-1995
State Percent of Death Sentences
Carried Out
Overall Error Rates on State DA
and PC and Federal Habeas















South Carolina 4 67
Illinois 3 66
Indiana 3 75











* Overall reversal rates for Delaware and Washington only include rates detected on state direct appeal and federal
habeas corpus because information about state post-conviction reversal rates is not available.
Sources: DRCen; Death Row U.S.A., Winter 2000; DADB; Appendix C; HCDB 
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% Executed % Noncon.
Executions
1973  334 42  376  0  0 0 0
1974  134 149  283  0  0 0 0
1975  244 298  542  0  0 0 0
1976  488 233  721  0  0 0 0
1977  420 137  557  1  0   .18 0
1978  423 187  610  0  0 0 0
1979  483 152  635  2  1   .31   .16
1980  595 174  769  0  0 0 0
1981  697 229  926  1  0   .11 0
1982  863 268 1131  2  1   .18   .09
1983 1073 254 1327  5  5   .38   .38
1984 1216 283 1499 21 21 1.40 1.40
1985 1421 268 1689 18 14 1.07   .83
1986 1589 299 1888 18 17  .95  .90
1987 1800 289 2089 25 23 1.20 1.10
1988 1964 291 2255 11 10  .49  .44
1989 2111 263 2374 16 14  .67  .59
1990 2232 252 2484 23 16  .93  .64
1991 2346 264 2610 14 14  .54  .54
1992 2466 289 2755 31 30 1.13 1.09
1993 2575 291 2866 38 31 1.33 1.08
1994 2716 321 3037 31 27 1.02  .89
1995 2890 322 3212 56 49 1.74 1.53
1996 3064 317 3381 45 37 1.33 1.09
1997 3242 274 3516 74 70 2.10 1.99
1998 3328 285 3613 68 58 1.88 1.61
1999 3452 300 3752 98 89 2.61 2.37
Sources: BJS 1998 Cap. Pun. Study (death row pop.; 1999 is est.); Death Row U.S.A., Winter 2000 (executions)
App. E-4
Table 3: State and Federal Reversals by Year, 1973-1995











1973-1995 41 40 65 248**
1973 100 0 100 0
1974 50 0 50 0
1975 66 0 66 1
1976 39 0 39 1
1977 57 0 57 0
1978 51 67 84 2
1979 63 0 63 4
1980 48 80 90 4
1981 53 71 86 3
1982 49 72 86 5
1983 41 32 60 6
1984 33 35 55 6
1985 41 43 66 5
1986 32 43 61 4
1987 40 49 69 13
1988 42 39 65 16
1989 42 33 61 16
1990 45 30 62 18
1991 44 36 64 18
1992 38 36 60 28
1993 36 28 54 29
1994 30 24 47 25
1995 32 45 63 20
1996-4/2000 N/A N/A N/A [ave. of 22/yr] 94
      *  Information on the proportion of cases reversed on state post-conviction, by year, is not generally
          available.
      **Column does not add up to 248 because the year of several post-conviction reversals known to
          have occurred between 1973 and 1995 is not know.
      Sources: DADB; HCDB; Appendix C
App. E-5
Table 9: Overall Error Rates, by State, 1973-1995
Excluding State Post-Conviction
State Overall Error Rate, Excluding State Post-Conviction
National Composite 64%                                       
1.   Kentucky* 100%
1.   Maryland* 100%
1.   Tennessee* 100%
4.   Mississippi 89%
5.   California 86%
5.   Montana 86%
7.   Wyoming* 84%
8.   Idaho 81%
9.   Arizona 77%



















* States with three or fewer federal habeas corpus cases.
Sources: DADB; HCDB
* States with three or fewer federal habeas corpus cases

























































































































































Error Rate by State
Average Reversal Rate
App. E-7
Table 11: Years from First Death Sentence
to First Non-Consensual Execution, 1973-2000
State Years From 1st Death Penalty to Execution
1.   Tennessee (2000)* 23
2.   Montana 22
3.   Nevada (1996)* 21
4.   Indiana 20
5.   Kentucky (1997)* 19
5.   Nebraska 19
7.   Arizona 18
7.   Maryland (1997)* 18
7.   Wyoming 18
10.  Illinois 17
10.  Washington 17
12.  Arkansas 16
12.  California 16
14.  Delaware 15
15.  Oklahoma 13
15.  Utah 13
17.  Georgia 10
17.  Missouri 10
19.  Mississippi 9
20.  Alabama 8
20.  South Carolina 8
20.  Texas 8
23.  North Carolina 7
23.  Virginia 7
24.  Florida 6




* The first non-consensual execution occurred after the end of the study period (i.e., after 1995) in
the year indicated.
** As of this publication there has not yet been a non-consensual execution.
Sources: DRCen; Death Row U.S.A., Winter 2000
App. E-8
Table 12: Average Years from Death Sentence to Execution, 1973-95
State Ave. Years from Sentence to Execution 
National Composite 9.00
1.   Montana 17.33
2.   Arizona 16.00
2.   Nebraska 16.00
4.   Oklahoma 14.67
5.   Illinois 13.38
6.   Pennsylvania 11.50
7.   Wyoming 11.50
8.   Arkansas 10.00
9.   Missouri 9.85
10.   Georgia 9.81
11. Alabama 9.44
12. North Carolina 9.40













          * Includes only consensual executions
Sources: DRCen; Death Row U.S.A., Winter 2000
App. E-9
Table 13: Proportion of 1973-1995 Death Sentences
Awaiting State Direct Review as of 1995































            Table 14: Death Sentences Per 1,000 Homicides, 1973-1995
State Death Sentences per 1,000 homicides





























Sources : DRCen; UCRDB
App. E-11
        Table 15: Death Sentences Per 100,000 Population, 1973-1995
State Death Sentences per 100,000 population     































      Table 16: Death Sentences Per 1,000 Prison Population, 1973-1995































    Table 17: Non-Consensual Executions Per 1,000 Homicides, 1973-1995
State NC Executions per 1,000 homicides





























Sources: Death Row, U.S.A., Winter 2000; UCRDB
App. E-14
Table 18: Non-Consensual Executions Per 100,000 Population, 1973-1995
State NC Executions per 100,000 population        













South Carolina 0.15 
Montana 0.13 
Utah 0.13 













Sources: Death Row, U.S.A., Winter 2000; USCen
App. E-15
Table 19: Non-Consensual Executions Per 1,000 Prison Population, 1973-1995





























Sources: Death Row, U.S.A., Winter 2000; PrisCen
App. E-16
            Table 20: Average Homicides Per 100,000 Population, 1973-1995































Table 21: Average Percent of Population Non-White,
1973-1995































Table 22: Index of Political Pressure on State Courts































Table 23: State Expenditures Per Capita on Courts, 1973-95































Table 24: State Court Criminal Cases Per 1,000 Population, 1973-95
State State Court Criminal Cases per 1,000 Population      































Table 26: Death Sentences Per 100,000 Population
by Region, 1973-1995 
Circuit Death Sentences per 100,000 Population
National Composite (death states) 3.90
Eleventh (AL, FL, GA) 7.09
Fifth (LA, MS, TX) 4.51
Tenth (CO, NM, OK, UT, WY) 3.09
Fourth (MD, NC, SC, VA) 2.89
Ninth (AZ, CA, ID, MO, NV, OR, WA) 2.60
Eighth (AK, MO, NE) 2.57
Seventh (IL, IN) 2.07
Sixth (KY, OH, TN) 2.03
Third (DE, NJ, PA) 1.70
         Source: DRCen; USCen
Table 27: Non-Consensual Executions Per 100,000 Population
by Region, 1973-1995 
Circuit Non-Consensual Executions per 
100,000 Population
National Composite (death states) 0.15
Fifth (LA, MS, TX) 0.53
Eleventh (AL, FL, GA) 0.32
Eighth (AK, MO, NE) 0.27
Fourth (MD, NC, SC, VA) 0.19
Tenth (CO, NM, OK, UT, WY) 0.08
Seventh (IL, IN) 0.04
Ninth (AZ, CA, ID, MO, NV, OR, WA) 0.02
Third (DE, NJ, PA) 0.01
Sixth (KY, OH, TN) 0.00
          Source: Death Row U.S.A., Winter 2000; USCen
App. E-22
Table 28: Percent of Death Sentences Carried Out (All Executions), 
1973-1995






























         Sources: DRCen; Death Row U.S.A., Winter 2000
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Table 29: Percent of Death Sentences 































         Sources: DRCen; Death Row U.S.A., Winter 2000







































































































































Percent of Death Sentences Carried Out
National Average
App. E-24
